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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction of appeals in civil actions across the country that
arise under the patent statutes.' During 1995, the Federal Circuit
decided 417 such appeals,2 and issued ninety-four opinions designat-
ed citable as precedent.' The work of the court this past year
1. See28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994) (vesting Federal Circuitwith exclusive jurisdiction in patent
appeals from final decisions of U.S. district courts and U.S. Court of Federal Claims, in decisions
of Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, in decisions
of Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and in decisions of U.S. International Trade
Commission).
2. Letter from the Honorable Francis X Gindhart, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, to Dr. Lawrence M. Sung (Jan. 16, 1996) (on file with The American
University Law Review).
3. Id. All dispositions of the Federal Circuit are precedential unless otherwise noted. FED.
CM R.P 47.6(a). The holdings of a precedential decision are binding on a subsequent panel
unless overruled by the court in banc. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.2,
215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 657,658 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (in banc) (stating appropriateness of adopting
body of law established by Court of Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Federal
Circuit decisions); cf. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1579, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382,
1386 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Where conflicting statements... appear in our precedent, the panel
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exemplifies the continued commitment of its judges and staff to the
nationwide uniformity and improved administration of the patent
laws.4 The history of the Federal Circuit likely will distinguish 1995,
however, based on three decisions of the court in banc. These cases
are Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,' Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co.,7 and Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.8
Organized into four major sections, this Article provides a compre-
hensive survey of the 1995 precedential Federal Circuit patent
decisions.9 In view of the issues raised in the majority of the cases
this year, including the in banc cases, the presentation of the recent
opinions occurs in a somewhat reverse order compared with past
annual patent area summaries published by The American University
Law Review. In the following Article, a consideration of patent
enforcement in the federal courts precedes a discussion of patent
application prosecution in the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("USPTO").
The Article begins in Part I with an overview of recent Federal
Circuit case law governing patent infringement and the available
defenses and remedies. The in banc decisions in Markman, Hilton
Davis, and Rite-Hite predominate here. Next, in Part II, the Article
is obligated to review the cases and reconcile or explain the statements, if possible. If not
reconcilable and if not merely conflicting dicta, the panel is obligated to follow the earlier case
law which is the binding precedent."). The assigned panel, however, unanimously may
determine at the time of issuance that an opinion would not significantly add to the law, and
therefore designate the opinion or order as nonprecedential. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b).
Furthermore, in certain circumstances the Federal Circuit may affirm the judgment of a trial
court or administrative agency without opinion. FED. CI. R. 36.
4. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. (96
Stat.) 11, 12 (describing legislative rationale behind establishment of U.S. Court of Appeals for
Federal Circuit with enactment of Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,
96 Stat. 25, 37 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295).
5. A majority of circuit judges in regular active service on a U.S. court of appeals may
order a hearing or rehearing before that court in banc. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). An in banc panel
consists of all active circuit judges plus any senior circuit judge who was a member of the
original panel deciding the case and who elects to participate. Id. Some legal authorities prefer
the term "en banc." The propriety of the terminology aside, this Article follows the language
of the authorizing statute and the Federal Circuit in its first decision. See id.; South Corp., 690
F.2d at 1370, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 658 (adopting in banc holdings of U.S. Court of Claims and
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals as binding precedent on Federal Circuit).
Accordingly, the term "in banc" appears throughout to specify decisions by the full court.
6. 52 F.3d 967,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384
(1996).
7. 62 F.3d 1512, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
8. 56 F.3d 1538, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
184 (1995).
9. The purpose of this Article is to provide neither an exhaustive consideration of the
patent law, nor a criticaljurisprudential analysis of the 1995 Federal Circuit patent law decisions.
To accommodate an interest in these topics, however, this Article refers to available treatises or
other published commentaries whenever appropriate.
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considers the more procedural aspects of patent enforcement through
litigation in the district courts and the Federal Circuit. The Article
then turns in Part III to a discussion of appeals from the USPTO
pertaining to the patentability of inventions. In Part IV, the Article
concludes with a brief account of apparent themes in certain opinions
of the Federal Circuit, including the dissents and concurrences. In
particular, this final portion highlights topics such as the light to a
jury determination of specific patent issues, and the proper degree of
judicial deference to USPTO determinations.
I. ENFORCING PATENT RIGHTS
This initial section reviews the precedential decisions relating to
patent infringement liability and remedies. The discussion of
substantive patent enforcement begins with the scope of patent
protection and the types of conduct that amount to infringement.
The presentation continues with the possible defenses to an infringe-
ment charge and ends with a listing of the forms of relief available to
a prevailing plaintiff patent holder."° Moreover, Part I spotlights the
three 1995 in banc decisions of the Federal Circuit and their impact
on the patent laws.
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.," the Federal Circuit
addressed whether the interpretation of a patent claim is a pure legal
conclusion within the exclusive province of the court.1 2 In a second
in banc decision, the court had another opportunity to define the
respective roles of judge and jury in the resolution of particular
patent law issues. The question raised in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co. 3 was whether the district court judge in a patent
infringement trial has discretion to preclude the jury from consider-
ation of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.1
4 In its third
in banc decision, Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,"5 the Federal Circuit
considered whether a patent holder who successfully has proven
10. A patent may issue to the inventor, the inventor's heirs, or an assignee. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(1) (1994). For simplicity, however, this Article uses the term "patent holder"
throughout to refer to those parties having legal title to a patent or standing to litigate matters
concerning that patent or both.
11. 52 F.3d 967,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), affid, 116S. Ct. 1384
(1996).
12. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,970-71,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1322 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
13. 62 F.3d 1512, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
14. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
15. 56 F.3d 1538, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
184 (1995).
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infringement may recover lost profits related to missed sales of certain
products, not covered by the patent-in-suit, which competed directly
with the defendant's infringing goods.
16
As the following case survey will show, Markman, Hilton Davis, and
Rite-Hite already have had a pronounced effect on patent practice.
The potential consequences of these in banc decisions have not
escaped the attention of the general public.17 In addition, the
constitutional issues raised by these three in banc cases appear to have
renewed the Supreme Court's interest in patent cases. 18
A. Infringement Liability
A United States patent is a government grant for a limited time of
exclusive rights to an invention. 9 One who engages without
permission in statutorily proscribed conduct relating to a patented
invention is liable, subject to available defenses, as an infringer.20
16. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1542,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1066 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
17. See, e.g., Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Tial, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1995, § 3
(Business), at 6 (noting that Markman was "landmark decision" because Federal Circuit held that
judges, not juries, should be responsible for defining scope of patents in patent trials); Teresa
Riordan, Substantial Questions LingerAfterA Ruling That Could Give Patent Holders More Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at D2 (commenting on response to Hilton Davis); Teresa Riordan, Patent
Court's Ruling Is Seen As Limiting Role of Juries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, § 1, at 41 (reviewing
"long-awaited decision" in Markman).
18. Since congressional inception of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the Supreme Court has
reviewed only a handful of patent cases. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent
Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALL. REV. 805, 820 n.58 (1988) (recognizing
that Supreme Court did not undertake its first review of patent appeal from Federal Circuit until
1986); Brian S. Tomko, Comment, Scripps OrAtlantic: The Federal Circuit Squares Off Over The
Scope of Product-By-Process Patents, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1693, 1693 n.2 (1995) (listing only four
Supreme Court cases since creation of Federal Circuit that concerned substantive patent law
issues). During 1995, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Federal Circuit on two
occasions to consider Seventh Amendment implications in patent cases. See Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 40 (1995), granting cert. to 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir.); American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 115 S. Ct. 2274, granting cert. to
In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, vacated, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995). The Court, however, later vacated
and remanded its grant of certiorari in Lockwood after the plaintiff patent holder filed a motion
in the district court to withdraw its demand for trial byjury. Lockwood, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995). In
1996, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hilton Davis. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co., 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996). If the frequency of Supreme Court review is an accurate
indicator, the relative significance of the in banc decisions is unmistakable.
19. The United States Constitution contemplates the statutory grant of intellectual property
rights. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cd. 8 (vesting Congress with power "(tbo promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). Title 35 of the United States Code sets
forth the statutory scheme for domestic patent protection. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-200
(1994) (providing for application and award of patents). In addition, the USPTO has
promulgated regulations concerning the prosecution of patent applications. See generally 37
C.F.R. §§ 1.31-1.378 (1995) (stating national processing provisions).
20. See infra notes 207-358 and accompanying text (discussing acts constituting patent
infringement).
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1. Scope of patent protection
Every patent concludes with at least one numbered paragraph
called a "claim."" The claim defines the patented invention.
Moreover, the claim sets forth the scope of the patent holder's legal
right to exclude others, during the patent term, from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the patented invention throughout the
United States, or from importing that invention into the United
States. 23  The correct interpretation of a claim is paramount in
virtually all patent-related matters.24 Indeed, judicial determinations
regarding the patentability, validity, or infringement of a patent claim
all rely on the same claim interpretation.25
a. Claim construction in general
This past year, the Federal Circuit in banc set forth specific
guidelines regarding proper claim construction.26 To determine the
legal scope of a patent claim, the court must decide what the words
used in the claim would have meant at the time of the invention to
someone having ordinary skill in the relevant technology.2 7 The claim
21. The specification of a United States patent contains several parts, namely a title, an
abstract, a summary of the invention, any drawings, and one or more claims. See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 1.71-1.77 (setting forth required elements and order of patent application). Although
technically part of the specification, a patent claim has heightened importance as the legally
recognized description of the invention. SeeAro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961) ("[T]he claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant
22. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01 (k) (6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter MPEP] ("35
U.S.C. 112 requires that the applicant shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject
matter which he or she regards as his or her invention. The portion of the application in which
he or she does this forms the claim or claims.").
23. See Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1285, 1290 (Fed. Cir.) ("[T]he claim ... sets the metes and bounds of the invention
entitled to the protection of the patent system."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 500 (1994); see also 35
U.S.C. § 154 (codifying Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809,
4983-85 (1994) and amending § 154 to include as infringing conduct unauthorized offer for sale
of patented invention in United States, or importation of patented invention into United States
afterJanuary 1, 1996).
24. The Federal Circuit has rejected the notion that claim construction and claim
interpretation are different. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 n.6, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) ("[I]n our view, the terms mean
one and the same thing in patent law."), a0fd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). This Article uses the
terms "claim construction" and "claim interpretation" interchangeably throughout.
25. See SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1468, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[T]he claims must be interpreted and given the same
meaning for purposes of both validity and infringement analyses.").
26. See infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text (discussing Markman holdings in detail).
27. SeeHoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 952 n.15, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936,
1939 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Ordinarily, the test for determining the meaning of a claim term
is from the vantage point of one skilled in the art.").
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language, the remaining portions of the patent specification, and the
patent prosecution history all serve as interpretative aids in this
exercise.2' Furthermore, claim interpretation is a question of law that
the trial judge in a patent infringement suit has an obligation to
decide alone.29 Perhaps most importantly, as a pure legal conclusion,
the district court's claim construction is subject to de novo review by
the Federal Circuit. °
i. Substantive concerns
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,"1 the Federal Circuit
resolved an apparent inconsistency in its precedent regarding the
respective roles ofjudge and jury in proper claim construction. 2 The
appellate court faced a jury's claim interpretation that seemingly
diverged from the trial judge's claim construction on post-trial
motions." The Federal Circuit held unequivocally that claim
construction is a purely legal conclusion, which falls exclusively within
the district court's province. 4 The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the
district court's judgment of noninfringement as a matter of law,
notwithstanding the jury verdict of infringement. 5
Markman had sued Westview alleging infringement of its patent to
an automated inventory system for monitoring articles of clothing
throughout the steps of commercial laundry and dry cleaning.16 The
claims of the patent recited an "inventory control and reporting
system" that could "localize spurious additions to inventory" and that
included, inter alia, a "means to maintain an inventory total."37 The
meaning of "inventory" was the crux of the case.' To inform the
28. ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1579, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1557, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
29. See infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text (discussing Markman holdings in detail).
30. See infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text (discussing Markman holdings in detail).
The ability of the Federal Circuit to state a proper claim construction on appeal without
deference to the conclusions or determinations of the district court facilitates a uniform
pronouncement of the true legal scope of a patent.
31. 52 F.3d 967, 34U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), affd, 116S. Ct. 1384
(1996).
32. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1329 (Fed. Cir.) (in banc), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
33. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
34. See id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (stating court's construction of claims is matter of
law reviewed de novo on appeal).
35. Id. at 988-89,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337, a/JgMarkman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
772 F. Supp. 1535, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1955 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
36. Id. at 971-72, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322-24. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Reissue
Patent No. 33,054, reissued from U.S. Patent No. 4,550,246. Id. at 971, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1322.
37. See id& at 972, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323 (reciting claim one of Markman invention).
38. Id. at 974-75, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325-26.
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meaning of "inventory," Markman introduced at trial the testimonies
of the inventor, a technical expert, and a patent law expert.39 These
individuals stated that one of ordinary skill in the art would not
necessarily have construed "inventory" to include articles of cloth-
ing.4°
The trial judge instructed the jury to construe the claims in view of
the patent documents from the perspective of those of ordinary skill
in the art.41 The jury found Westview liable for infringement on two
of Markman's claims.4 2 Notwithstanding the jury verdict, the district
court granted Westview's deferred motion for judgment as a matter
of law.43 The district court relied upon its own claim construction and
held that "inventory" included articles of clothing.4' The parties did
not dispute that even though Westview's accused system could register
transactions and cash totals, it could not maintain information
regarding particular articles of clothing.'4 The district court thus
entered judgment for Westview as a matter of law, based on the
absence of this claim limitation in the accused system.46
On appeal, Markman relied upon Federal Circuit precedent
holding that a district court should submit to the jury any underlying
factual disputes about meanings of claim terms.47 The Federal Circuit
in banc rejected Markman's contention, however, and affirmed the
district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law.48 In so ruling,
the court implicitly overruled precedent contrary to its present
holding that the district court alone must construe patent claims as
a matter of law.49 The appellate court reasoned that its holding was
entirely consistent with the fundamental general legal principle that
39. Id. at 973, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
40. Id at 983, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332-33.
41. Id. at 973, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
42. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
43. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
44. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
45. Id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
46. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
47. Id. at 973-74, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324-25.
48. I& at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
49. Id. at 976-77, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327-28 (citing as inconsistent precedent McGill
Inc. v.John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672,221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 944,948 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Bio-Rad
Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 614, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654, 661 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5, 8 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 657, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 992, 995 (Fed. Cir.
1986); H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 389, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1926, 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 832 F.2d 581, 584,
4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621, 1624 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg.
Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1550, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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"'the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the
court. '"
5 0
The Federal Circuit emphasized that placing sole responsibility for
claim construction with the trial judge did not deprive parties to a
patent infringement case of their Seventh Amendment right to trial
by jury.5" In addition, although the dissent, one of the concurring
opinions, and certain of the amici agreed with Markman's contention,
the majority opinion specifically discounted the argument that the
assignment of claim construction to the court's exclusive province
conflicted with Supreme Court precedent.52 The majority distin-
guished the cases cited by Markman as anachronistic or inapposite.58
Responding further to the dissenting and concurring opinions, the
majority used, as an analytical framework, the analogy of a patent to
a statute to support the judge's interpretation of patent claims, rather
than the analogy of a patent to a contract.54 Although the majority
recognized the inherent limitations of such analogies, it nevertheless
noted that general principles of statutory interpretation were germane
to patent claim construction cases.
55
In Markman, the Federal Circuit provided clear guidance to the
district courts about the relative significance of certain evidence
regarding the meaning of claim terms.56 The court embraced
precedent stating that proper claim interpretation derives from
consideration of the relevant patent-related documents.57 This
"intrinsic" evidence includes: (i) the patent itself, i.e., the specifica-
tion and the claims; and (ii) the prosecution history, i.e., the record
of proceedings before the USPTO.58 The court also approved the
examination of "extrinsic" evidence, e.g., expert and inventor
testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises, to inform the state of
the technology, or "prior art," at the time of the invention.59 The
50. Id. at 978, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
180, 186 (1805)).
51. Id. at 983-84, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
52. Id at 987-88, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336-37.
53. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336-37 (distinguishing Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
218 (1852), and Bischoffv. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869), upon which dissenting and
concurring opinions relied).
54. Id. at 987, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
55. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
56. See generally id at 979-83, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329-31 (describing evaluation of
evidence of record to interpret meaning of claims).
57. See id. at 979-80,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329-30 (citing Graham v.John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 33 (1966) (considering patent's prosecution history); Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United
States, 384 F.2d 391, 396-98, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 701-03 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (relying on
specification and included claims)).
58. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329-30.
59. Id. at 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
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Federal Circuit emphasized, however, that extrinsic evidence could
only be used to assist in the court's understanding of the patent, not
to clarify ambiguity in claim language, much less to vary or contradict
the meaning of claim terms.61 Specifically, the court noted that
evidence of the subjective intent of the inventor during claim drafting
deserves little or no probative weight in claim interpretation, unless
otherwise documented in the prosecution history. 1
Several matters remain unresolved after Markman. One such issue
concerns the respective roles of judge and jury in the interpretation
of a means-plus-function claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph six,
which involves a determination of equivalents.62 In addition, the
Seventh Amendment implications raised by the elimination of the
jury's role in claim construction have prompted review by the
Supreme Court.63 The Court granted certiorari specifically to answer
whether, "[i]n a patent infringement action for damages, [there is]
a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution of genuine factual disputes about the meaning of
a patent."' The Court heard oral arguments on January 8, 1996, in
this appeal.'
ii. Procedural concerns
The Federal Circuit's holding in Markman leaves no doubt that a
trial judge has an absolute and exclusive duty to construe indepen-
60. I at 981, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
61. See id. at 983, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332-33 (stating that testimony of inventor of
patent-in-suit and of someone of ordinary skill in art pertaining to proper claim construction
amounted only to legal opinion which court was not required to follow). "[T]he court has
complete discretion to adopt the expert legal opinion as its own, to find guidance from it, or
to ignore it entirely, or even to exclude it." Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332-33.
62. See id. at 977 n.8, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 n.8 ("[Tihe issue of construction of
means-plus-function claim limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6... is not before us today,
[and] we express no opinion on the issue whether a determination of equivalents under § 112,
para. 6 is a question of law or fact."). For an insightful discussion of the law concerning § 112,
16, see Rick D. Nydegger, Traversing the Section 112, Paragraph Six Field of Land Mines: Does In
re Donaldson Adequately Defuse the Problems? (Part I), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 947
(1994) and Rick D. Nydegger, Traversing the Section 112, Paragraph Six Field of Land Mines: Does
In re Donaldson Adequately Defuse the Problems? (Part II), 77J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 30
(1995).
63. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 40 (1995), granting cert. to 52 F.3d
967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir.).
64. Robert C. Scheinfeld, Markman Issues Ready for Supreme Court Review, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 15,
1995, at 3.
65. Id.
On April 23, 1996, after the submission of this Article, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Federal Circuit's decision in Markman. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384
(1996). The unanimous decision held that the relegation of claim construction exclusively to
thejudge did not violate the Seventh Amendment and, moreover, fostered consistency in patent
infringement case resolution, a goal that the Federal Circuit was established to achieve.
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dently the claims of a patent-in-suit.66 Furthermore, in a jury trial,
the judge has the additional responsibility of instructing the jury on
proper claim interpretation.67 Various procedural questions remain
unanswered, however. For example, the Federal Circuit did not
specifically opine on whether a district court may submit claim
interpretation issues to the jury for advisory opinions pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c).1 While this approach seems
proper so long as the district court provides some indication that it
has met its obligation of independent claim construction, the issue
has yet to be tested on appeal. In addition, procedural complications
can arise when a district court defers involvement by submitting claim
interpretation to the jury and later rules as a matter of law on
post-trial motions. Difficulty occurs if the trial judge adopts the jury's
claim construction in its entirety without any indication of further
independent analysis. In such instances, the Federal Circuit may be
unable to ascertain whether the trial judge has truly construed the
claims independently.
In any event, pre-trial hearings on claim construction have taken
place in post-Markman district court litigation.69 While such hearings
are perhaps a focused method for trial judges to discharge their claim
construction obligations, the actual efficiency of such a procedure has
been controverted.7" The timing of district courts' claim construc-
tion aside, actual jury consideration of a proper claim construction
will apparently support the verdict, regardless of the source of that
interpretation.
71
In Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 2 the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court's judgment of noninftingement as a matter of law,
notwithstanding the jury verdict of infringement. 3 Although the
66. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (explaining that judicial
interpretation of patent claims is matter of law to be decided by court on consideration of
record).
67. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 39(c) (providing that "[i]n all actions not triable of right by ajury
the court ... may try any issue with an advisoryjury").
69. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 846, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1066 (D. Del. 1995); Lucas Aerospace Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890
F. Supp. 329, 331-32, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235, 1237-38 (D. Del.), modfied, 899 F. Supp. 1268
(D. Del. 1995).
70. John J. Kirby, Jr. & TerrenceJ. Connolly, In the Wake of Marknan, LEGAL TIMES, Dec.
11, 1995, Special Report, at 21; see Lucas, 890 F. Supp. at 332 n.3, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238
n.3 (explaining that Markman creates administrative problems by requiring additional time and
jury hiatus).
71. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text (discussing Laitram in detail).
72. 62 F.3d 1388, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
73. Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 62 F.3d 1388,1395,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206,1211 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), revk'32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602 (E.D. La. 1994).
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district court submitted the issue of claim interpretation to the jury
in the form of special interrogatories, the court itself eventually
construed the claims by ruling on NEC's motion for judgment of
noninfringement as a matter of law.74 The procedural propriety of
the district court's actions, therefore, was not an issue on appeal. 75
Similar to its review in Markman, the Federal Circuit treated the jury's
claim interpretation as an advisory determination and focused, in its
de novo review, on the propriety of the district court's claim construc-
tion.76 Contrary to Markman, however, the Federal Circuit conclud-
ed in Laitram that the district court's claim interpretation was
incorrect, whereas the jury's claim construction was correct.77 The
appellate court further determined that in view of the jury's proper
claim interpretation, substantial evidence supported the jury finding
of literal infringement.7 s The Federal Circuit thus remanded the
case to the district court with instructions to reinstate the jury's
verdict.
79
Laitram had sued NEC alleging infringement of its patent to a
letter-quality, electro-optical printer using photosensitive paper.80
The district court asked the jury to construe the patent claims in
special interrogatories."s Thejury retumed a verdict against NEC for
literal infringement.8 2 On NEC's motion for judgment of nonin-
fringement as a matter of law, the district court undertook an
independent claim construction.83 The district court decided that
the jury had erred in interpreting the claims and granted NEC's
motion. 4
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court's post-trial
claim construction was substantively flawed.' The district court's
independent claim interpretation apparently contained inconsistent
underlying determinations.86 In any event, the Federal Circuit
74. Id. at 1394, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
75. See id. 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210 (explaining that claim construction is legal
determination solely within court's province).
76. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
77. Id. at 1394-95, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210-11.
78. Id at 1395, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
79. M, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
80. Id. at 1389-91,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206-08. The patent-in-suitwas Reexamined U.S.
Patent No. BI 3,952,311. Id at 1389, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
81. Id. at 1391-92, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
82. Id at 1392, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
83. 1, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
84. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
85. IdM at 1394,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210 (explaining trial court's conclusion that NEC
printers could not literally infringe claims as inexplicable and erroneous).
86. M, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210 (stating that trial court contradicted its previous claim
determination by holding that claims at issue did not cover strobed printing, whereas jury
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decided that the jury correctly construed the claim and properly
applied this construction to find infringement 7 The appellate court
thus implicitly held that if the district court discharges its obligation
of making an independent claim construction and if the jury
ultimately has the benefit of a proper claim construction to which to
apply evidence of infringement, the source of that proper construc-
tion is irrelevant.88
b. Claim construction in certain contexts
On several other occasions during 1995, the Federal Circuit
considered the issue of claim construction. The court provided
general guidance regarding the significance of preamble language, 9
prosecution history,90 and composition recitations." In addition,
the Federal Circuit addressed the meanings of specific terms used in
patent claims, such as "at least approximately,"92 "solution-phase,"93
"skinless,"94 and "into said bend. 95
i. Preamble language
In some patents, the claims begin with introductory language,
known as a preamble.96 For example, a preamble may specify an
intended use of the invention.97 While interpretation of a claim
preamble is simply a part of claim construction as a whole, the inquiry
applied correct claim construction in reaching verdict of infringement).
87. Id. at 1394, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
88. Id at 1395, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
89. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (discussing Bell Communications
Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)).
90. See infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (reviewing Southwall Technologies, Inc.
v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
515 (1995)).
91. See infra notes 122-46 and accompanying text (considering Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc.
v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
92. See infra notes 149-70 and accompanying text (discussing Quantum Corp. v. Rodime,
PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1162 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
93. See infra notes 171-87 and accompanying text (analyzing Gentex Corp. v. Donnelly
Corp., 69 F.3d 5277, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1667 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
94. See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text (reviewing Pall Corp. v. Micron
Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
95. See infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text (considering Hoover Group, Inc. v.
Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 66 F.3d 299, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
96. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(explaining that preamble may state invention's purpose or intended use and may represent
"additional structural limitation or mere introductory language").
97. Id, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673.
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into whether the preamble constitutes a limitation to the claim
depends on the facts of a particular case.9
8
In Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications
Corp.,99 the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that no precise test exists to
determine when words in a preamble constitute a claim limita-
ion."° The court agreed with the district court's holding that the
preamble language, incorporated in the body of the claim, constituted
a limitation.1'' The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that the
district court's interpretation of this preamble-derived language was
erroneous." 2 The appellate court thus vacated the district court's
summary judgment of noninfringement.
0 3
Bellcore had sued Vitalink alleging infringement of its patent to a
computer local area network through which source devices can
broadcast data packets along tree paths to destination devices.
°4
Vitalink counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of
noninfringement 0 5 The district court granted Vitalink's motion for
summaryjudgment of noninfringement based on Vitalink's proposed
construction of one of Bellcore's patent claims. 10
Absent implications regarding the respective roles ofjudge and jury,
this appeal represented a straightforward application of the claim
construction principles of Markman. 7 The Federal Circuit held
that the district court had improperly read an additional limitation
into the claim by interpreting the claim language in isolation from
the teaching of the specification. 8 Given this erroneous claim
construction, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court's summary
judgment of noninfringement and remanded for factual consider-
98. See In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
("Whether a preamble of intended purpose constitutes a limitation to the claims is ... a matter
to be determined on the facts of each case in view of the claimed invention as a whole.").
99. 55 F.3d 615, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
100. SseBell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615,
621, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816, 1821 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("We have long eschewed the use of an
absolute rule according or denying all preambles limiting effect, having recognized that one
cannot determine a preamble's effect except by reference to the specific claim of which it is a
component.").
101. d,, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1821 (describing claim as limited in light of specification).
102. Id. at 621-22, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
103. 1&. at 623, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822.
104. 1&t at 618, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,706,080. Id. at 616, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
105. It. at 618, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
106. 1i at 618-19, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818-19.
107. See supra notes 31-71 and accompanying text (discussing in detail Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), affd, 116
S. Ct. 1384 (1996)).
108. Bell Ummunication, 55 F.3d at 621-22, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
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ations of infringement, either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents.1 9
ii. Prosecution history
The prosecution history of a patent consists of the entire record of
proceedings before the USPTO." 0 In Markman, the Federal Circuit
held that proper claim construction requires consideration of, inter
alia, arguments and amendments made during the prosecution of a
patent application. 1 '
In Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.," 2 the Federal
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Markman that courts should construe
claims in light of the patent prosecution history.'18 The court
further emphasized that resort to the prosecution history as an
interpretative aid in claim construction stands wholly apart from its
use as an estoppel to limit infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents." 4  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
summary judgment of noninfringement.11
5
Southwall had sued Cardinal alleging infringement of its patent to
heat-reflective coating for windows."' The district court concluded
that the prosecution history of Southwall's reexamined patent
required that the "sputter-deposited dielectric" limitation recited in
the claims result from a one-step deposition process." 7  Examina-
tion of the prosecution history revealed that Southwall had amended
its claims in response to the patent examiner's obviousness rejec-
109. Id. at 623, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822.
110. SeeAutogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697,
702 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (holding that patent's prosecution history, or file wrapper, is part of patent);
Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293, 296
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that prosecution history, sometimes called "file wrapper and contents,"
of patents consists of entire record of proceedings before USPTO); cf.Jonsson v. Stanley Works,
903 F.2d 812, 818,14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1863, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (providing that prosecution
history of original application is also relevant to understanding scope of claims issuing from
continuation-in-part application).
111. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (stating that claim should be
construed upon consideration of patent's prosecution history).
112. 54 F.3d 1570,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 515 (1995).
113. Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1673, 1676-77 (Fed. Cir.) (holding, as in Markman, that infringement analysis is two-step
process, first step of which requires court's interpretation of meaning of claim as matter of law,
necessarily viewed in light of patent prosecution history), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 515 (1995).
114. Id. at 1578, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
115. Id. at 1584, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684, aff'g No. C-92-0327-DLJ, 1994 WL 118008
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 1994).
116. Id. at 1573-74, 34U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674-75. The patent-in-suitwas Reexamined U.S.
Patent No. B1 4,799,745. Id. at 1573, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
117. Id. at 1575, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
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don.118  In support of this amendment, Southwall specifically
explained that the invention was patentably distinguishable over the
prior art because the recited dielectric layers could be deposited
directly."9 In view of Cardinal's two-step process, the district court
held that Cardinal's product could not infringe literally Southwall's
patent as a matter of law.'20 The Federal Circuit agreed entirely
with the district court's reasoning.'
iii. Composition recitations
In Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,1 22 the Federal
Circuit held that a composition claim covers any product which, at
any time, contained the recited elements of the claimed composi-
tion. 23  The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court's
instruction to the jury on the proper meaning of the claims was
erroneous. 24  Moreover, the appellate court held, as a matter of
law, that Exxon failed to prove infringement of the properly con-
strued claims." The Federal Circuit thus reversed the district
court's entry of judgment on the jury verdict of infringement.
1 26
Exxon had sued Lubrizol alleging infringement of its patent to
additives that enhanced the performance of lubricating oils for motor
vehicle engines. 27 The claims of the Exxon patent recited a
lubricating oil composition containing five specific ingredients.1
2
1
At trial, Lubrizol did not contest Exxon's assertion that Lubrizol
created its infringing product by combining the five Exxon ingredi-
ents. 29 Lubrizol argued, however, that the proper claim interpreta-
tion required the presence of all five ingredients in the final
ready-to-use product."s Furthermore, Lubrizol contended that two of
the five ingredients reacted immediately when combined during the
manufacturing process, so that the final Lubrizol product lacked one
118. I& at 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
119. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
120. Id at 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
121. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
122. 64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
123. Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1557-58, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
124. Id. at 1558, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
125. Id. at 1560, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806 (stating that Exxon did not prove presence
of required quantity of ashless dispersant in Lubrizol's products).
126. Id. at 1561-62,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808, revuB0 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813 (S.D. Tex.
1994).
127. Id at 1555-56, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802-03. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,867,890. Id at 1555, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
128. See id. at 1562 (setting forth Claim one of Exxon's '890 patent as appendix).
129. Id. at 1558, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804-05.
130. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
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of the ingredients specified by Exxon.1 3' Therefore, according to
Lubrizol, its final product did not infringe Exxon's patent.
1 3
2
In response, Exxon offered expert testimony disputing the effect of
Lubrizol's asserted chemical reaction.1 33  Exxon presented no
evidence, however, that Lubrizol's accused final products actually
contained all five ingredients."3 Instead, Exxon relied heavily on
its construction of its patent claims as defining a recipe, 15 which
Lubrizol admitted following. 6 The district court agreed with
Exxon's claim interpretation and charged the jury accordingly."'
The jury rendered a verdict against Lubrizol for willful infringe-
ment.1'0
As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit criticized the district court's
failure to undertake its own claim construction.1 39  The appellate
court emphasized that rather than simply adopting one of the parties'
proffered claim interpretations to instruct the jury, the trial judge has
a duty to construe the claims independently and then instruct the jury
on that interpretation. 4 The appellate court admonished against
merely choosing between the parties' proffered claim constructions
because such interpretations typically favored one side improper-
ly1
41
In any event, the Federal Circuit held that the district court's jury
charge was legally erroneous." Neither of the parties' proffered
claim interpretations was entirely correct."~ The court concluded
that the claims of the Exxon patent were product claims, the proper
construction of which encompassed any product that, at any time,
contained the five recited ingredients." In view of the trial pro-
ceedings, the Federal Circuit further held that Exxon did not avail
131. Id. at 1559, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
132. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (describing Lubrizol's argument that no ashless
dispersant existed in Lubrizol's products after ingredient blending).
133. Id. at 1559, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805-06.
134. Id. at 1558, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804-05.
135. Id. at 1557, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803-04.
136. Id. at 1558, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804 (explaining that Lubrizol's view of claims
depended on temporal limitation when claims related only to composition of end products).
137. Id. at 1555, 1557, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802, 1804.
138. Id. at 1555, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
139. Id. at 1556, 1558, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803, 1805.
140. Id, at 1556, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
141. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
142. Id. at 1558, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
143. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805-06. Lubrizol was correct in considering Exxon's claims
to read on product, although its interpretation was too narrow. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1804-05. On the other hand, Exxon correctly interpreted its claims not to be time-limited,
although Exxon erred in failing to offer evidence analyzing composition of Lubrizol's end
products. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804-05.
144. Id. at 1557-58, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
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itself of ample opportunity to present evidence that Lubrizol's
products met the limitations of Exxon's patent claims at some time
during the manufacturing process." The Federal Circuit thus
concluded that Lubrizol was entitled to a judgment of
noninfringement as a matter of law,'4
iv. Specific claim language
On several occasions during 1995, the Federal Circuit discussed the
meanings of certain terms in the context of the specific claims in
which they appeared. The favored interpretation of a claim is one
that sustains the validity of that claim. 47 Courts may not, however,
redraft claims to uphold their validity." s
In Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC,4 9 the Federal Circuit held that
certain amendments made during a reexamination proceeding
constituted an impermissible broadening of the claims, thus rendering
those claims invalid.' The court specifically concluded that
Rodime's amendment of its claims, changing the track density of "at
least 600" tracks per inch ("tpi") to "at least approximately 600" tpi,
broadened the scope of the claims.' Furthermore, this broadening
amendment during reexamination under 35 U.S.C. § 305 rendered
the claims invalid.'52 The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the district
court's summary judgment of invalidity.
53
Rodime requested reexamination of its patent to computer disk
drives that accommodated 3.5 inch diskettes capable of comparable
performance to 5.25 inch diskettes. 54 In addition to making
numerous other amendments, Rodime changed language regarding
the data storage capacity of the claimed invention by adding the term
145. Id. at 1560-61, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806-07.
146. Id. at 1561, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
147. Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 937 n.5, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 485 n.5
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
148. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 701
(Ct. Cl. 1967).
149. 65 F.3d 1577, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1162 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
150. Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1584-85, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1162,
1168-69 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
151. Id. at 1582, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
152. Id. at 1584, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168. Section 305 permits an applicant to amend
previously filed claims and to add new claims to distinguish an invention. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1168; cf. 35 U.S.C. § 305 (1994) ("No proposed amended or new claim enlarging the
scope of a claim of the patent will be permitted in a reexamination proceeding.").
153. Quantum Corp., 65 F.3d at 1585, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169, affig851 F. Supp. 1382,
33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458 (D. Minn. 1994).
154. Id. at 1578-79, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163. The patent-in-suit was Reexamined U.S.
Patent No. BI 4,638,383. Id. at 1578, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
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"approximately" to the track density limitation.155 The reexamined
patent issued with this alteration.156
Five years later, Quantum filed suit against Rodime for a declaratory
judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, and noninfringement. l' v
Rodime counterclaimed for infringement.5 8 Quantum filed a
motion for summary judgment of invalidity, arguing that the
amendment to track density during reexamination broadened the
scope of the claims in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 305.159 The district
court construed the reexamined claims and concluded that "at least
approximately 600 tpi" was broader in scope than "at least 600
tpi."16 Accordingly, the district court granted Quantum's mo-
tion.1
6 1
On appeal, Rodime contended that those skilled in the art would
have understood that routine manufacturing variances rendered track
density values imprecise.162 In other words, one skilled in the art
would have interpreted "600 tpi" to mean "approximately 600
tpi."'' According to Rodime, the amendment to the track density
limitation during reexamination was, therefore, a mere clarifica-
tion.1" The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that
Rodime's evidence did not extend to how one skilled in the art would
have interpreted "at least 600 tpi."'1 Absent such a showing, the
appellate court construed the claim language according to its ordinary
meaning." The Federal Circuit concluded that "at least 600 tpi"
specified an exact floor of 600 whereas "at least approximately 600
tpi" defined an imprecise range starting slightly below 600.167 The
reexamined claims thus covered more than the original claims.16
155. ML at 1579, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-64.
156. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
157. ML, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
158. M, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
159. Md, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (contending that addition of"approximately" would
serve to cover certain disk drives that were not covered by original patent).
160. Id. at 1580, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (looking to ordinary meaning of disputed
claim limitations).
161. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
162. Id. at 1581, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165 (stating that density value is understood to
represent range of possible track densities).
163. ML, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
164. IL at 1580, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
165. Id. at 1581, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66 (reasoning that addition of"approximately"
was substantive change).
166. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66 (citing dictionary definitions of "at least" and
approximately").
167. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
168. Id. at 1581-82, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
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In addition, the appellate court considered, as a matter of first
impression, the effect of § 305's proscription against claim broaden-
ing. 9 Despite the absence of guidance in the statutory language,
the legislative history of the statute, and the court's own precedent,
the Federal Circuit concluded that a violation of § 305 rendered
invalid the claims in their entirety, not simply those portions of the
claims representing the broadened scope.'
In Gentex Corp. v. Donnelly Corp.,' the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's summary judgment of noninfringement, holding
that no genuine issue of infringement existed where the accused
device clearly lacked a particular limitation of the properly construed
claims. 72 Gentex had sued Donnelly alleging infringement of its
patent to an automobile rear view mirror that could darken in
response to glare from headlights behind the vehicle. 7 3 In particu-
lar, the claims recited a "solution-phase" electrochromic element in
the mirror that reversibly changed color upon low voltage electric
current triggered by rear vehicle sensors.
74
Gentex had previously sued Donnelly on the same patent, alleging
infringement by different Donnelly mirror models.7 5 The district
court in the earlier case held that the Gentex patent was neither
invalid nor unenforceable. Because Donnelly had not asserted
noninfringement as a defense, the district court awarded damages and
enjoined further infringement.'
7
Shortly afterwards, Donnelly began marketing a new mirror model
using an electrochromic element in solid film instead of in solution
phase. 7 Gentex's complaint in this case alleged specifically that
the new Donnelly mirrors were really no different from Donnelly's
earlier infringing mirrors. In response, Donnelly counterclaimed
for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity and
169. Id at 1582-83, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
170. I& at 158-84, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168 (reasoning that § 305 explicitly prohibits
any broadening of claims during reexamination).
171. 69 F.3d 527, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1667 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
172. Gentex Corp. v. Donnelly Corp., 69 F.3d 527, 530, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1667, 1670
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that patent only covered "solution phase" reactions and accused
device's reactions occurred in solid film), aff'g31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1189 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
173. Id. at 528, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
5,128,799. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
174. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
175. See id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668 (citing Gentex Corp. v. Donnelly Corp., 27
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1714 (W.D. Mich. 1993)).
176. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
177. Id. at 528-29, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
178. Id. at 529, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
179. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
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later moved for summary judgment."8 The district court construed
the claims of the Gentex patent as limited to devices in which the
electrochemical reactions occurred in a liquid environment. 18 '
Because Donnelly's new mirrors employed electrochromic elements
in a solid film, the district court concluded as a matter of law that
Donnelly could not infringe.82
The Federal Circuit embraced the district court's opinion. 83 The
appellate court further rejected Gentex's technical arguments on
appeal" and held that the trial judge properly construed the claims
in view of the specification." Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted
that the district court's interpretation of "solution-phase" in the claims
was consistent with the inventor's testimony.186 The appellate court
thus discerned no error in the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of Donnelly. 7
In Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalkraft, Inc.,"ta the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court's judgment of infringement.8 9
The district court found infringement after the liability phase of a
bifurcated bench trial."9 Hoover had sued Custom alleging in-
fringement of two of its patents to metal tanks of a particular
configuration used for liquid storage and transport.19'
The Federal Circuit held that the district court improperly
construed the claims of one of the Hoover patents to cover bends in
the bottom plate of the tank that resembled either a "V" or an
inverted "V."192 The court concluded that nothing in the patent's
specification or prosecution history, nor in the prior art, suggested
that the recited limitation "into said bend and along said bend"
meant anything other than V-shaped. 93 The district court found
180. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
181. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
182. I-, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
183. Id. at 530, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
184. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670 (describing technical arguments that accused devices
function in same way as solution-phase devices).
185. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669 (stating that use of"solution-phase" in specification
limited patent claims to devices where electrochemical reactions occur entirely in liquid).
186. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
187. IM., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
188. 66 F.3d 299, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
189. Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 66 F.3d 299,305,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1101, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
190. Id at 303, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
191. Id at 301, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (noting that tanks in question possessed sloped
bottoms to facilitate drainage of contents). The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent Nos. 4,840,284
and 4,785,958. Id.
192. Id. at 304, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104-05.
193. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104-05.
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that the bottom plates of all accused Custom tanks had inverted
V-shaped bends." In view of the clear absence in the accused devices
of a limitation of the properly construed claims, the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's finding of infringement. 195
In Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.,96 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment of infringement after a bench
trial. 97 Although the Federal Circuit initially decided to hear this
appeal in banc, the resolution of the claim interpretation issue in
Markman facilitated the return of Pall to the original panel for
disposition. 9 Pall had alleged that Micron's Nylon 66 and Nylon
46 products infringed Pall's patent to nylon microfiltration mem-
branes suitable for filtering microorganisms or other microscopic
contaminants."m The claims of the patent required that the nylon
membrane be "skinless."2°" With respect to its accused Nylon 66
membranes, Micron defended against infringement on the sole
ground that photomicrographs of the Nylon 66 membranes revealed
a "skin" layer."' Pall, however, contended that the "skinless"
limitation was a performance characteristic describing a surface that
does not impede filtration flow.
202
Both the district court and the Federal Circuit agreed with Pall's
interpretation of "skinless. 203 Based on technical evidence present-
ed at trial, the district court found that Micron's Nylon 66 membranes
contained all the relevant performance characteristics of a "skinless"
membrane, and thus literally infringed Pall's patent.2t 0 The Federal
Circuit discerned no clear error in the district court's finding. 5
The appellate court did further consider whether the Micron Nylon
46 membranes infringed the Pall patent, however, focusing on
194. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104-05 (noting distinction between accused metal tanks,
bottoms of which were inverted V-shaped, and patented tanks with upright V-shaped bottoms).
195. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105 (stating that finding of infringement could not be
supported where accused devices do not have same structure as patented devices).
196. 66 F.3d 1211, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
197. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,
1228 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'g792 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mass. 1992).
198. Id. at 1214 n.1, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226 n.1.
199. Id. at 1215, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,340,479. Id
200. Id at 1216, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
201. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
202. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
203. Id. at 1217, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228 (agreeing that term "skinless" refers to "a
performance characteristic").
204. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
205. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
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whether prosecution history estoppel precluded a finding of infringe-





Patent infringement liability arises with the unauthorized manufac-
ture, use, offer for sale, or sale in the United States of a patented
invention, or importation of that invention into the United States.
207
The determination of infringement is a two-step inquiry, beginning
with a proper claim construction as set forth in Markman.2 0 ' The
second step of the infringement analysis involves the comparison of
the accused product or process to the properly construed claim.0 9
A patent holder alleging infringement has the burden of proving at
trial by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused infringer's
product or process contains every limitation of at least one of the
asserted claims of the patent, either literally or by equivalence.210
Infringement is a question of fact that the Federal Circuit reviews for
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict,2 ' or for clear
error where the trial judge sits as the fact-finder. 12
206. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228 (explaining that infringement may be proved under
doctrine of equivalents when there is insubstantial difference between claimed invention and
accused product); see infra notes 303-15 and accompanying text (discussing infringement by
Micron's accused Nylon 46 products).
207. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994) (codifying Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4983-85 (1994)).
Congress amended § 154 to include as infringing conduct the unauthorized offer for sale of a
patented invention in the United States, or the importation of a patented invention into the
United States after January 1, 1996. For a statistical study of the Federal Circuit's dispositions
in appeals from infringement findings, see Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the
Federal Circuit's Patent Decisions: 1982-1994,5 FED. Cut. BJ. 151, at tbl. 5 (1995) (covering period
from Oct. 1, 1982, to Mar. 15, 1994).
208. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., 15 F.3d 1573,1576,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1836, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that claim must be properly construed to determine scope
and meaning).
209. Lemeison v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1284,1287
(Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 976 (1993).
210. Conroy v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1573, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1373, 1374-75
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that "[t]o support an infringement determination, an accused device
must embody exactly each claim limitation or its equvalent."); Key Mfg., Inc. v. Microdot, Inc.,
925 F.2d 1444, 1449, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1806, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that "the
patentee must prove that the accused device embodies every limitation in the claim, either
literally or by a substantial equivalent").
211. See Lmelson, 968 F.2d at 1207, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288 ("[The substantial evidence
test] requires us to decide for ourselves whether reasonable jurors viewing the evidence as a
whole could have found the facts needed to support the verdict in light of the applicable law.").
212. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) ("A finding is
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.").
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a. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
A literal infringement results when every limitation recited in a
patent claim is present exactly in an accused product or process.213
A finding of infringement does not, however, require that the accused
product or process embody every limitation of the claim literally.
2 14
Even when a patent holder cannot prove literal infringement, a
finding of infringement may be appropriate under the doctrine of
equivalents.215
In Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,
216
the Supreme Court set forth a tripartite test to decide infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.217 The Court held that the
absence of literal infringement did not preclude a finding of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents when the accused
device "performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result."21 ' This holding soon received
shorthand reference as the function-way-result test of Graver Tank.2" 9
Moreover, the function-way-result test achieved wide application in the
lower courts as the definitive test of equivalence, despite the Court's
admonition against viewing equivalency as "the prisoner of a
formula."220 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's treatment of the
doctrine of equivalents as equitable in nature spawned controversy
over whether this doctrine is a matter of equity applicable at the
court's discretion.22' Even Federal Circuit precedent appeared to
raise questions regarding the nature and proper application of the
doctrine of equivalents. 2
213. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282, 230
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45,46 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d
1563, 1570, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 676, 681 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
214. See infra notes 216-50 and accompanying text (considering Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,608 (1950), and Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson
Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted 116 S.
Ct. 1014 (1996).
215. See infra notes 216-50 and accompanying text (explaining doctrine of equivalents and
cases decided under this doctrine).
216. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
217. Id. at 608.
218. Id (stating that essence of doctrine is that one may not practice fraud on patent).
219. Cf International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg., 991 F.2d 768, 774, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1588, 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that there may be instances in which function-way-
result test is satisfied but when facts may not justify application of doctrine of equivalents).
220. Graver, 339 U.S. at 609.
221. International Visual Corp., 991 F.2d at 774,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1458-59
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
222. SeeHilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521,35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1647-48 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996) (explaining
1996] 1553
THE AMERIC.AN UNmVRSITy LAW REIEW [Vol. 45:1529
In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,223 the Federal
Circuit clarified the law regarding infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents.224 This case presented the Federal Circuit with
another opportunity to consider the respective roles of the judge and
jury in patent cases.21 The in banc court held unequivocally that
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a factual issue for
the jury to resolve after proper instructions on claim interpreta-
tion.22' The Federal Circuit stated that a district court judge in a
jury trial on patent infringement may not withhold from the jury
consideration of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.227
In so ruling, the appellate court foreclosed any argument that
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a matter of equity
applicable at the discretion of the judge.22  The Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's entry of judgment on the jury verdict of
infringement.
229
Hilton Davis had sued Warner-Jenkinson alleging infringement of
its patent to the ultrafiltration-mediated purification of commercial
dyes for food and drug use.2" °  The claims of the patent recited,
inter alia, parameters for uitrafiltration through a membrane at "a
hydrostatic pressure of approximately 200 to 400 p.s.i.g., at a pH from
approximately 6.0 to 9.0.," 231 At trial, Hilton Davis presented
evidence that the accused Warner-jenkinson ultrafiltration process
operated at a pressure between 200 to nearly 500 p.s.i.g. and
sometimes at a pH of 5.0.212 The jury found that Warner-Jenkinson
had infringed Hilton Davis' patent under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.
233
that Federal Circuit's allusions to equity in doctrine of equivalents is reference to general
fairness).
223. 62 F.3d 1512, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014
(1996).
224. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
225. See infra notes 1384-1406 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit's holdings
regarding roles ofjudge and jury in patent cases).
226. Hilton Davis, 62 F.2d at 1520-21, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
227. Id. at 1522, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648 ("The trial judge does not have discretion to
choose whether to apply the doctrine of equivalents when the record shows no literal
infringement.").
228. Id. at 1521, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
229. Id. at 1529, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
230. Id. at 1516, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,560,746. Id. at 1515, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
231. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
232. Id. at 1524-25, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650-51.
233. Id. at 1516, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (noting thatjury only awarded Hilton Davis
20% of requested damages).
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On appeal, Warner-Jenkinson argued that the doctrine of equiva-
lents is an equitable remedy available only upon a suitable threshold
showing of the equities by the patent holder, e.g., copying or piracy
by the accused infringer.3 Furthermore, Warner-Jenkinson assert-
ed that, as a matter of equity, infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is a legal issue for the court, and not the jury, to de-
cide.213  The Federal Circuit in banc, however, rejected
Warner-Jenkinson's contentions. 236 The court held that a showing
of culpable conduct is not necessary for, much less a prerequisite to,
a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 37 The
Federal Circuit thus affirmed thejury verdict of infringement, despite
the literal pressure and pH differences from the claimed inven-
tion." The court relied on substantial evidence demonstrating that
the Warner-Jenkinson ultrafiltration process performed the same
function, in an equivalent way, to achieve the same result as the
patented invention.
23 9
The Federal Circuit clearly set forth that infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents exists where the differences between the
claimed invention and the accused product or process are objectively
insubstantial.2' The court noted that it may often be enough to
rely solely on the function-way-result test to establish insubstantiality,
and thus equivalency.24 ' In newer technologies, however, the court
recognized the possibility that the function-way-result test would not
suffice to illuminate the substantiality of the differences.21 The
Federal Circuit noted that important factors not considered in the
function-way-result, test included: evidence of known interchange-
ability of the accused and claimed elements; copying; designing
around; and independent development.2' Furthermore, the court
stated that the proper objective standard for assessing the substantiali-
ty of differences is the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art.2 "
234. Id at 1522-23, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
235. I at 1523, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
236. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
237. Id. at 1519, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646 (asserting that doctrine of equivalents does
not rely on subjective awareness or intent of accused infringer).
238. Id. at 1528-29, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
239. Id. at 1524-25, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650-51.
240. Id. at 1518, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
241. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
242. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (noting that new technologies are more sophisticated
than those in existence when function-way-result test arose).
243. Id. at 1519-20, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47.
244. Id. at 1519, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
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Still unclear after Hilton Davis is whether evidence of
interchangeability, copying, or designing around would be sufficient,
in the absence of a function-way-result analysis, to support a finding
of equivalency.24 According to its holding in Malta v. Schulmerich
Carillons, Inc.,246 the Federal Circuit requires a patent holder alleg-
ing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents to assert with
particularity why or how the accused device is equivalent to the
claimed invention.247  What constitutes a sufficient showing under
Malta after Hilton Davis remains uncertain.248
Warner-Jenkinson petitioned the Supreme Court to grant certiorari
to consider the issue: "Does patent infringement exist whenever
accused product or process is 'equivalent' to invention claimed in
patent, in that differences are not 'substantial' as determined by jury,
even though accused product or process is outside literal scope of
patent claim?"249 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on Febru-
ary 26, 1996,1 ° to Warner-Jenkinson's petition and will hear oral
arguments on the appeal during its 1996 term.
In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 21 the Federal
Circuit faithfully applied the holding in Hilton Davis regarding a
proper doctrine of equivalents inquiry.12 The court concluded that
substantial evidence supported the jury verdict of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents.25 3  In particular, the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed that while infringement requires a literal or an equivalent
245. Id. at 1518, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (noting that analysis of function-way-result
alone would suffice in many cases but acknowledging that test does not necessarily end inquiry
in some instances).
246. 952 F.2d 1320, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974
(1992).
247. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1166 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974 (1992).
248. See generally Albert W. Preston, Jr. & Dianne B. Elderkin, Malta v. Schulmerich: The
Federal Circuit At A Crossroads In Its Search To Harmonize Substantive Patent Law With Jury Trial
Procedure and Review, 20 AM. INTELL PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 49 (1992) (discussing practical
consequences of Malta).
249. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
250. Id.
251. 72 F.3d 857, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
252. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857,862,37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
253. Id. at 862-63, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164-65. The Federal Circuit concluded that
prosecution history estoppel did not otherwise bar Festo's asserted range of equivalency to
encompass Shoketsu's accused device. Id at 863-64, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66. Although
the prosecution history revealed a relevant claim amendment, the reason for the amendment
was unclear. Id. at 864,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. After considering all of the evidence, the
district court held that the claim amendment did not create an estoppel and instructed the jury
accordingly. Id. at 864-65, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66. The Federal Circuit noted that
Shoketsu did not object to thisjury instruction and thus affirmed the infringement finding. Id.,
37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66.
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correspondence of the accused device with respect to each and every
element of the claim, such correspondence did not have to be
one-to-one as to particular components.254 The appellate court thus
affirmed the district court's entry of judgment on the jury verdict of
infringement.
55
Festo had sued Shoketsu alleging infringement of its Carroll and
Stoll patents to a material transport piston/cylinder system in which
movement of a sleeve member outside the cylinder is magnetically
coupled with the movement of the piston inside the cylinder."
Before trial, the district court granted partial summary judgment on
infringement of the Carroll patent under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.25 The parties tried the issue of infringement of the Stoll
patent to the jury.258  The jury returned a verdict of infringe-
ment
25 9
Shoketsu contended that its product did not infringe either the
Carroll or the Stoll patents because it lacked certain claimed sealing
rings used to increase the life of the piston."6 The Federal Circuit
clarified, however, that the "all elements rule" of Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc. 261 did not require a one-to-one correspondence
between the recited components and those of the accused device.262
The appellate court held that, despite the absence of certain claimed
components, Shoketsu's accused device contained a ring configura-
tion corresponding to those of the Carroll and Stoll patents.263 In
view of the equivalency evidence presented, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the summary judgment on infringement of the Carroll
patent as well as the jury verdict of infringement of the Stoll
patent.
26
254. Id. at 863, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
255. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
256. Id. at 861 n.2, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162 n.2. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent
Nos. 3,779,401 (Carroll) and 4,354,125 (Stoll). Id. at 860, 862, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162,
1163.
257. Id. at 860-61, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162-63 (noting that Shoketsu offered no
evidence to refute Festo's assertion that accused device performed substantially same function
in substantially same way as patented device).
258. Id. at 862-66, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164-67 (revealing that issues of patent validity
and infringement were also heard by special master, due to complexity of case).
259. Id. at 862, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
260. Id. at 863, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
261. 833 F.2d 931, 935, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739-40 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in banc), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
262. Feto, 72 F.3d at 863, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (citing Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding &
Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 398, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1769 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
263. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (indicating that accused device was not as effective
as patented one).
264. Id. at 868, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
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b. Prosecution history estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel limits the scope of protection available
under the doctrine of equivalents.2  Prosecution history estoppel
thus precludes a patent holder from asserting a scope of equivalency
in an infringement suit that would encompass subject matter that it
had disclaimed during prosecution of the patent application to obtain
allowance of the claims in their issued form.2
Prosecution history estoppel is a question of law that the Federal
Circuit reviews de novo.267 Whether a particular statement during
prosecution results in estoppel depends upon the reason for the
statement.21 Clearly, express disclaimers of subject matter in the
prosecution history give rise to estoppels.6 9
In Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,27° for example,
the Federal Circuit concluded that prosecution history estoppel
restricted the permissible range of plaintiff's equivalents claim.271
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that during the
prosecution of its reexamination patent, Southwall expressly dis-
claimed a "sputter-deposited dielectric" resulting from a process other
than one-step deposition.272 Southwall had amended its claims and
specifically explained that the invention was patentably distinguishable
from the prior art because the recited dielectric layers could be
deposited together directly.27 The appellate court thus affirmed
the district court's summary judgment of noninfringement.
274
265. SeeTownsend Eng'g Co. v. HiTec Co., 829 F.2d 1086, 1090, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1136,
1139 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that patentee is prevented "'from contending later in an
infringement action that his claims should be interpreted as if limitations added were not
present' (quoting Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1579, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1, 6 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
266. See Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1285, 1290 (Fed. Cir.) (stating that essence of prosecution history estoppel is that
patentee should not be able to obtain through litigation coverage of subject matter relinquished
during prosecution), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 500 (1994).
267. LaBounty Mfg. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 867 F.2d 1572, 1576,9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1995, 1998 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
268. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 866-67, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767,
1775 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
269. See infra notes 271-75 and accompanying text (considering Southwall Technologies, Inc.
v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1581,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1681 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 515 (1995).
270. 54 F.3d 1570, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 515 (1995).
271. Southwall Technologies, 54 F.3d at 1581, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
272. Id. at 1580, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
273. Id. at 1581, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
274. Id. at 1584, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684, afg No. C-92-0327-DLJ, 1994 WL 118008
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 1994).
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In contrast, changes or arguments that are not substantive in nature
and that did not affect patentability will not create estoppels. 75 As
the following cases show, various types of conduct during the
prosecution of a patent application can present grave consequences
for the unwary in later litigation, however.
i. Continuation practice
In Mark I Marketing Cop. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,276 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment of
noninfringement.2  Mark had sued Donnelley alleging infringe-
ment of its patent to a process for full-spectrum color printing using
only two printing plates and two ink colors." The patent claims
required sequential exposure of the recited film and sequential use
of the recited color filters.
2 79
Donnelley filed a motion for summary judgment of
noninfringement both literally and under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.2"0  Donnelley asserted that its process neither exposed film
sequentially nor used filters sequentially.28' Donnelley also argued
that prosecution history estoppel, or alternatively the prior art, barred
application of the doctrine of equivalents in this case. 82 Mark
conceded the absence of literal infringement.8 3 The district court
ultimately granted Donnelley's motion on the ground that Mark failed
to refute the assertion that Donnelley used a prior art process.2s4
Given this use, Donnelley could not infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents as a matter of law.2"
The Federal Circuit did not consider whether the district court
correctly held that Mark failed to refute Donnelley's factual assertion
of practicing a prior art process.286 Instead, the appellate court only
addressed the issue of prosecution history estoppel..2 " The Federal
275. SeeLaitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 952 F.2d 1357, 1361, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276, 1279
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that change may render claim "merely clarified").
276. 66 F.3d 285, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
277. Mark I Mktg. Corp. v. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 66 F.3d 285, 292, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1095, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affl'gNo. 92-C-8380, 1994 WL 603884 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 1994).
278. Id at 288, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,554,241. Id. at 287, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1096.
279. Id. at 287-88, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097-98.
280. Id. at 288, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
281. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
282. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097 (alleging that Donnelley's process was known and
used before Mark's invention).
283. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
284. Id at 289, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097-98.
285. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097-98.
286. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
287. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
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Circuit concluded that the prosecution history supported the district
court's summary judgment of noninfringement.
21
The prosecution history of Mark's patent application involved the
filing of two continuation-in-part applications.289 In Mark's original
"grandparent" application, the patent examiner rejected the claims as
anticipated and obvious.20  These claims contained no limitations
regarding sequential use of filters or sequential exposure of film.
29 1
Mark did not respond to the rejections, but instead filed a second
"parent" application. 9 2  Mark amended the claims in the parent
application to add a limitation of sequential filter use.293 Despite
Mark's representation that sequential filter use distinguished the
invention from the prior art, the patent examiner rejected the
amended claims as obvious.2' Again, Mark did not respond to the
rejections, but instead filed another continuation-in-part applica-
tion.2 5 This application, from which the patent ultimately issued,
contained further amended claims including the limitation of
sequential film exposure.29" The patent examiner allowed these
claims to issue without comment.
297
In view of this prosecution history, the Federal Circuit concluded
that Mark clearly had disclaimed coverage of processes that did not
use filters sequentially.298  Mark's decision to file narrower
continuation-in-part applications rather than to respond expressly to
the patent examiner's rejections in no way avoided an estoppel.299
The court further concluded that summary judgment was appropriate
given the undisputed record of the disclaimers in the prosecution
history.
00
ii. Responses to non-pfior art rejections
In Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.,301 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment of infringement after a bench
288. i, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
289. i at 289-91, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098-99.
290. Id at 290, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
291. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
292. M, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
293. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
294. Id. at 291, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
295. I, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
296. I, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
297. i, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
298. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
299. Id at 292, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
300. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100-01.
301. 66 F.3d 1211, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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trial.30 2 Pall had sued Micron alleging that Micron's Nylon 66 and
Nylon 46 products infringed its patent to nylon microfiltration
membranes suitable to filter microorganisms or other microscopic
contaminants.0° With regard to the accused Nylon 46 membranes,
the district court found no literal infringement, based on the
difference between the 4:1 methylene to amide ratio in the Nylon 46
resin and the "about 5:1 to about 7:1" ratio recited as a claim
limitation.0 4 The district court, however, did find that Micron's
Nylon 46 membranes infringed Pall's patent under the doctrine of
equivalents.0 5
On appeal, Micron did not challenge the district court's infringe-
ment findings, but argued that prosecution history estoppel precluded
Pall from asserting the range of equivalents necessary to capture
Micron's Nylon 46 membranes.3 6 The prosecution history indicat-
ed that Pall had filed a narrower continuation-in-part application
containing claims with the additional limitation of a methylene to
amide ratio.0 7 The addition of this ratio limitation was voluntary,
however.303  In the original claims of the "parent" application, the
sole limitation regarding the resin was insolubility in alcohol.0 9
The patent examiner did not reject the continuation-in-part claims
based on prior art, but rather on inadequate support in the specifica-
tion."0 Pall responded that the claims were "actually rather nar-
row," but did not further amend the claims as to the ratio limita-
tions.1 The patent examiner then allowed the claims to issue. 12
The Federal Circuit stated that, in contrast to claim amendments
or arguments in response to prior art rejections, those made simply
to impart precision to the claim language generally do not create the
302. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1220, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,
1231 (Fed. Cir. 1995), af'g 792 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mass. 1992) (rejecting both estoppel and
doctrine of equivalents arguments).
303. Id. at 1215, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,340,479. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
304. Id. at 1217, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
305. Id. at 1218, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (finding that Micron's product has sub-
stantially same chemical and physical structures, performed same function in same way, and
achieved same result as Pall's claimed membranes).
306. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
307. Id. at 1219, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
308. 1&, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (stating that refiling was based on Pall's own
research).
309. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
310. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (noting that patent examiner also labeled claims as
"too broad").
311. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
312. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
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presumption of an estoppel. 13 In view of Pall's voluntary restriction
of the claims and the facts surrounding the response to a non-prior
art rejection, the Federal Circuit held that Pall was not estopped from
asserting a range of equivalence to encompass a methylene to amide
ratio of 4:1."'4 The appellate court thus affirmed the district court's
judgment of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents regard-
ing the Nylon 46 membranes."' 5
c. Design patent infringement
A design patent protects the nonfunctional aspects of a claimed
ornamental design.316 Design patent infringement liability attaches
if visually the accused design is substantially the same as the patented
designw 1 7 and if it appropriates the novelty in the patented design
that distinguishes the patented design from the prior art.318  The
relevant comparison is between the accused design and the claimed
design, not the commercial embodiment of the claimed design."1 9
Similar to the infringement determination for utility patents, this
determination for design patents is a two-step inquiry involving a
proper claim construction followed by the comparison of the accused
design for overall visual similarity.2° Design patent infringement is
a question of fact that the Federal Circuit reviews for substantial
313. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (stating that non-substantive change does not trigger
estoppel).
314. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
315. Id. at 1220, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
316. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994); seeKeyStone RetainingWall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d
1444, 1450, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that appearance of design
as whole is controlling factor when determining questions of patentability and infringement).
317. See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871). The Court delineated the test as
follows:
[In the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives,
two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an
observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first patented
is infringed by the other.
Id.
318. See Oakley, Inc. v. International Tropic-Cal, Inc., 923 F.2d 167, 169, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1401, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (observing that factfinder must consider overall similarity of
design as well as whether accused device appropriates novelty in patented design that distin-
guishes it from prior art). Id. (citing Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., 853 F.2d 1557,
1565, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1548, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). For a more detailed discussion of the
applicable standards for design patent infringement, see Harry C. Marcus & Mark J. Abate,
Design Patent Infringement Put To Sea Without Guiding Charts, 22 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N QJ.
135 (1995).
319. See Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 990, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1516, 1520-21 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that proper application of Gorham test requires
comparison of accused design to claimed design and not to commercial embodiment).
320. See infra notes 330-36 and accompanying text (discussing Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, 67
F.3d 1571, 1581, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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evidence to support the jury's verdict or for clear error where the
judge sits as the fact-finder.3 2'
In Sun Hill Industries, Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc.,322 the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court's bench trial judgment of infringe-
ment.3 23 Sun Hill had sued Easter alleging infringement of its
design patent to a large, orange, plastic bag that resembled a
Halloween pumpkin when stuffed with leaves or other lawn de-
bris.3 24 The district court relied on color, size, and material charac-
teristics in comparing the accused bags to the patented bags." The
Federal Circuit held that the district court erred by comparing the
accused Easter bags to Sun Hill's commercial product, which
contained more features than specified in the patent claims.326
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit held that the district court improp-
erly found infringement because the accused bags did not embody
any of the four points of novelty in the Sun Hill patented design, i.e.,
the contrasting jack-o-lantern faces, the bottom closure, the specific
facial features, and the shiny surface. 27 Absent an appropriation of
points of novelty by the accused product, a finding of design patent
infringement may not stand as a matter of law. 28
In Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 29 the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court's entry ofjudgment on the jury verdict of design patent
infringement.3a Elmer had sued ICC alleging infringement of its
design patent to a triangular vehicle rooftop advertising display.33'
The patent claim recited an "'ornamental design for a vehicle top sign
holder, as shown and described.""'3 2 The Federal Circuit noted that
each of the patent's six figures showed the presence of triangular
321. SeeBraun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. ofAm., 975 F.2d 815,819,24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121,
1124 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
322. 48 F.3d 1193, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
323. Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193,1199,33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1925, 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1995), ro'ginpart831 F. Supp. 1024,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1115 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
324. 1&. at 1195,33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Design Patent No.
310,023. f1. at 1194, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925.
325. 1t at 1196, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
326. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927.
327. 1&. at 1197-98, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927-28.
328. 1&. at 1197, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
329. 67 F.3d 1571, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
330. Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1581, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1424
(Fed. Cir. 1995), revk Elmer v. Take Out Express, Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1530 (M.D. Fla.
1995).
331. 1&. at 1573,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Design Patent No.
290,620. It, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.
332. fat at 1577,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421 (quoting claim language of U.S. Design Patent
No. 290,620).
1996] 1563
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1529
vertical ribs and an upper protrusion. 3 The appellate court thus
held these aspects to be necessary ornamental limitations."s In view
of this claim interpretation, the Federal Circuit decided that substan-
tial evidence did not exist to support the jury verdict of infringe-
ment 33 Moreover, the appellate court concluded that no reason-
able jury could have found the overall visual appearance of the
claimed design to be substantially similar to the accused design.336
d. Plant patent infringement
One who discovers and asexually reproduces a distinct and new
variety of plant may obtain plant patent protection.337 In general,
the same patent rights and remedies pertain to both utility patents
and plant patents.3
In Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses,139 the Federal Circuit
construed the scope of protection of a "variety" under the Plant
Patent Act as limited to a single plant and its asexually reproduced
progeny." ° The appellate court accordingly held that infringement
of a plant patent requires proof of asexual reproduction of the actual
plant patented. 1  In addition, the Federal Circuit stated that
evidence of independent creation was a valid affirmative defense to
plant patent infringement."2  The appellate court reversed the
district court's summaryjudgment of noninfringement and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of this interpretation of the Plant
Patent Act-343
Imazio had sued Coastal Nursery alleging infringement of its patent
to an early blooming variety of Erica Sunset heather that bloomed
during Christmas and Valentine's Day seasons.' Coastal asserted
333. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
334. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
335. Id. at 1578, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
336. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421. The court found that ICC's sign lacked triangular
vertical ribs and an upper protrusion. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421. Because the ICC
device lacked these ornamental features and was substantially different in overall appearance,
the ICC product did not infringe the design patent. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
337. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994).
338. Id.
339. 69 F.3d 1560, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
340. Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1568, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1673, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For a more detailed discussion of the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of the term "variety," see infra note 354.
341. Id. at 1570, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
342. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
343. Id. at 1570-71,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681-82 (remanding because trial court did not
use proper standard for plant patent infringement and, therefore, may not have considered all
evidence relevant to infringement issue).
344. I. at 1562, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Plant Patent No.
5336. Id. at 1561, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
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the defenses of invalidity and noninfringement.1 In particular,
Coastal argued that it had independently grown the accused
plants. 46 The district court granted Imazio's motion for summary
judgment of infringement, but sent the questions of validity,
willfulness, and damages to the jury.47 The jury verdict found
Imazio's patent not invalid, Coastal's infringement willful, and
damages at over $100,000.m The district court further found the
case exceptional and awarded attorney fees plus prejudgment
interest.34'
In ruling on the summary judgment motion, the district court
reasoned that "asexual reproduction" under the Plant Patent Act
covered plants having the same morphology and phenotype as the
patented plant."' 0 Moreover, the district court discounted Coastal's
defense of independent creation as irrelevant.3"'
The Federal Circuit commented at length on the proper scope of
plant patent protection .3 2 After a full consideration of the statute,
its legislative history, and related case law, the appellate court
concluded that the proper scope of a plant patent is limited to a
single plant and its asexually reproduced progeny. 53 The appellate
court was not troubled by the apparently inconsistent use of the term
"variety" between the Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protec-
tion Act.S" Because of the divergent goals of these statutes, the
Federal Circuit ruled that the definition of "variety" under the Plant
Variety Protection Act did not necessarily inform the meaning of
"variety" under the Plant Patent Act.3 5
Furthermore, the appellate court construed asexual reproduction
under the Plant Patent Act to include progeny of the patented plant
obtained by "'grafting, budding, cuttings, layering, division and the
345. Id. at 1562, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
346. Id. at 1570, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
347. Id. at 1562, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
348. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
349. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
350. Id. at 1569, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
351. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
352. Id. at 1564-68, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676-80.
353. IM, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676-80.
354. See id. at 1568, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679-80 (rejecting Imazio's argument that term
"variety" applies broadly to plants with same characteristics). The court reasoned that the Plant
Patent Act was enacted to protect plants reproduced asexually, whereas the Plant Variety
Protection Act was enacted to afford protection for plants sexually reproduced. Id, 36
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679-80. Based on the fact that sexual and asexual reproduction are
different, the term "variety" cannot be interpreted the same under both statutes. Id., 36
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679-80.
355. Id. at 1568, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
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like, but not by seeds."'356 Evidence of independent development
thus would tend to disprove asexual reproduction.5 7  In any event,
the Federal Circuit held that the district court improperly entered
summaryjudgment by basing infringement solely on evidence that the
accused plants had the same essential characteristics as those of the
patent plant.
358
3. Defenses to infringement
a. Invalidity
To obtain patent protection, the claimed invention must involve
statutory subject matter that is useful, novel, and nonobvious.3 59 In
addition, the applicant must satisfy the statutory disclosure require-
ments.3 0
A defendant to an infringement suit may raise, as an affirmative
defense, patent invalidity based on these grounds.16 ' An issued
patent, however, carries a statutory presumption of validity.3 62  A




To receive patent protection, the invention must be novel, i.e., not
anticipated by the prior art." An invention is anticipated if a
single prior art reference expressly or inherently discloses each and
every limitation of the claimed invention.36 A party must prove
356. Id. at 1566,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (quoting S. REP. No. 315,71st Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1930)).
357. See id. at 1570, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681 (rejecting district court's conclusion that
independent creation is not valid defense to plant patent infringement).
358. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
359. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994).
360. Id. § 112. The statute provides in relevant part:
[T]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, dear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Id.
361. Id. § 282.
362. Id.
363. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1375, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 81, 87 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
364. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b).
365. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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anticipation by clear and convincing evidence."s Anticipation is a
question of fact that the Federal Circuit reviews for clear error. 67
In Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metacraft, Inc.,"s the Federal
Circuit affirmed the portion of the district court's judgment that
found the patents-in-suit not invalid for anticipation.3 69 Hoover had
sued Custom alleging infringement of two of its patents to metal tanks
of a particular configuration for liquid storage and transport.
3 0
Custom defended that the Hoover patents were invalid based on the
existence of certain Custom products that anticipated the claimed
inventions.3  The district court held that each of the asserted
Custom products lacked at least one of the limitations recited in the
Hoover patent claims. 7 2 Accordingly, the district court found that
the Hoover patents were not invalid for anticipation.3  The Federal
Circuit ascertained no clear error in the district court's determina-
tions and thus upheld its judgment.
37 4
In Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment that the patent-in-suit was not invalid.76
Glaxo had sued Novopharm alleging infringement of its patent to a
specific crystalline form of the antiulcer medication, ranitidine
hydrochloride.3 7 7 Novopharm conceded infringement, but asserted,
366. SeeVerdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628,632,2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051,
1053 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987).
367. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 619, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 634, 637 (Fed. Cir.), cert. disnisse 474 U.S. 976 (1985).
368. 66 F.3d 299, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
369. Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 66 F.3d 299, 305,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1101, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
370. Id. at 302, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent Nos.
4,840,284 and 4,785,958. Id. at 301, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
371. Id. at 302, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. Custom Metalcraft claimed that several of its
products embodied the patented invention in question nearly a year before Hoover filed for a
patent. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
372. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. For example, with respect to the '284 patent, the
district court found that the "plough sugar bin was not a tank suitable for storing liquids, but
a bin for storage of dry materials." Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. The district court also
found that the three center discharge tanks did not have slopes caused by the presence of "'a
plurality of creases' and were not completely draining, lacking 'a smooth contoured surface
sloping toward said discharge opening.'" Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103 (quoting Hoover
Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., No. 4:CV91-3053 (D. Neb. Feb. 1, 1993)).
373. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
374. Id at 303, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1103.
375. 52 F.3d 1043,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565 (Fed. Cir.), cert. deneAd, 116S. Ct. 516 (1995).
376. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1052, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565, 1571
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denieA 116 S. Ct. 516 (1995).
377. Id at 1047, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566, afflg830 F. Supp. 871,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1126 (E.D.N.C. 1993). The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No. 4,521,431. Id. at 1045, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
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inter alia, that the patent was invalid as anticipated.8  Contrary to
Novopharm's argument, the district court found that the prior art did
not inherently anticipate the claimed invention because the prior art
disclosed the production of a different crystalline form than that
claimed. 379 The Federal Circuit discerned no clear error in the
district court's findings.3 °
ii. Public use bar
The patent laws bar patent protection of an invention that was in
public use or on sale more than one year before the filing date of the
United States patent application for that invention .3 1  The public
use and on sale bars to patentability derive from the same public
policy."8 2 The rationales for these patentability bars include the
encouragement of prompt disclosure of inventions to the public and
the discouragement of commercial exploitation of the invention while
deferring the start of the patent protection term.
A party asserting patent invalidity based on public use must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the invention was used before
the critical date, in public, and primarily for purposes other than
experimentation. 3' Factors relevant to a public use inquiry include
public access to and awareness of the activity, the degree of confiden-
tiality imposed on observers, indicia of bona fide experimentation,
and the financial aspects of the activity.38 The Federal Circuit
reviews de novo the district court's ultimate conclusion of public use,
and reviews for clear error the underlying factual findings. 86
In Allied Colloids Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 87 the Federal
Circuit vacated the district court's judgment of invalidity as a matter
of law based on public use, notwithstanding the jury verdict.38 The
378. Id. at 1047, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567. Novopharm argued that the invention
claimed in the '431 patent was inherently disclosed in the '658 patent because the practice of
Example 32 always yields ranitidine hydrochloride in its form two crystalline polymorph. Id.
379. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
380. Id. at 1047-48, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
381. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
382. See infra notes 388-99 and accompanying text (discussing Allied Colloids Inc. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
383. See infra notes 388-99 and accompanying text (discussing Allied Colloids).
384. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
805, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
385. See Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1210, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
386. SeeManville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544,549,16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1587, 1591 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
387. 64 F.3d 1570, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
388. Allied Coloids, 64 F.3d at 1578-79, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846. The district court
granted a directed verdict in favor of Cyanamid. Id. at 1572, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
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appellate court held that the mere existence of a commercial motive
when testing an invention does not render that activity a public
use.
89
Colloids had sued American alleging infringement of its patent to
the treatment of sewage with certain polymeric flocculents. °
American asserted that Colloids' patent was invalid based on public
use. 9' Before the critical date of April 23, 1985, Colloids conducted
a series of laboratory tests at a Detroit sewage treatment facility.92
At trial, the evidence showed that Colloids personnel kept research
records of the tests, maintained strict control of the test samples, and
conducted the tests outside the presence of Detroit municipal
employees. 93 Moreover, Colloids received no payment for these
tests.39 4  The district court nevertheless held the Detroit tests
established a public use bar because they were commercially motivat-
ed. 95
The Federal Circuit disagreed.396 The court emphasized that the
public use inquiry required a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances."9 ' The district court had erred in viewing as disposi-
tive the commercial motivation behind the Detroit tests.398 The
appellate court held that the overall experimental nature of the
Detroit test did not support the conclusion of public use."9
iii. On sale bar
A party asserting patent invalidity based on on sale activity must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that a definite sale or offer to
sell occurred before the critical date and that the subject matter of
the sale or offer to sell either anticipated the claimed invention or
would have rendered the claimed invention obvious."0 The Federal
389. Id at 1576, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
390. Id. at 1570-72, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 184041. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent
Nos. 4,720,346 and 4,943,378. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840-41.
391. Id. at 1575, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
392. Id. at 1573, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
393. Id. at 1575, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
394. Id. at 1576, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
395. Id. at 1573-74, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
396. Id. at 1576-77, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844-45.
397. Id at 1576, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844 (observing that lack of payment for Detroit
testing, as well as keeping detailed experimental notes, indicated that testing of invention did
not amount to public use).
398. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
399. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
400. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1472
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denieAd 484 U.S. 1025 (1987) (noting that party asserting patent invalidity based
on sale activity must prove that there was definite sale or offer to sell one year prior to filing for
subject patent).
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Circuit reviews de novo the district court's ultimate conclusion of on
sale activity and reviews for clear error the underlying factual
findings."°
In Ferag AG v. Quipp Inc.,4°2 the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court's bench trial judgment of infringement.4°3 Ferag AG
had sued Quipp alleging infringement of its patent to a specialized
conveyer apparatus used in the printing of newspapers or maga-
zines.4"' Quipp asserted noninfringement and invalidity as defens-
es.405  The appellate court concluded that Ferag AG's patent was
invalid for on sale activity.
40°
In January 1981, Ferag AG filed a patent application to its inven-
tion.4 7 Ferag AG, a Swiss corporation, is the partial owner of Ferag,
Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation.4 ~ In November 1979, Ferag AG
confirmed an order with Ferag, Inc., for a conveyer system purchased
by the Bergen Evening Record, a NewJersey newspaper publisher.4°
The district court found that Ferag AG and Ferag, Inc., were not
separate entities. 410  Because a sale or offer to sell must involve
separate entities, the district court concluded the absence of an on
sale bar. 1
The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that Ferag, Inc., was under
the complete management authority of an entity other than Ferag
AG.412 The appellate court rejected Ferag AG's argument that the
existence of common sales goals, including "best efforts" provisions
and confidentiality agreements, made Ferag AG and Ferag, Inc.,
indistinguishable.413
401. SeeAtlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834,836,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1481, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
402. 45 F.3d 1562, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1512 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 71 (1995).
403. Ferag AG v. Quipp Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1569, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1512, 1517 (Fed.
Cir.) (holding Ferag AG's patent invalid due to this company's sales activity), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 71 (1995).
404. Id. at 1566, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,381,056. Id. at 1564, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513.
405. Id. at 1566, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
406. Id. at 1569, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 (basing its determination on fact that Ferag
AG sold or offered to sell product embodying invention more than one year before filing of
patent application).
407. Id. at 1564, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513.
408. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513.
409. Id. at 1569, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
410. Id. at 1567, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
411. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
412. Id. The sale or offer of an invention must involve separate entities. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1994). The court in FeragAG reasoned that Ferag, Inc., and Ferag AG were not controlled by
the same group because the outstanding shares of Ferag, Inc., were split evenly between
Smallacombe and Ferag AG's owners. FeragAG, 45 F.d at 1567, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
413. FeragAG, 45 F.3d at 1567, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
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In addition, the Federal Circuit concluded that Ferag AG attempted
to commercialize its invention before the critical date. 14 The
appellate court rejected Ferag AG's contention that the product sold
to Bergen did not embody the patented invention. 5 The Federal
Circuit also concluded that the district court legally erred by requiring
a party asserting the on sale bar to prove that the patent owner
intended, and the customer understood, that the product sold
embodied the invention.41 The Federal Circuit therefore held
Ferag AG's patent invalid and reversed the district court's judg-
ment
4 17
In Mahurkar v. Impra, Inc.,41s the Federal Circuit held that no on
sale activity had occurred even though the transaction at issue was a
bona fide sale under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").419
The appellate court emphasized that whether an invention was on sale
within the meaning of § 102(b) depends on the totality of the
circumstances and focuses on commercialization. 420  Despite the
existence of an actual sales transaction, the appellate court concluded
that this event neither resulted in commercialization of the invention
nor placed the invention in the public domain.42 ' The Federal
Circuit thus affirmed the district court's bench trial judgment that the
patent was not invalid. 2
Mahurkar had sued Impra alleging infringement of his patent to a
smooth bore double lumen hemodialysis catheter.4 23 Impra asserted
noninfringement and invalidity.424 The sole basis for Impra's
invalidity defense was the alleged on sale activity.42 The district
court found that the transaction at issue did not constitute on sale
activity despite being a bona fide UCC sale. 26  The district court
414. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515 (describing sale of Ferag system to Bergen before
Ferag AG filed patent application as evidence that Ferag AG put conveyor system invention on
sale).
415. 1&, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515-16.
416. Id at 1568, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
417. Id. at 1569, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
418. 71 F.3d 1573, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
419. Mahurkarv. Impra, Inc., 71 F.3d 1573,1577, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138,1142 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (concluding that sale was sham and did not violate patentability bar under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) despite fact that prototype was reduction to practice of invention).
420. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142-43.
421. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
422. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142, aftg 831 F. Supp. 1354, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801
(N.D. Ill. 1993).
423. Id. at 1575, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,583,968. Id. at 1574, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
424. Id. at 1575, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
425. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
426. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140 (noting that UCO sale was for nonexperimental
purposes).
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also found that Impra literally infringed the patent and ultimately
awarded Mahurkar lost profits damages of $4,589,472.4w
Mahurkar filed his utility patent application in August 1984.428
The application claimed entitlement to the earlier October 1983 filing
date of his design patent application. 429 Before this, Mahurkar had
granted Quinton Instruments Company an exclusive license to make,
use, and sell the invention.' s However, the license conditioned
exclusivity on Quinton's marketing of the double lumen catheters by
September 1982.43' In August 1982, Northwest Kidney Center
purchased two prototype catheters from Quinton.3 Northwest
never used these prototypes, however, because they had serious
structural defects.433 Quinton did not engage in widespread commer-
cialization of the perfected invention until April 1983.43
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that "the on sale
inquiry is not subject to a mechanical rule.''4 5  The fact that an
actual sale under the UCC had occurred did not alter this analy-
sis. 4"6 The appellate court concluded that the Northwest transaction
was a sham intended only to retain exclusive rights under the
license.4" Indeed, Mahurkar had contested Quinton's status as an
exclusive licensee based on the Northwest deal.4 s In any event, the
Federal Circuit further recognized that Quinton had not advertised
the prototype catheters, nor offered them to anyone except North-
west. 439 Moreover, the prototypes were unusable for their intended
427. Id. at 1576, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
428. Id. at 1575, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
429. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
430. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
431. Id. at 1574, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
432. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
433. Id. at 1575, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
434. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
435. Id. at 1577, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141. To determine whether Mahurkar's patent
was invalid for on sale activity, the Federal Circuit considered the policies underlying 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (b), including- (1) discouraging removal of inventions from the public domain that the
public reasonably has come to believe are freely available; (2) encouraging the prompt and
widespread disclosure of inventions; (3) allowing an inventor a reasonable amount of time
following sales activity to determine the potential economic value of a patent; and (4)
prohibiting an inventor from commercially exploiting his invention beyond the statutorily
prescribed time. Id. at 1577, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142 (citing Environtech Corp. v. Westech
Eng'g Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1577, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
436. Id. at 1577, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
437. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
438. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
439. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142 (observing that Northwest transaction was deal to
satisfy licensing requirements and not commercial sale because Northwest bought catheters as
favor rather than as commercial purchase).
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purpose.'5 In view of the totality of the circumstances, the court
found that the Northwest transaction did not constitute an invalidat-
ing on sale activity."
iv. Obviousness
To receive patent protection, an invention must be nonobvious at
the time of the invention to one of ordinary skill in the relevant
art."42 An accused infringer must prove obviousness by clear and
convincing evidence.' 4 Obviousness is a question of law that the
Federal Circuit reviews de novo.4" The conclusion of obviousness
is subject to underlying factual findings, however. 5 These findings
include the scope and content of the prior art, the level of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of the invention, objective evidence of
nonobviousness, and differences between the prior art and the
claimed invention." 6  Relevant secondary considerations of non-
obviousness include commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failures of others, and copying."' The Federal Circuit reviews the
factual findings of the district court for clear error.'
In Para-Ordnance Manufacturing; Inc. v. SGS Importers International,
Inc.," 9 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of
invalidity for obviousness despite the district court's failure to explain
explicitly how one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined
the cited prior art references to achieve the claimed invention. 410
The appellate court thus discerned no clear error in the factual
findings underlying the district court's ultimate conclusion of
obviousness.4 1
Para-Ordnance had sued SGS, alleging infringement of its patent
to a kit to increase the ammunition capacity of a semi-automatic
440. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142 (noting that enclosed catheter instructions did not
aid in making product usable for its intended purpose).
441. Id. at 1577-78, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
442. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
443. SeePolaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556, 1558,229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561,
562-63 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denieA 479 U.S. 850 (1986).
444. See Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1182, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1102
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
445. See Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
446. See id.
447. See id.
448. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1565-66, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1593, 1594-95 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987).
449. 73 F.3d 1085, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
450. Pam-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Importers Int'l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085,1090,37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1237, 1240-41 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d
1015, 1025, 226 U.S.P.Q. 881, 886-87 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
451. Id.
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handgun.452 In addition to noninfringement, SGS asserted patent
invalidity based on obviousness."5  In the bench trial, the district
court found that the prior art taught the widening of the ammunition
magazine to accommodate more cartridges in a staggered configura-
tion." Contrary to the prior art, the claimed invention used a
converging one-piece frame to hold the widened magazine.
455
Relying on the testimony of SGS's expert witness, the district court
concluded that the claimed invention would have been obvious to one
of ordinary skill in the art having the benefit of the cited prior art
references. 4 6
The Federal Circuit majority opinion stated that a thorough
inspection of the prior art device would have provided the requisite
motivation to construct the claimed invention after appropriate
modifications.5 The dissent, however, characterized this holding
as a classic example of impermissible hindsight reconstruction. 4 s
Although the Federal Circuit agreed with Para-Ordnance that a trial
exhibit had improperly suggested a hindsight analysis, the court held
that the remaining record nonetheless supported the district court's
conclusion.
9
v. Best mode violation
To obtain patent protection, an inventor must disclose the best
mode personally known at the time of filing the application.'1° The
best mode inquiry thus focuses on the inventor's state of mind based
on personal knowledge of available facts.416 1 A party must prove a
best mode violation by clear and convincing evidence. 462 Compli-
452. Id. at 1086-87, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,862,618. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
453. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
454. Id at 1090, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
455. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
456. 1, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240-41.
457. IM. at 1091, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241.
458. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
459. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241-42 (clarifying that no weight had been given to exhibit
or any testimony pertaining to exhibit).
460. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994); supra note 360 (enumerating specification requirements).
461. See Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923,926, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033,
1035 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that factfinder must consider not only inventor's state of mind
at time application is filed, but also level of skill in art and scope of claimed invention);
Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1535, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1745
(Fed. Cir.) (noting that there is no clear objective standard to judge adequacy of best mode, but
evidence of accidental or intentional concealment is considered), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954
(1987).
462. See Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1517, 220 U.S.P.Q. 929,
939-40 (Fed. Cir.) (stating that clear and convincing evidence standard is required by law rather
than preponderance of evidence standard), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984).
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ance with the best mode requirement is a factual question that the
Federal Circuit reviews for clear error."
In Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.,4  the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment that the patent-in-suit was not invalid.4"
Glaxo had sued Novopharm alleging infringement of its patent to a
specific crystalline form of the antiulcer medication, ranitidine
hydrochloride. 6 Novopharm conceded infringement, but sought
summary judgment that the patent was invalid for failure to disclose
the best mode of practicing the invention.467 The district court
denied Novopharm's motion.
46
At trial, Novopharm presented evidence that officials at Glaxo
considered an azeotroping process as the best mode of preparing the
claimed compound for use in a pharmaceutical composition.469 No
evidence existed, however, that the inventor ever knew of the
azeotroping process.47 Indeed, the inventor did not work in the
same department as the scientists who developed the azeotroping
process.47' Despite Novopharm's arguments to the contrary, the
district court refused to impute knowledge of the Glaxo officials to
the inventor to find a best mode violation.472
The Federal Circuit held that imputed knowledge alone may not
form the basis of a best mode violation. 43 The court noted that a
plain reading of the relevant statute focused the best mode inquiry on
what the inventor contemplated.474 In particular, the court recog-
nized that the inventor was concerned solely with the creation of the
claimed compound and was entirely unconcerned with the steps
necessary to prepare the claimed compound for use in a commercial
463. See DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1324, 226 U.S.P.Q. 758, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that best mode is question of fact and court's review of Board's best mode determina-
tion is clearly erroneous standard).
464. 52 F.3d 1043, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116S. Ct. 516 (1995).
465. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1052, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565, 1571
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 516 (1995).
466. Id. at 1047, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566, afl'g830 F. Supp. 871, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1126 (E.D.N.C. 1993). The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No. 4,521,431. Id. at 1045, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
467. Id. at 1047, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
468. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
469. Id. at 1049, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
470. Id. at 1050-51,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. Novopharm raised an imputed knowledge
best mode defense, arguing that the Glaxo official's knowledge of the azeotroping process
should be imputed to the inventor. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
471. Id. at 1051, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
472. Id. at 1050, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
473. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
474. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569 (noting that meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994),
which states that "[t]he specification ... shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention," could not be more obvious).
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pharmaceutical composition.475 In addition, the majority opinion
rejected Novopharm's contention, with which the dissent agreed, that
failure to impute corporate knowledge to the inventor would foster
intentional ignorance in corporate inventors.476  The majority
instead characterized the practical reality of corporate research as a
compartmentalized work environment.
477
In Graco, Inc. v. Binks Manufacturing Co.,47 the Federal Circuit
vacated the portion of the district court's judgment after a bench trial
that found the patent-in-suit infringed and not invalid.479  Graco
had sued Binks, alleging infringement of its patent to a pump used
to deliver heavy and abrasive fluent materials. 4 ' Binks defended
against this charge by asserting invalidity of the patent based on a best
mode defense. 481 Before filing the patent application, the inventor,
Paul Schlosser, designed an improved seal in the prototype pump to
replace O-rings that wore out daily.482 Schlosser clearly contemplat-
ed the improved seal as a better mode.4  Indeed, the commercial
embodiments of the claimed invention incorporated the improved
seal, and a later, related patent disclosed the same.4 8  Schlosser,
however, never disclosed this improvement in the application from
which the patent-in-suit issued.4
In any event, the district court made no findings regarding a best
mode violation.486 On appeal, the parties argued whether the
district court ruled on this issue at all and whether Binks had waived
the defense.48 7 Unable to ascertain the answers to these questions
from the record, the Federal Circuit remanded to the district
court. 4ta In particular, the appellate court inquired whether the
475. Id. at 1051, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
476. Id. at 1051-52, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570-71.
477. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570-71.
478. 60 F.3d 785, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
479. Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 795,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255, 1263 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
480. Id. at 787, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,035,109. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
481. Id. at 789, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
482. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
483. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
484. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257. The improved seal was the subject of U.S. Patent No.
4,029,442. Id. at 788, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256-57.
485. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256-57 (noting that Schlosser as individual holds U.S.
Patent No. 4,029,442 on modified pump, while Ceraco's patent, which is patent at issue, contains
general language that does not specify improvement).
486. Id. at 789, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
487. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
488. Id. at 790, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
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district court improperly imported the intent to mislead requirement
from the inequitable conduct defense to the best mode defense.489
vi. Abandonment
The abandonment, suppression, or concealment of an invention
may preclude an inventor from obtaining patent protection.4' No
particular period of delay is unreasonable per se.491 Abandonment
is a question of fact that the Federal Circuit reviews for clear
error.
492
In Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commis-
sion,4 93 the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the International
Trade Commission ("ITC") that no violation of § 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 had occurred.4 94 In so ruling, the ITC held that the
patents-in-suit were not infringed and were invalid due to abandon-
ment 495 The Federal Circuit reviews the factual findings of the ITC
for support by substantial evidence. 6 In addition, the court reviews
de novo the ITC's legal conclusions regarding validity.
497
Checkpoint alleged that various foreign companies imported, sold
for importation, or sold in the United States after importation,
products that infringed its patents to deactivatable electronic tags used
in retail stores to deter shoplifting.498 The ITC instituted an investi-
gation against these foreign companies based on Checkpoint's com-
plaint.499 During the proceeding, two of the foreign companies
claimed that the patents were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) based
on the work of Checkpoint design engineer George Kaltner, who was
489. lId, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
490. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994) (stating that "A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless-... (g) before the applicant's invention thereof, the invention was made in this country
by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.").
491. SeePaulikv. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1273,226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 224,226 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(stating that determination of abandonment rests on application of equitable principles and
public policy to facts of case); Shindelarv. Holdeman, 628 F.2d 1337, 1343,207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
112, 117 (C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981) (noting that because each case must
be considered on its own facts, no established time frame exists for determining when abandon-
ment occurs).
492. See Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 15 (1939) (describing various
issues of fact, such as negligence or delayed application, that can lead to determination of
abandonment).
493. 54 F.3d 756, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
494. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 54 F.3d 756, 763, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1042, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
495. Id. at 759, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
496. Id. at 759-60, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044.
497. Id. at 760, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
498. Id at 759, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044-45. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent Nos.
4,498,076 and 4,567,473. Id. at 758, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
499. Id. at 759, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
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not a designated inventor on the patents-in-suit 5 ° The ITC agreed,
finding that Kaltner had indeed invented the claimed deactivatable
tags before the inventors who had been designated in the patents."'
The ITC, however, determined that Kaltner had not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed the invention.
02
On appeal, Checkpoint did not contest the factual findings of the
ITC, but instead challenged the ITC's legal conclusion of invalidi-
ty.510 The Federal Circuit noted that after reduction to practice of
the deactivatable tags, Kaltner had diligently continued to perfect
them for use as part of a commercial electronic security system.
514
The appellate court held that the period of time between reduction
to practice and commercialization was not an unreasonable period
constituting abandonment.5 Moreover, Kaltner's diligent activity
excused such delay."6 In addition, the Federal Circuit noted that
Checkpoint failed to avail itself of the opportunity to correct the
omission of Kaltner as an inventor.0 7 Such a correction would have
obviated the invalidity ground now facing Checkpoint.5 8
b. Noninfringement
In addition to patent invalidity, noninfringement is another
affirmative defense available to an accused infringer.5 9 During
1995, the Federal Circuit considered several cases involving various
asserted grounds of noninfringement.
510
i. Prior art practice
In Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc.," the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's judgment of noninfringement as a matter
500. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
501. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
502. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
503. Id. at 760, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
504. Id. at 762, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
505. See id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047 (describing efforts to perfect invention for market
in 4 years between reduction to practice and commercialization).
506. See id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047 (describing Kaltner's diligent efforts to perfect
invention for marketing).
507. Id. at 763, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
508. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
509. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(1) (1994) (stating that noninfringement, absence of liability for
infringement, or unenforceability shall be defenses in actions involving validity or infringement
of patent).
510. See infra notes 511-630 and accompanying text (discussing prior art practice, repair,
licensed conduct, and patent term extension period activity).
511. 49 F.3d 1575, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995).
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of law, notwithstanding the jury verdict of infringement.1 2 The
court held that literal infringement may exist even though the
accused device would have been obvious in light of the prior art.
513
Baxter had sued Spectramed alleging infringement of its patent to a
direct blood pressure monitoring system in which the calibration of
transducers occurred continuously.514  In response, Spectramed
asserted that the patent was unenforceable for inequitable conduct,
and invalid as anticipated and obvious.
51 5
After trial, thejury returned a special verdict, answering unanimous-
ly in Baxter's favor on twelve of fourteen interrogatories. 51 1 The
jury unanimously found, inter alia, that Spectramed willfully infringed
Baxter's patent." The jury, however, was unable to return a
unanimous verdict on the issue of obviousness.518 The district court
declared a mistrial based on the jury's inability to answer all of the
interrogatories unanimously.1 9 On the parties' post-trial motions,
the district court entered ajudgment of noninfringement as a matter
of law in favor of Spectramed.52 °
The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in accepting
Spectramed's argument that the jury's findings of infringement
should be set aside.521 This argument was based solely on the
assertion that Spectramed only used what the prior art had already
disclosed. 522 The appellate court emphasized that infringement may
exist even if the accused device is obvious in light of the prior art or
is otherwise unpatentable.5" The Federal Circuit thus held that the
district court had no grounds for upsetting the jury verdict of
infringement.5 4 Moreover, "ample evidence" existed to support the
jury's infringement finding.5" Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
512. Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1585,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1120, 1128 (Fed. Cir.), cert. deniek, 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995).
513. Id. at 1583, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
514. Id. at 1579, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,610,256. I at 1577, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
515. Id at 1579-80, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123-24.
516. i at 1580, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123-24.
517. Id. at 1579 & n.6, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123 & n.6.
518. Id. at 1579 n.8, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123 n.8.
519. Id. at 1580, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
520. Idt., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
521. Id. at 1583, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
522. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
523. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126 (noting that issues of obviousness in view of prior art
are relevant in assessing validity of claims, not infringement issues).
524. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
525. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126 (noting that defendant agreed "that the record is
devoid of substantial evidence" showing that its product was different than patented product).
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remanded on the invalidity issues and affirmed the district court's
entry of judgment on the jury verdict of no inequitable conduct.
26
ii. Repair
Infringement liability does not attach to the repair of a patented
combination of unpatented components.5" The distinction be-
tween permissible repair and impermissible reconstruction does not
depend on whether the replaced element is an essential or distin-
guishing part of the claimed combination.528 Permissible repair
includes any repair necessary for the maintenance or use of the whole
patented combination, such as the replacement of spent, unpatented
elements.529
In Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc.,53 0 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's summary judgment of
noninfringement.53- ' Sage had sued Devon, alleging inducement to
infringe, and contributory infringement of, its patent to a disposal
system for contaminated sharp medical instruments.3 2 The claimed
disposal system contained an inner disposable container within a
permanent outer unit.533 The removable inner container was an
unpatented element of the claimed combination.5 4 Sage contend-
ed that hospital replacement of its removable inner container with
Devon's inner container was an impermissible reconstruction that
constituted direct infringement.5 5 Sage further alleged that Devon
was consequently "inducing infringement of and/or contributorily
infringing" Sage's patent.
36
The Federal Circuit, however, held that the Sage inner containers
were effectively spent when filled. 37 Accordingly, Devon's offer of
526. Id. at 1585, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
527. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961)
(describing replacement of individual parts after original is spent as owner's "lawful right" to
repair own property).
528. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,217 (1980) (citing Aro, 365 U.S.
at 344).
529. Aro, 365 U.S. at 346 (outlining extent of permissible repair).
530. 45 F.3d 1575, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
531. See Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 45 F.3d 1575, 1579, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1765, 1768 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining that plaintiff was engaging in "no more than an attempt
to expand patent rights to an unpatented product").
532. Id at 1577, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Reissue Patent
No. 33,413. Id. at 1576, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
533. Id. at 1576-77, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
534. Id. at 1576, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
535. Id. at 1577, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
536. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
537. Id. at 1578, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
1580
1995 PATENT LAW DECIsIoNs
a replacement product did not constitute infringing conduct.538
Indeed, Sage prescribed its inner containers for single use only,
marking them with a warning label "BIOHAZARD-SINGLE USE
ONLY"5" 9  Given the absence of any direct infringement, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment that
Devon could neither have induced infringement nor contributorily in-
fringed.5-4
iii. Licensed conduct
When a patent holder sells or authorizes a sale of the patented
product, a court may recognize an implied license.541 The existence
of an implied license is a question of law that the Federal Circuit
reviews de novo.5
In McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc.," the Federal Circuit held that
the breach of a supply contract by a patent holder creates an implied
license for the supplier to resell the patented articles to third parties
in the mitigation of damages.54 Accordingly, such a sale does not
constitute infringing conduct.5' The appellate court thus reversed
the district court's entry of judgment on the jury verdict of infringe-
ment. 
5
McCoy contracted with Mitsuboshi for the production of its
patented knife, which simultaneously peels, deveins, and butterflies
shrimp.54  After Mitsuboshi produced the requested 150,000
patented shrimp knives, McCoy accepted and paid for only
20,000.5" Following unsuccessful negotiations with McCoy for
payment and delivery on the balance of the stock, Mitsuboshi resold
the remaining knives to other parties. 49 McCoy sued Mitsuboshi for
538. Id&, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
539. I., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
540. Id. at 1579, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768.
541. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1942) (noting that patent
holder's sale of unfinished patented item was both transfer of ownership and license to
complete patented procedure without further payment).
542. See Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 474, 476 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that parties raised no issue of fact and that existence
of implied license was sole issue decided by trial court).
543. 67 F.3d 917, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
544. McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 922, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1292
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
545. Itd at 923, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
546. Id. at 925, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295.
547. Idt at 919, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,759,125. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
548. 1d, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
549. 1&, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
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patent and trademark infringement.5  The jury found that McCoy
breached its supply contract.55' The jury decided that Mitsuboshi
infringed McCoy's patent in its resale of the knives, however.5 The
district court denied Mitsuboshi's motion for judgment of
noninfringement as a matter of law, notwithstanding the jury
verdict.
553
The Federal Circuit concluded that the course of conduct between
McCoy and Mitsuboshi created an implied license upon McCoy's
breach of contract for Mitsuboshi's resale of the patented knives.
554
As an initial matter, the court stated that McCoy subjected its patent
rights to state contract law upon its supply agreement with
Mitsuboshi. 5 Applying Texas law to the breach of contract issue,
the Federal Circuit held that Mitsuboshi had a right to resell the
goods in mitigation of its damages when McCoy wrongfully refused to
pay, even without McCoy's consent or a prior adjudication of McCoy's
breach.556 The Federal Circuit concluded that patent infringement
liability could not attach based solely on Mitsuboshi's exercise of its
remedies under state contract law.
5 7
In Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equipment Innovations, Inc.,"'8
the Federal Circuit held that a purchaser of an unpatented compo-
nent of a patented combination from the patent holder obtains an
implied license to use the patented combination for the life of that
component.5 9 The court concluded that the replacement of the
original component with another sold by a competitor effectively
terminated the implied license and therefore rendered the continued
use of the patented combination a direct infringement.5'0 The
Federal Circuit thus affirmed the district court's entry ofjudgment on
the jury verdict of contributory infringement and inducement to
infringe.
5 61
Metaullics, the plaintiff, owned a patent to a metal purification
system that uses gas injection to facilitate the removal of impurities
550. hIL, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
551. Id. at 920, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
552. Id. at 919-20, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
553. Id at 920, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
554. Id. at 922, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
555. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
556. I1. at 923, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
557. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
558. 72 F.3d 872, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
559. Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 880, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
560. ld. at 881, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
561. Id. at 883, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
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from scrap metal.562 Metaullics sold only one component of this
patented combination, namely a pump for the gas injection and
molten metal transfer." The Metaullics pump had no use other
than as an element of its metal purification apparatus." Molten,
the defendant, also sold a pump suitable for use in the patented
system.
565
Metaullics sued Molten alleging inducement to infringe, and
contributory infringement of its patent.56  As a defense, Molten
asserted an absence of direct infringement. 67 After closing argu-
ments in the liability phase of the bifurcated jury trial, the district
court granted Metaullics' motion for a directed verdict, holding that
the use of a Molten pump in a Metaullics metal purification system
constituted a direct infringement.5' 6 Following the jury verdict
finding Molten liable for contributory infringement and induced
infringement, the district court entered a permanent injunction.
69
The Federal Circuit stated that whether the purchase of an
unpatented component of a patented combination creates an implied
license depends on the circumstances of the sale.5 7° Furthermore,
the component at issue must have no noninfringing uses. 1 In view
of the lack of any express restrictions by Metaullics regarding the use
of its pump and the absence of noninfringing uses, the court easily
concluded that an implied license to use the patented system
existed.572 The crux of the case, however, was the proper scope of
this license." The Federal Circuit held that the term of the
implied license was limited to the life of the pump.574  Had
Metaullics sold the patented system, its customer would have had an
implied license for the life of the combination, allowing for replace-
ment of the individual, unpatented components throughout that
lifetime. The court noted, however, that Metaullics chose to sell
562. Id. at 875, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,169,584. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
563. Id. at 876, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
564. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
565. Id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
566. Id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
567. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
568. Id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
569. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
570. Id. at 878, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
571. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
572. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
573. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (noting that parties did not contest existence of
implied license).
574. Id. at 880, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
575. Id. at 879-80, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
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only a single component of the metal purification system, and thus to
forgo revenue on the entire patented apparatus.576 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the circumstances of the sale did not
support an implied license beyond the life of the individual pump
component
77
iv. Patent term extension period
The Hatch-Waxman Act578 exempts from infringement liability
certain activity reasonably related to the application for generic drug
approval by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").179 A phar-
maceutical manufacturer may file an abbreviated new drug application
("ANDA") to obtain expedited FDA approval of its generic version of
the patented drug."' In the ANDA, a manufacturer also can state
its intention to commercialize the generic drug before the expiration
of the approved drug's patent.5"' This occurs via a "paragraph IV"
certification, asserting invalidity or noninfringement of the patent on
the approved drug. 82 In response to a paragraph IV certification,
the patent holder may file an infringement suit.5 3 The initiation
of litigation operates as a statutory bar to suspend FDA approval of
the generic drug.5"
As a member country to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"), the United States promulgated the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act ("URAA ), s6 which provided, inter alia, for
576. Id. at 880, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
577. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
578. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994)) (amending the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 52-675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-395 (1994)).
579. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (describing conditions under which person may file abbreviated
application for approval of new drug).
580. Id.
581. Id. § 355(0)(2)(A)(vii)(1V).
582. See id. (setting forth paragraph IV requirement of generic drug applicant's certification
that in its opinion and to its best knowledge, patent pertaining to that drug "is invalid or will
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted").
583. See id. § 3550)(4)(B)(iii); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2) (A) (1994).
584. See 21 U.S.C. § 355() (4) (B) (iii) (stating that approval of abbreviated new drug
application is effective immediately on approval by government, unless infringement action is
brought by patent holder within 45 day period after current holder receives notice ofapplication
as required by § (2)(B)(i)).
585. For a discussion of the potential impact of GATT on patent practice, see Gary D.
Yacura, A Patent Practitioner's Guide to Understanding GATT and Its Implications, 4 FED. CIR. BJ. 423,
455-60 (1994).
586. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4983-85 (1994) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1994)).
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the patent term extension of certain extant patents."8 7 The URAA,
however, included safe harbor provisions limiting the remedies
available for infringement during the patent extension term to
equitable renumeration.11
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce Laboratories, Inc.,5"9 the Federal
Circuit held that the URAA does not shield from liability otherwise
infringing conduct under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 9° The court
concluded that liability under section (e) of the Hatch-Waxman
Act 91 arises from the submission of an ANDA containing a para-
graph IV certification, irrespective of whether the ANDA filing
occurred during the original patent term, or during the patent term
extension period, also known as the Delta period, provided by the
URAA. 92  The appellate court consequently reversed the district
court's dismissal of the case and remanded. 95
Bristol had sued Royce alleging infringement of its patent to the
antihypertensive drug, captopril, used to treat high blood pressure
and certain heart and kidney diseases. 5' The URAA postponed the
expiration of Bristol's patent from August 8, 1995 to February 13,
1996."95 The basis for the suit was the paragraph IV certification in
Royce's ANDA for a generic version of captopril.596 Although Royce
had not asserted patent invalidity, it stated that its generic version of
captopril would not infringe Bristol's patent because of the safe
harbor provisions of the URAA.' 9' In the district court, Royce filed
respective motions to dismiss the complaint and to set aside the
suspension of the FDA approval of its generic drug.59 The district
court agreed with Royce that after FDA approval, the safe harbor
587. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1).
588. Id. § 154(c) (2)-(3) (providing for equitable renumeration in lieu of traditional remedies
of 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-285).
589. 69 F.3d 1130, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 754
(1996).
590. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce Lab., Inc., 69 F.3d 1130, 1137-38, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1647 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 754 (1996).
591. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (describing conditions underwhich importation of patented genetic
materials is permissible, actions which constitute infringement, and available relief if
infringement is found).
592. See Bristol-Myers, 69 F.3d at 1136, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (noting that if Congress
intended for URAA to convert infringing conduct into non-infringing action, it would have
stated so in URAA).
593. Id. at 1138, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648, revm 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637 (S.D. Fla.
1995).
594. Id. at 1133, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,105,776. Id. at 1131, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
595. M, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
596. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
597. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
598. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
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provisions of the URAA would shield Royce from infringement
liability for the manufacture, use, or sale of its generic version of
captopril.599 Accordingly, the district court reasoned that the
"artificial" infringement triggered by Royce's filing of the ANDA
should not further delay FDA approval.' The district court thus
granted Royce's motions."°
The Federal Circuit held that the safe harbor provisions of the
URAA did not affect infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
6°2
The court concluded that the safe harbor provisions of the URAA did
not, as Royce argued, exempt from infringement liability the
commercialization of a generic drug simply because it occurred
during the patent extension term, as opposed to the original term, of
a drug patent."3 Instead, the URAA provided that the remedy for
infringement during the Delta period would be limited to equitable
renumeration.' In addition, the court ruled that the Hatch-
Waxman Act operated as a statutory bar, precluding FDA approval of
Royce's ANDA until after February 13, 1996, the expiration date of
the extended patent term.'
Earlier, in DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co.,6"6 the Federal Circuit had similarly held that the URAA did not
affect infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 7  The court
concluded that the safe harbor provisions of the URAA did not
exempt from infringement liability the commercialization of a generic
drug simply because it occurred during the Delta period." s The
Federal Circuit thus affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
declaratory judgment action.
6°9
Before enactment of the URAA, DuPont filed an ANDA certifying
that Bristol's patent to captopril would expire on August 8, 1995.61"
The URAA subsequently postponed the expiration of Bristol's patent
599. Id at 1134, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
600. I& at 1133-34, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
601. Id. at 1134, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (noting that no infringement was present
under 35 U.S.C. § 271 and therefore no need to prohibit FDA approval existed).
602. Id at 1136-37, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
603. Id- at 1136, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
604. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
605. Id. at 1137-38, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
606. 62 F.3d 1397, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
607. DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 62 F.3d 1397, 1402, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
608. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
609. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722, aft g894 F. Supp. 804 (D. Del. 1995).
610. Id. at 1400, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,105,776. Id. at 1398, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719.
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until February 13, 1996.611 DuPont chose not to amend its ANDA
to add a paragraph IV certification, but instead filed suit seeking a
declaration of noninfringement.612 The district court dismissed the
action for lack ofjurisdiction absent an actual controversy.
611
The Federal Circuit disagreed, concluding that Bristol had created
a reasonable apprehension of suit by threatening to sue DuPont for
infringement during the Delta period.614 The appellate court
affirmed the district court's dismissal, however, because DuPont failed
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.615 The Federal
Circuit decided that the URAA did not affect infringement liability
under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e) (2).616 In addition, the URAA did not
alter the operation of the statutory bar precluding FDA approval of
an accused infringer's ANDA until after the expiration of the patent
term.
617
The Federal Circuit considered patent term extension in a third
decision during 1995. In this case, however, the court addressed this
issue outside the context of an infringement defense. In Aktiebolaget
Astra v. Lehman,61 the Federal Circuit held that the determination
of the regulatory review period used to calculate the patent term
extension period under the Hatch-Waxman Act is within the exclusive
purview of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.619 The
appellate court thus affirmed the district court's dismissal of Astra's
suit to have the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks recompute
the patent term extension that the Secretary had assessed.62
Astra's patent covered a method of using phosphonoformic acid to
treat diseases associated with acquired immunodeficiency syn-
drome.62' Astra applied for FDA review of its patented drug,
FOSCAVIR.6 22  Accordingly, Astra sought a patent term extension
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.6 23  Astra disagreed with the
611. Id. at 1399, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
612. Id. at 1400, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
613. Id. at 1401, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721 (granting Bristol-Myer's motion to dismiss for
want of controversy as required by DeclaratoryJudgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994)).
614. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
615. Id. at 1402, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
616. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722 (stating that URAA does not change definition of
infringement under § 271(e) (2)).
617. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
618. 71 F.3d 1578, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
619. Aktiebolaget Astra v. Lehman, 71 F.3d 1578, 1580, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1212, 1215
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
620. Id. at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
621. Id. at 1579, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,215,113. Id. at 1578, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
622. Id. at 1579, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
623. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1996] 1587
THE AMERICAN UNERSIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1529
Secretary's determination of the length of the regulatory review
period, arguing that it should be extended an additional eighty-four
days.6 24  The Commissioner denied Astra's request for lack of
authority to reconsider the Secretary's calculation." Astra filed suit
in the district court against the Commissioner.626 In granting the
Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, the district court
agreed that the Hatch-Waxman Act committed the regulatory review
period determination solely to the Secretary.62 The district court
thus dismissed Astra's suit.
628
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's holding,
concluding that the terms of the statute clearly and unambiguously
vested authority of the regulatory period determination to the
Secretary.6 9  Moreover, the legislative history fully supported the
statutory construction given by both the district and appellate
courts.
63 0
c. Unenforceability for inequitable conduct
Patent applicants and their representatives have a duty of candor,
good faith, and honesty in their dealings with the USPTO.
631
Breach of this duty constitutes inequitable conduct.632  A party
alleging inequitable conduct must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the patent applicant intentionally misrepresented or
withheld material information from the patent examiner.633  Infor-
mation is material if a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable
examiner would have considered it necessary to a proper patentability
assessment of an invention.6' Circumstantial evidence may allow
624. Id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213 (claiming that, under 35 U.S.C. § 156, proper
extension should be 1126 days instead of 1042 days).
625. Id. at 1580, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213-14.
626. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
627. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
628. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
629. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
630. Id. at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
631. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
818 (1945) (stating that persons with pending applications at Patent Office have "uncompromis-
ing duty to report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the
applications in issue").
632. See id. (explaining that only through requiring disclosure can USPTO prevent
inequitable conduct, thereby protecting public from "fraudulent patent monopolies"); 37 G.F.R.
§ 1.56 (1995) (describing intentional failure to report material information as inequitable
conduct).
633. See Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
634. See 37 C.F.1. § 1.56 (1995) (delineating duties to disclose information material to
patentability).
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the inference of an intent to deceive the USPTO 35 Evidence of
gross negligence alone, however, cannot support a finding of
deceptive intent.
616
The Federal Circuit reviews for abuse of discretion in the district
court's determination of inequitable conduct.637 Misrepresentation,
materiality, and intent to deceive are underlying questions of fact that




In Therma-Tru Corp. v. Peachtree Doors Inc.,639 the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's judgment of unenforceability for
inequitable conduct.' Therma-Tru had sued Peachtree alleging
infringement of its patent to a glass fiber-reinforced plastic door."1
The claims of the patent recited a compression-molded plastic door
surface etched in a simulated wood grain texture to a depth between
0.003 and 0.009 inch and essentially devoid of glass fibers to a depth
of at least 0.005 inch.6 At trial, Peachtree contended that
Therma-Tru engaged in inequitable conduct by intentionally
withholding from the patent examiner an enabling disclosure of how
to make a compression-molded plastic door surface essentially devoid
of glass fibers to a depth of at least 0.005 inch.' While the jury
considered patent validity and infringement issues, the judge alone
decided the issue of inequitable conduct.'" In holding the patent
unenforceable, the trial judge determined that Therma-Tru had
intentionally withheld material information from the patent examin-
er. 6 5
The Federal Circuit held, however, that the district court's
judgment of unenforceability conflicted with the implied findings
635. See Paragon Podiatry Lab. v. KLM Lab. Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1561, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1993); KansasJack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151,219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 857, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating presumption that one intends natural consequences
of one's acts).
636. See Kingsdozm, 863 F.2d at 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392 (noting all evidence is
necessary in determining intent to deceive).
637. See id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
638. See id. at 872, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
639. 44 F.3d 988, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
640. Therma-Tru Corp. v. Peachtree Doors Inc., 44 F.3d 988, 998, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1995), revkg24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1493 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
641. I& at 991, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274-75. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,550,540. Id at 990, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
642. Id. at 991, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
643. Id. at 994, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
644. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
645. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
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underlying the jury verdicts of infringement and validity. 6 In
particular, the appellate court noted thejury finding that Therma-Tru
had properly disclosed the best mode of practicing the claimed
invention.' The court relied upon precedent to support the
notion that the jury's findings of fact control where inconsistencies
exist between the jury verdict and the judge's determinations.m
The Federal Circuit thus concluded that the district court's finding of
materiality was clearly erroneous."4°
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment based on
clear error in the district court's finding of intent.65 In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted the absence of evidence that
Therma-Tru knew at the time of filing the patent application that
some glass fibers were closer to the door surface than 0.005 inch.651
Indeed, photomicrograph evidence of the detail structure of the door
surface was available only later when Peachtree obtained it in
contemplation of litigation. 2  Moreover, the court found no
evidence of intent to mislead or deceive the patent examiner.
65 3
The Federal Circuit emphasized that a finding of such intent may not
be based simply on a failure to satisfy a condition of patentability,
such as the enablement requirement.
65 4
In Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.,65 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment that the patent-in-suit was not unenforce-
able.656  Glaxo had sued Novopharm alleging infringement of its
patent to a specific crystalline form of the antiulcer medication,
ranitidine hydrochloride."7 Novopharm conceded infringement,
but asserted, inter alia, that the patent was unenforceable due to the
inequitable conduct in Glaxo's submission of an erroneous declara-
tion in response to an initial rejection by the patent examiner."8
646. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
647. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
648. Id. at 995, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
649. Id. at 996, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
650. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
651. Id. at 995, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
652. Id. at 995-96, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
653. Id. at 996, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
654. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
655. 52 F.3d 1043, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 516 (1995).
656. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1052, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1995), afftg830 F. Supp. 871, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126 (E.D.N.C. 1993), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 516 (1995).
657. Id. at 1047, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,521,431. Id. at 1045, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
658. Id. at 1047, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
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The examiner had originally rejected the claims of the Glaxo patent
as anticipated or obvious in view of the prior art.659 The examiner
had then requested proof to support Glaxo's assertion that the prior
art disclosed a different crystalline form of ranitidine hydrochloride
than the form contained in Glaxo's claim.6" Glaxo provided test
data as proof, accompanied by a declaration of one of its scien-
661 Acordng te6thtists."' Accordingly, the examiner withdrew the rejection.662
At trial, Glaxo admitted that, contrary to statements in the
declaration, the test data did not show the actual results of tests on
the prior art compound.6  In fact, the scientists had substituted
test data from an analogous compound, because they knew that the
analogous compound would show characteristics identical to that of
the prior art compound.6' Although the district court found the
misstatements material, it nevertheless declined to infer fraudulent
intent.6" The trial court thus held that Novopharm failed to carry
its burden of proving inequitable conduct by clear and convincing
evidence. 6' Although it questioned the correctness of the district
court's determination, the Federal Circuit ascertained no clear error
warranting reversal.
667
In Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc.,6 s the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's entry of judgment on the jury verdict of
no inequitable conduct.669 Baxter had sued Spectramed alleging
infringement of its patent to a direct blood pressure monitoring
system that continuously calibrates its transducers.67 ° Spectramed
defended, inter alia, that the patent was unenforceable for inequitable
conduct.
671
The parties consented to a jury determination of inequitable
conduct.62 After trial, the jury rendered a verdict through special
interrogatories, finding that Spectramed had failed to prove materiali-
659. Id. at 1048, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
660. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
661. 1d., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
662. M, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
663. I& at 1049, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
664. Id. at 1048-49, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
665. Id. at 1049, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
666. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
667. See id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568 (noting Novopharm's failure to prove intent and
best mode defense).
668. 49 F.3d 1575, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denie, 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995).
669. Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F3d 1575, 1585,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1120, 1128 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995).
670. Id. at 1579, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,610,256. Id. at 1577, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
671. Id. at 1584, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
672. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
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ty or Baxter's intent to mislead the USPTO.673 The district court
denied Spectramed's motion for judgment of unenforceability as a
matter of law.
674
The Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the
jury's finding of the absence of intent to mislead the USPTO.675
Furthermore, the court noted that Spectramed did not have direct
evidence of intent, but instead sought to rely solely on inferences
drawn from the materiality of Baxter's alleged misrepresentations.67
The Federal Circuit added that it would have been improper for the




In Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc.,678 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment of unenforceability based on inequitable
conduct.679 Molins had sued Textron alleging infringement of its
patent to a fully automated system for the simultaneous machining of
related tool parts.' ° Even though Molins' attorney had represented
previously to foreign patent offices that a particular prior art
reference was the closest prior art, he did not cite this prior art
reference to the USPTO during the United States patent application
prosecution. 1 Molins cited the prior art reference to the USPTO
only after the issuance of the patent. 2 Moreover, Molins' prior art
statement listed this reference among a multitude of other references
cited in foreign prosecutions. 
83
After a bench trial, the district court held that Molins had engaged
in inequitable conduct during patent prosecution by withholding the
prior art reference from the USPTO. 4 The Federal Circuit ascer-
tained no error in the district court's determination of the materiality
of the withheld prior art reference and the district court's inference
673. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
674. Id. at 1580, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
675. Id. at 1584, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
676. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
677. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127-28.
678. 48 F.3d 1172, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
679. Molins PLCv. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1187,33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1834 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), vacating 840 F. Supp. 306, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1054 (D. Del. 1993), and af'g821
F. Supp. 1551, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1889 (D. Del. 1992).
680. Id. at 1175-76, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825-26. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent
Nos. 4,369,563 and 4,621,410. Id. at 1175, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824.
681. Id. at 1176-77, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
682. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
683. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
684. Id. at 1177, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
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of Molins' intent to deceive.' The district court, however, had also
based its inequitable conduct holding on Molins' failure to disclose
certain Lemelson patents" and a Lemelson patent application."
The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in this portion
of its decision.' In particular, the Federal Circuit agreed with
Molins' contention on appeal that its failure to cite the Lemelson
patents did not constitute inequitable conduct because the patent
examiner had cited and considered these references despite Molins'
nondisclosure. 9 In addition, the appellate court concluded that
the Lemelson patent application was merely cumulative and thus not
material.69°
d. Laches and estoppel
Laches and equitable estoppel are defenses to an allegation of
patent infringement.691 An accused infringer invoking a laches
defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff's unreasonable delay in bringing suit resulted in material
prejudice to the defendant192  Similarly, an accused infringer
invoking equitable estoppel must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff misled the defendant into reasonably
believing that the plaintiff had foregone enforcement of its patent
rights against the defendant, that the defendant relied on this belief,
and that material prejudice would result from survival of the
claim.693 The Federal Circuit reviews for an abuse of discretion the
district court's decision whether to apply the equitable defenses of
laches or equitable estoppel.
694
In Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Manufacturing Corp.,695 the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment that
685. Id at 1180-81, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828-29.
686. See id. at 1177, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826 (noting that patents were filed originally
in name ofJerome Lemelson).
687. I at 1184-85, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
688. Id. at 1185, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
689. i, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833.
690. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833.
691. SeeHemstreetv. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 1292, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1860, 1862 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that both defenses are based on factual determinations
made at trial court's discretion).
692. SeeAdvanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 988 F.2d 1157, 1161, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
693. SeeA.C. Aukerman Co. v. RL. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1041,22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (in banc) (noting that equitable estoppel, unlike laches,
is not factually limited).
694. I at 1028, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
695. 60 F.3d 770, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1822 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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laches and equitable estoppel barred Gasser's patent infringement
claim.696 Gasser had sued Infanti alleging infringement of its patent
to a bumper edge for chairs.6" In January 1979, Gasser sent Infanti
a cease-and-desist letter asserting that Infanti made and sold chairs
that infringed Gasser's patent.6" Although Infanti agreed to stop
such activity,6' Gasser became aware of continued infringement,
particularly through Infanti's trade show displays in 1983, 1986, and
1987.1°  Gasser did not correspond with Infanti until February
1988.701 After negotiating efforts with Infanti failed, Gasser filed its
patent infringement suit in December 1988.02
In reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor of
Infanti, the Federal Circuit focused on the lower court's disregard of
evidence relevant to the issues of laches and equitable estoppel.7°8
For example, the district court failed to consider certain relevant
factors, such as Infanti's intentional copying of Gasser's designs, when
making its laches inquiry.7°4 In addition, the Federal Circuit found
that the district court had improperly relied on a conclusory assertion
by Infanti that Gasser's silence was evidence of Gasser's forgiveness of
Infanti's infringing acts. °5 In view of Infanti's burden on a motion
for sunmaryjudgment, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court's treatment of the evidence and failure to draw reasonable
inferences in Gasser's favor were improper.
70 6
In ABB Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp., °  the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's summary dismissal of the case with
prejudice."' ABB had sued GMF alleging infringement of its patent
696. Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 772, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1822, 1823 (Fed. Cir. 1995), reujg21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1131 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
697. See id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (explaining that bumper edge is structural device
used for upholstered chairs). The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No. 4,106,739. Id., 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
698. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
699. Id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
700. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
701. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
702. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
703. Id. at 774-75, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825-27 (noting that summaryjudgment motion
requires consideration of "all pertinent factors").
704. Id. at 775, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
705. Id. at 776, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
706. Id. at 776-77, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827-28 (finding that appellants lacked sufficient
time to argue and present evidence).
707. 52 F.3d 1062,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1597 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995).
708. ABB Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp., 52 F.3d 1062, 1065, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1597, 1600 (Fed. Cir.), af'g 828 F. Supp. 1386, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1581 (E.D. Wis.
1993), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995).
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to a mechanical manipulator suitable for use in robotic arms.7, 9 In
September 1986, GMF specifically denied infringement 710 ABB did
not reallege infringement until June 1991. 71' The district court
found that, by its silence, ABB misled GMF into believing that ABB
would not enforce its patent rights against GMF. 712 In addition, the
trial court found that GMF relied on this silence, subsequently
expanding its infringing activity threefold.13
On appeal, ABB argued that no misleading conduct can exist
absent a "legally required threat of immediate and vigorous enforce-
ment."714 The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that a threat of
enforcement followed by silence was but one example of misleading
conduct.715 ABB also contended that no economic prejudice can
exist absent "a non-recoupable capital investment.7 6  Again, the
Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the proper inquiry regarding
economic prejudice is whether the alleged infringer changed its
economic position during the patent holder's period of enforcement
delay.717 Ascertaining no error in the district court's findings, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the summary dismissal on the basis of
equitable estoppel.18
e. Claim and issue preclusion
Claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars the relitigation of claims
already adjudicated.7 9  Similarly, issue preclusion, or collateral
estoppel, bars the relitigation of issues already adjudicated.720  A
party to a subsequent action invoking collateral estoppel regarding
issue preclusion must prove that the prior action: (1) involved the
same controlling facts and applicable law; (2) involved actual litigation
of the identical issue; (3) concluded with a final judgment to which
709. Id. at 1065,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598, afftg828 F. Supp. 1386,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1581 (E.D. Wis. 1993). The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No. 4,068,536. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1598.
710. Id. at 1063, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598.
711. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598.
712. Id. at 1064, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599.
713. Id. at 1065, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599.
714. Id. at 1064, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599.
715. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599.
716. Id. at 1065, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600.
717. Id,, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600.
718. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600.
719. SeeYoung Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1316, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding second infringement action barred when
issues were litigated previously).
720. See Mother's Restaurant, Inc. v. Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1569-70, 221 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that cancellation proceeding adjudication of similar
service marks issue prevents further adjudication on same issue).
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the identical issue was essential; and (4) permitted a "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate that issue. 21 As claim and issue preclusion
are not matters unique to patent cases, the Federal Circuit applies the
applicable law of the relevant regional circuit rather than its own
jurisprudence. 22
i. Claim preclusion
In Mars Inc. v. Nippon Conlux Kabushiki-Kaisha,71 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment that claim
preclusion barred the suit.72  Mars had sued Nippon Conlux
alleging inducement to infringe its patent to an electronic coin sorter
used in vending machines.7' Although Mars had a pending action
before the same district court on a related matter when it filed its
complaint, Mars did not move to consolidate the cases.
728
Mars had filed suit previously on the same patent against Conlux
USA, a wholly owned subsidiary of Nippon Conlux.727 Mars did not
name Nippon Conlux as a defendant.728  In that action, Mars
alleged that Conlux USA directly infringed, and induced others to
infringe, its patent.729 After trial, the jury returned a verdict of
infringement and awarded Mars $545,562. 7
In the present case, Nippon Conlux filed a motion for summary
judgment on claim preclusion grounds.731  The district court
granted this motion, finding that despite its subsidiary status, the
relationship between Nippon Conlux and Conlux USAwas sufficiently
close to justify barring the suit against Nippon Conlux on the same
underlying claim.
732
721. See In reFreeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1467, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 1449-50 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
722. SeeEpic Metals Corp. v. H.H. Robertson Co., 870 F.2d 1574, 1576, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1296, 1298-99 (Fed. Cir.) (noting application ofresjudicata principles is not exclusive to Federal
Circuit jurisdiction) (citing Hartley v. Mentor Corp. 869 F.2d 1469, 1471 n.1, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1138, 1139 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 855 (1989).
723. 58 F.3d 616, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
724. Mars Inc. v. Nippon Conlux Kabushiki-Kaisha, 58 F.3d 616, 620, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1995), afg 855 F. Supp. 673, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1776 (D. Del. 1994).
725. Id. at 617, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312 (describing that coin device distinguished real
from counterfeit coins). The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No. 3,918,565. Id. at 617, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
726. Id. at 618, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
727. Id. at 617, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
728. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
729. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
730. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
731. Id. at 618-19, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
732. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312 (noting that absent distinct legal basis for recovery
against defendant, prior action bars further proceedings).
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The Federal Circuit rejected Mars' contentions that Nippon Conlux
is a separate entity from Conlux USA and that the suits raised wholly
different causes of action."3 The appellate court concluded that
privity existed between Nippon Conlux and Conlux USA based on
Conlux USA's status as a wholly owned subsidiary, controlled and
financed by Nippon Conlux.7" Furthermore, the court embraced
regional circuit precedent recognizing that the standard for privity in
defensive assertions of res judicata is less onerous than that of claim
preclusion. 5  In rejecting Mars' claim that the suits involved
separate causes of action, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district
court that the suits derived from the same causes of action despite the
application of somewhat different legal theories." 6
ii. Issue preclusion
In Comair Rotron, Inc. v. Nippon Densan Corp.,7 7 the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's summaryjudgment of noninfringement
based on the application of collateral estoppel.71 In that case,
Rotron had sued Nidec alleging infringement of its patents to field
commutation magnets in direct current fans.7 9 The Connecticut
district court granted Nidec's motion for summary judgment based
upon prior litigation in NewJersey district court between Rotron and
Matsushita.74 During the damages phase of the prior litigation, the
New Jersey district court found that Nidec's fans, among those of
other manufacturers, were acceptable noninfringing alternatives to
those claimed in Rotron's patents.741
In reversing the district court's summary judgment, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court's finding regarding Nidec's
fans was not essential to the judgment.7' The court determined
that the district court could have reached a damages award decision
without considering Nidec's fans.7' The Federal Circuit thus held
733. Id. at 619, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313-14.
734. I&, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
735. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313-14 (favoring Third Circuit's focus on relationship
between parties rather than strict privity analysis).
736. Id. at 620, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314.
737. 49 F.3d 1535, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
738. Comair Rotron, Inc. v. Nippon Densan Corp., 49 F.3d 1535,1539,33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1929, 1932 (Fed. Cir. 1995), remanding sub nom. ComairRotron v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.,
31 F.3d 1177, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
739. Id. at 1536, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent Nos.
4,494,028 and 4,779,069. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
740. Id. at 1537, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
741. Id. at 1538, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
742. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
743. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
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that the application of collateral estoppel by the Connecticut district
court was improper.7' Furthermore, the Federal Circuit suggested
that ajudgrnent based on independent, alternative grounds may not




A prevailing plaintiff patent holder has several available statutory
remedies. These include damages, injunctive relief, and reasonable
746attorney fees.
1. Damages
A patent holder prevailing in an infringement action is entitled to
recover damages, interest, and costs.747 In general, such damages
must be adequate to compensate for infringement.78 In no circum-
stance, however, may damages be less than a reasonable royalty.49
One measure of damages depends on the sales and profits that the
patent holder lost because of the infringement.715 If the prevailing
patent holder cannot establish lost profits, then the court may
determine a reasonable royalty by using a hypothetical royalty
negotiation between the patent holder and a willing licensee at the
time of the alleged infringement.75 In addition, where the patent
holder's product embodies unpatented and patented components, the
court must assess whether the reasonable royalty may derive from the
entire market value of the combination.752 The Federal Circuit
744. Id. at 1539, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
745. Id. at 1538,33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS
§ 27, cmt. i (1982)).
746. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-285 (1994).
747. See id. § 284.
748. See id.
749. Id.
750. See infra notes 754-72 and accompanying text (considering Rite-Hite in detail).
751. See Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
679, 682 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (articulating use of hypothetical licensee/licensor agreement for
infringing ski resort showing no profits); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.,
318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (setting forth
comprehensive, albeit nonexclusive, list of relevant factors in determining reasonable royalty),
modyied and af/'d 446 F.2d 295, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870
(1971).
752. SeeLeesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958,974,202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 424,439 (Ct.
CL) (holding that compensation included market value royalties), cert. denied, 444 US. 991
(1979).
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reviews the district court's damages award for an abuse of discre-
tion.5
a. Lost profits
In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,7' the Federal Circuit affirmed in
banc the portion of the district court's judgment that awarded certain
lost profits after the damages phase of the bifurcated bench trial. 5
The appellate court held that a prevailing patent holder may recover
lost profits related to missed sales of certain products, which directly
competed with the defendant's infringing goods, even if the
patent-in-suit did not cover these products.
756
Rite-Hite had sued Kelley alleging infringement of its patent to a
locking device designed to prevent separation of freight trucks from
dock platforms during loading and unloading.1 7 Rite-Hite manu-
factured the patented truck restraints and distributed them through
independent sales organizations. 758 After a bench trial, the district
court found Kelley liable for infringement.7 9 The district court
further found that "but for" Kelley's sale of 3,825 infringing devices,
Rite-Hite would have made (i) eighty additional sales of its MDIL-55
restraining device, which the patent-in-suit covered; (ii) 3,243
additional sales of its ADL-100 restraining device, which the patent-in-
suit did not cover; and (iii) 1,692 additional dock levelers, a bridging
platform sold with the restraints.7 ° The district court thus awarded
Rite-Hite as a manufacturer the lost wholesale profits based, on the
MDIL-55, the ADL-100, and the dock levelers.761 The district court
also awarded Rite-Hite as a retailer a reasonable royalty based on
these lost sales.762
753. See State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1576-77, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting district court's discretion to award damages based
on market share), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
754. 56 F.3d 1538, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 184 (1995).
755. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1556,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1078 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (in banc), aff'g 774 F. Supp. 1514, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (E.D. Wis. 1991), cert.
denied, 116 S. C. 184 (1995).
756. Id. at 1548-49, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072 (noting alternative to Panduit test, which
requires intrinsic value of patent to be sole basis for lost profits).
757. Id. at 1542, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,373,847. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
758. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
759. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
760. Id. at 1543, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
761. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
762. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
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On appeal, Kelley challenged, inter alia, Rite-Hite's entitlement to
lost profits on the ADL-100. v Kelley conceded that Rite-Hite had
established "but for" causation, but argued that these lost profits were
not legally compensable because the patent-in-suit did not cover the
ADL-100. 7 The Federal Circuit held, however, that Rite-Hite's lost
ADL-100 sales were reasonably foreseeable in view of the direct
market competition between the ADL-100 and Kelley's infringing
restraints .71 In addition, the court rejected Kelley's contention that
awarding damages for products not covered by the patent-in-suit
constituted an expansion of patent rights in contravention of the
antitrust laws. 7' Affirming the district court's lost profits award, the
Federal Circuit held that although the Rite-Hite patent did not cover
the ADL-100, Kelley should have reasonably foreseen that its infringe-
ment of the patent-in-suit would have resulted in lost sales of the
ADL-100. 767
The Federal Circuit, however, did vacate the district court's damage
award based on lost sales of the dock levelers. 71 The appellate
court construed the precedent as holding that recovery of the entire
market value of a combination of unpatented and patented compo-
nents is proper only if those components compose a single machine
or constitute an otherwise functional unit.769 Concluding that the
dock levers could function independently of the truck restraints, the
Federal Circuit refused to allow recovery for unpatented components
sold with patented components for convenience or business rea-
sons.
7 70
Kelley petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari from the Federal
Circuit decision.771 The Supreme Court, however, denied the peti-
tion.
772
763. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
764. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
765. Id. at 1549, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072 (noting that when simultaneous sale of
unpatented and patented components occurs, courts apply "entire market value rule" to
determine reasonable royalties or lost profits).
766. Id. at 1547, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (arguing that patents should restrict
competition for sale of patented products).
767. Id. at 1549, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
768. Id. at 1551, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
769. Id. at 1550,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (noting that recovery for entire market value
is allowable when patented and unpatented components are analogous to single assembly or
entire machine).
770. Id at 1550-51, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073-74, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
771. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
772. Id.
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i. Exploitation by the patent holder
In King Instruments Corp. v. Perego,7"8 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's award of damages.774  As an initial matter, the
court reiterated its holding in Rite-Hite that a prevailing patent holder
may recover lost profits on missed sales of directly competing and
infringing goods, even if the patent-in-suit did not cover these
products.775
More importantly, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that a patent
holder may recover lost profits even though it does not make or sell
the patented device.776 The Federal Circuit sought to justify this
pronouncement through a consideration of the legislative history and
public policy rationale of the patent damages statute.7" In particu-
lar, the court noted that any prerequisite of patent exploitation to the
recovery of lost profits by the patent holder would contravene the
principle that the patent grant dictated only a right to exclude others
from infringing conduct, not a personal right to practice the
invention.
778
The district court found that Perego had infringed the '461 patent,
one of King's asserted three patents.779 King asserted lost profits
attributable to its missed sales of a tape loader, which directly
competed with Perego's infringing tape loader, even though the '461
patent did not cover this particular King tape loader.78° Factors
considered by the district court regarding damages included, inter
alia, (i) King's seventy percent tape loader market share before
Perego's infringement, (ii) the relative consumer attraction of features
in the King versus Perego tape loaders, and (iii) the existence of
acceptable noninfringing substitutes.781 The Federal Circuit ascer-
tained no abuse of discretion in the district court's assessment and
upheld the damage award.8 2
773. 65 F.3d 941, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
774. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 953, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1138
(Fed. Cir. 1995), affg 737 F. Supp. 1227, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1994 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding
no patent infringement against competitor by manufacturer of magnetic tape loading
machines).
775. Id. at 947, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
776. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133 (rejecting cross-appellant's contention that no
damages be awarded because appellee refrained from selling product).
777. Id. at 94748, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
778. Id. at 949, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
779. Id. at 945, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent Nos.
3,637,153, 3,825,461, and 3,997,123. Id. at 944, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
780. Id. at 947, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132-33.
781. Id. at 953, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137-38.
782. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
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ii. Noninfringing substitutes
In Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Ina.," the Federal Circuit
modified the district court's award of damages after a bench trial.'
84
The district court found that Micron infringed the Pall patent.7M
In addition to Pall and Micron, Cuno Corporation also sold similar
nylon membranes. 86 In reducing Pall's lost profit award, the district
court assessed market realities and found that Cuno's nylon mem-
branes were acceptable noninfringing substitutes.787
On appeal, Pall argued that this reduction was improper.78 In
May 1990, Pall and Cuno settled ongoing infringement litigation
through a patent license to Cuno.789 Pall contended that Cuno's
products therefore were not noninfringing substitutes before that
time. 7 ° In addition, Pall maintained that its subsequent license to
Cuno should not affect its recovery of lost profits resulting from
Micron's infringement.791 The Federal Circuit agreed with Pall
regarding the district court's reduction of the damage award before
the Cuno settlement.792 The Federal Circuit held that Pall should
recover lost profits, measured by Micron's infringing sales before May
1990,'9' and that the district court's reduction was proper for the
time after Cuno became a licensee.794 The Federal Circuit therefore
remanded to the district court for a recalculation of damages.795
b. Reasonable royalty
The amount of a reasonable royalty is a question of fact that the
Federal Circuit reviews for substantial evidence to support the jury's
783. 66 F.3d 1211, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
784. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1223, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,
1234 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
785. Id at 1215-16, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227 (holding ownership ofpatent for polyamide
microfiltration membranes, which remove harmful impurities from liquids, belonged to Pall
Corp.), modifying 792 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mass. 1992). The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,340,479. Id at 1215, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
786. Id. at 1222, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
787. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
788. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
789. Id,, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
790. I, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
791. IH, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
792. Id at 1223, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
793. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
794. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
795. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
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verdict, or for clear error where the trial judge sits as the
fact-finder.
796
In Unisplay, S.A. v. American Electronic Sign Co.,797 the Federal
Circuit vacated the district court's entry of the jury's reasonable
royalty award after the damages phase of the bifurcated trial.798
Unisplay had sued American alleging infringement of its patent to a
high visibility message display using reflective surfaces in the day and
backlighting at night.79 At the end of the liability phase of trial,
the district court entered judgment of infringement based on the jury
verdict.81° As a measure of damages, Unisplay sought a reasonable
royalty rather than lost profits. 0 ' In addition, Unisplay argued
during the damages phase of trial for a reasonable royalty measured
by its projected sales, not American's actual sales. 02 Unisplay
advanced the theory that American had "poisoned the market" for
Unisplay's signs.80 3
The district court, however, excluded the proffered sales projections
and instructed the jury that the "poisoning of the market" theory was
an improper measure of damages.'°4 The jury awarded Unisplay
$1,628,950, which represented fourteen percent of American's actual
sales.80 5 The district court increased this award by twenty-five
percent for willful infringement, granted prejudgment interest on the
actual damages, and awarded attorney fees to Unisplay.80 6  In
denying American's post-trial motion forjudgment as a matter of law,
the district court relied on evidence of, inter alia, a comparable
license involving a ten percent royalty, and testimony of Unisplay's
damages expert that at the time of trial a willing licensee would pay
a ten percent to twelve percent royalty.
807
The Federal Circuit held that the relevant evidence of record did
not support the jury's reasonable royalty determination. 0 8 None of
796. See SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922,1924 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing scope of discretion for Federal Circuit
in setting standard of review to determine reasonable royalty).
797. 69 F.3d 512, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
798. Unisplay, S.A. v. American Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512,520,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1540,
1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacating 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721 (E.D. Wash. 1993).
799. Id. at 514-15, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 154142. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,163,332. Id. at 513, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541.
800. Id. at 515, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
801. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
802. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
803. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
804. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1543.
805. Id. at 516 & n.5, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1543 & n.5.
806. Id. at 516, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1543.
807. Id. at 516-17, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 154344.
808. Id. at 518, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545.
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the proffered comparable licenses involved a royalty of more than ten
percent with minimum quarterly payments." 9  In addition, the
testimony of Unisplay's damages expert improperly focused on the
time of trial, instead of the time of the infringement.8 ° The court
thus vacated the damages award as excessive." Although American
had requested a new trial, the Federal Circuit encouraged Unisplay to
consider remittitur of the portion of the actual jury award in excess
of $1,428,950.812 This figure represented the application of the
"maximum recovery rule" using the ten percent royalty of the most
favorable comparable license presented as evidence at trial.s 8 The
Federal Circuit remanded to the district court with instructions to




a. Preliminary and permanent injunctions
In a patent infringement suit, the district court may grant a
preliminary injunction pending trial and a permanent injunction after
a full determination on the merits.815 The grant of a preliminary
injunction depends on the likelihood of success on the merits,
irreparable harm, balance of hardships, and the public interest.816
The moving party bears the burden of showing that these elements
support the award of a preliminary injunction." 7 The Federal
Circuit reviews the district court's grant of a preliminary or perma-
nent injunction for an abuse of discretion.818
In High Tech Medical Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Industries,
Inc.,"1 9 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a
809. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545.
810. 1& at 518-19, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545.
811. Id. at 520, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546.
812. I& at 519, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546.
813. Md, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546.
814. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546.
815. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994) (providing for grant in equity of injunctions of reasonable
scope to prevent violation of patent rights).
816. See New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1622, 1625 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
817. See H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 388, 2 U.S.PQ.2d
(BNA) 1926, 1928 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
818. SeeOrtho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936,945,22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119,
1127 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
819. 49 F.3d 1551, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005 (Fed. Cir.), reu' 161 F.R.D. 86 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
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preliminary injunction. 2 High Tech had sued New Image alleging
that New Image's AcuCam product infringed its patent to a hand-held
dental endoscope containing a small video camera to allow recorded
examination inside a patient's mouth.82' The claims of High Tech's
patent included the limitation that the internal camera be "rotatably
coupled" to the housing to facilitate shifts in the orientation of the
video image even while the operator holds the endoscope in a fixed
position.
8 22
The Federal Circuit held that the district court had ruled incorrect-
ly in favor of High Tech on two of the four requirements for the
grant of a preliminary injunction. 28 Specifically, the Federal Circuit
held that the district court erred in finding that High Tech would
likely succeed on its infringement claim, and that High Tech would
suffer irreparable harm if denied injunctive relief pending trial.8 24
Regarding the likelihood of success, the district court had relied on
evidence that one could conceivably loosen two screws in the AcuCam
housing to allow independent rotation of the internal camera similarly
to High Tech's patented endoscope.8s2 In contrast, the Federal
Circuit held that a device does not infringe merely because simple
alteration would place it within the scope of a patent claim. 26
According to the Federal Circuit, a device that is specifically designed
for alteration or assembly may infringe if such manipulation resulted
in a device meeting every limitation of a patent claim. 27
Based on the finding that High Tech would likely succeed on its
infringement claim, the district court presumed irreparable harm.
28
The Federal Circuit held that this finding must fall with the district
court's erroneous finding of likelihood of success. 29 Moreover, no
independent grounds for prospective harm existed.8 30 High Tech,
for example, did not make or sell dental endoscopes, nor had it
820. High Tech Medical Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551,1558,
33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005, 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
821. Id. at 1553, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2006. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Reexamined
Patent No. 4,858,001. 1&, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2006.
822. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2006.
823. Id. at 1554-55, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2008.
824. Id. at 1555-57, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2008-10.
825. 1&, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2008-10.
826. 14, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2008-10.
827. Id. at 1556, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2009.
828. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2009.
829. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2009.
830. See id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2009 (noting absence of any other information in
district court record that would support finding of irreparable harm).
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licensed rights to the manufacture or sale of the claimed inven-
tion.
831
In Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equipment Innovations, Inc.,
832
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a permanent
injunction."33 Metaullics had sued Molten alleging inducement to
infringe, and contributory infringement of, its patent to a metal
purification system." 4 The jury found Molten liable and awarded
Metaullics $254,421 in lost profits attributed to Molten's past sales of
infringing pumps and repair parts.835 The district court permanent-
ly enjoined Molten from selling repair parts to customers who
previously purchased its pumps to replace the original Metaullics
pump in the patented system.3 ' Accordingly, Metaullics did not
seek lost profits damages on the future repair parts sales.837
The district court denied Molten's request to modify the permanent
injunction.8" Molten contended that the payment of lost profits
damages for past events created an implied license for Molten's
customers to repair their pumps. 39 The district court disagreed,
stating that in view of Metaullics' limited damages request, such an
implied license would be inequitable."'
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that to modify the
injunction according to Molten would essentially deny Metaullics full
compensation for the infringement. 1  In addition, the appellate
court distinguished the case from King Instrument Corp. v. Otari
Corp.,842 in which the Federal Circuit held that the defendant could
sell its customers unpatented repair parts associated with infringing
products for which the patent holder had received full compensa-
tion."4 As opposed to the patent holder in King, Metaullics proved
entitlement to lost profits on the sale of spare parts.8" The Federal
831. Id. at 1556-57, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2009.
832. 72 F.3d 872, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affgNo. 1:92-CV-2106 (N.D.
Ohio Apr. 21, 1994).
833. Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 875, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
834. Id. at 876, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,169,584. Id. at 875, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
835. Id. at 877, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
836. Id, at 876, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
837. Id. at 877, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
838. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
839. Id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
840. Id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
841. Id at 882, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
842. 814 F.2d 1560, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
843. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 814 F.2d 1560, 1564, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201,
1204 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
844. Carborundum, 72 F.3d at 881, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
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Circuit thus held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to modify the permanent injunction, which prohibited
Molten from future spare parts sales."s
b. Restitution
In FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranauticss46 the Federal Circuit held that
the absence of property transfer in the context of injunctive relief did
not preclude restitution as a matter of law. 47 The court further
decided that the losses incurred here as a consequence of a wrongful-
ly granted injunction warranted recovery in damages rather than
restitution." s The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the district court's
denial of a motion seeking restitution. 49
FilmTec had sued Hydranautics alleging infringement of its patent
to a reverse osmosis membrane for water desalinization.
5 0
Hydranautics defended that FilmTec did not have actual title to the
patent.851 The district court bifurcated the trial into a liability and
a damages phase.8 52 After the liability phase of trial, the district
court found infringement and enjoined Hydranautics from further
manufacture of its accused membranes.
8 53
The Federal Circuit held that title in the patent vested in the
United States, not in FilmTec, and that FilmTec, therefore, lacked
standing. 54 On remand to the district court, Hydranautics sought
restitution for FilmTec's unjust enrichment during the time the
injunction prohibited Hydranautics from manufacturing its accused
membranes."55 The district court denied the motion because: (1)
the injunction did not cause Hydranautics to transfer any property to
FilmTec; (2) Hydranautics held title to the patent until the appellate
decision held otherwise; and (3) the losses suffered were recoverable
more properly as damages than restitution.
8 56
845. Id. at 882, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
846. 67 F.3d 931, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
847. FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931,939,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1415 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
848. Id. at 940, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
849. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
850. Id. at 933, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,277,344. IM., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1411.
851. IM. at 934, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
852. IM, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
853. IM., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
854. Id. at 934, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412.
855. I& at 939, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415.
856. IM, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415.
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The Federal Circuit agreed only with the district court's last stated
ground for denial."7  In particular, the court noted that
Hydranautics did not seek a stay of the pending injunction.8 3 In
any event, the Federal Circuit discerned no clear error in the district
court's denial of Hydranautics' motion.
8 59
3. Enhanced damages, attorney fees, and costs
A deliberate disregard of another's patent rights, as opposed to
actions taken by an accused infringer under a reasonable belief that
it did not infringe the patent, may support a finding of willful
infingement 8 ' A plaintiff patent holder must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that, in view of the totality of the circumstances,
the defendant's infringement was willful.8 ' Willfulness is a question
of fact that the Federal Circuit reviews for clear error. 2 Further-
more, a finding of willful infringement may form the basis for an
exceptional case determination.
863
The district court may award attorney fees and costs in an excep-
tional case.864 A party must prove an exceptional case by clear and
convincing evidence.s" The determination that a case is exception-
al is a question of fact that the Federal Circuit reviews for clear
error.
86
In addition, the district court has inherent authority to assess
attorney fees as a sanction against a party for bad faith litigation
conduct.8 7 The Federal Circuit reviews for an abuse of discretion
857. Id. at 939-40, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
858. Id. at 940, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
859. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
860. See Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1565, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 377, 388 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (noting that deliberate disregard, as opposed to inadvertance, indicated willfulness).
861. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson &Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1581, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
862. See Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v. Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik
Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1083, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1044, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988).
863. See S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201, 228 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 367,369 (Fed. Cir. 1986); cf Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448,
455, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (enumerating other circumstances, such as
inequitable conduct, litigation misconduct, vexatious litigation, and frivolity, that are appropriate
grounds for exceptional case finding).
864. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) (providing for award of attorney fees in "exceptional cases").
865. See Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 821, 824 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
866. SeeLA. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1128, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1913, 1921 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
867. See FED. R. CiV. P. 11, 37; see also Refac Int'l Ltd. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 921 F.2d 1247, 1256,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (providing example of court using inherent
power to award fees due to "frivolous" nature of appeal).
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the propriety of the district court's award of attorney fees and
costs.
8 68
In Graco, Inc. v. Binks Manufacturing Co.,859 the Federal Circuit
reversed a portion of the district court's judgment after a bench trial
finding Binks' infringement willful and awarding attorney fees.
870
Graco had sued Binks alleging infringement of its patent to a pump
to deliver heavy and abrasive fluent materials. 71 The district court
found Binks' infringement willful based on the inadequate opinion of
Binks' counsel and Binks' failure to heed the advice of its coun-
sel.8
72
Regarding the adequacy of the opinion of counsel, the district court
cited the absence of any analysis of the prosecution history or the
validity of the patent-in-suit.7 3 The Federal Circuit held that the
district court's findings were clearly erroneous. 74  Although the
opinion of Binks' attorney did not provide a detailed analysis, it
clearly reflected a consideration of the prosecution history.7" The
court did not contest the district court's determination that validity
was never assessed. 876 Instead, the Federal Circuit held that such an
absence alone does not render an opinion of counsel inadequate.
8 77
Furthermore, the court concluded that the opinion was detailed and
reasonable, albeit incorrect in hindsight.78
The Federal Circuit also disagreed with the district court's second
ground for finding willfulness. 79 The district court had found that
Binks ignored the advice of counsel to cease manufacture of certain
pump models." 0  In contrast, the Federal Circuit characterized
these acts as the result of carelessness or inadvertency of technical
personnel, not the wanton disregard of Graco's patent rights by Binks'
management.88' Moreover, the court pointed to Binks' candor in
stipulating at trial to the sales of these particular pumps as infringe-
868. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 629, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 634, 644 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 976 (1985).
869. 60 F.3d 785, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
870. Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 794-95, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255, 1262-63
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
871. Id. at 787-88, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256-57. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,035,109. Id. at 787, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
872. Id. at 792, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
873. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
874. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
875. Id. at 793, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
876. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
877. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
878. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
879. Id. at 794, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
880. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
881. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
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ments. as 2  The Federal Circuit accordingly reversed the district
court's finding of willfulness and the resultant award of attorney
fees. s
In Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.,' the Federal Circuit
reversed the portion of the district court's judgment finding Micron's
infringement willful.Ya Pall had sued Micron alleging infringement
of its patent to nylon microfiltration membranes suitable to filter
microorganisms or other microscopic contaminants.86  After a
bench trial, the district court found that Micron's Nylon 66 and Nylon
46 products infringed. 7
On the issue of willfulness, the district court determined that
Micron had made "'significant efforts"' during the initial manufacture
of its Nylon 66 membranes to avoid infringement of the Pall patent,
despite the absence of a noninfringement opinion of counsel.M In
1989, three years after Pall filed suit, Micron shifted most, but not all,
of its filter manufacture to the Nylon 46 product. 89 The district
court found that the production of Nylon 46 membranes did not
constitute willful infringement." ° The district court, however, held
that Micron should have known, when it shifted to the Nylon 46 filter,
that its Nylon 66 filters infringed the Pall patent.8 91 Accordingly,
the district court ruled that Micron's continued manufacture of Nylon
66 membranes after 1989 was evidence of willfulness.892 The district
court therefore doubled the damages award attributable to infringing
sales of the Nylon 66 product after 1989.891
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court's reason-
ing."° Because the district court found that the initial manufacture
of Nylon 66 filters did not constitute willful infringement, the court
held that the partial shift in manufacture from the Nylon 66 to the
Nylon 46 filters was simply not probative of willfulness regarding the
882. It, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
883. Id. at 795, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
884. 66 F.3d 1211, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
885. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1222, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,
1233 (Fed. Cir. 1995), retg792 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mass. 1992).
886. Id. at 1215, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,340,479. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
887. It at 1215-16, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
888. Id. at 1221, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations,
Inc., No. 86-1427-Y (D. Mass.June 24, 1991)).
889. It, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
890. It, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
891. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
892. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
893. 1It, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
894. It at 1222, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
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continued production of Nylon 66.895 The Federal Circuit stressed
that attempts to mitigate or avoid infringement, even if unsuccessful,
do not alone prove culpability in continuation of the allegedly
infringing conduct. 96
II. FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE
This section of the Article considers the procedural aspects of
patent enforcement in the district courts and the Federal Circuit.
These issues include jurisdiction, disposition, and control of cases.
897
For instance, as courts vested under Article III of the United States
Constitution, the district courts and the Federal Circuit must remain
cognizant of their limited jurisdiction.898 The failure of the parties
at any time during the litigation to satisfy the requirements of Article
III divests the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear the case. 89 In
addition, the district courts and the Federal Circuit may dispose of
and control their cases as appropriate under the applicable federal
rules.900
A. District Court Practice
1. Jurisdiction
a. Declaratory judgment
The DeclaratoryJudgment Act established a procedural mechanism
for the resolution of actual controversies between interested par-
ties.9 ' A determination of an actual controversy requires the
existence of a reasonable apprehension of immediate harm.902 The
party seeking a declaratory judgment has the burden of establishing
895. ML, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232-33.
896. Md, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
897. See infra notes 901-1185 and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing various
procedural issues which occur commonly in patent litigation).
898. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 913, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921, 1923 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
899. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975).
900. See infra notes 982-1074 and accompanying text (regarding summary judgment,
dismissal, contempt, settlement, and leave to amend).
901. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1994) (creating remedy of declaratory judgment). See
generally Lawrence M. Sung, Comment, Intellectual Property Protection Or Protectionism? Declaratory
Judgment Use By Patent Owners Against Prospective Infringers, 42 Am. U. L. REV. 239, 249-56 (1992)
(discussing Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988) and application of
declaratory judgment jurisprudence to patent cases).
902. SeeArrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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the existence of an actual case or controversy.90 3  Declaratory
judgment jurisdiction is a question of law that the Federal Circuit
reviews de novo.9 4
In Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha,0 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a declaratory
judgment action."' Phillips had filed suit in December 1992
seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of
Kato's reissue patent to expandable fasteners for reversibly attaching
panels to one another.0 7  In dismissing Phillips' declaratory judg-
ment suit, the district court concluded that Phillips lacked reasonable
apprehension of suit by Kato. °
Kato first contacted Phillips in October 1987, asserting that Phillips
manufactured fasteners within the scope of Kato's patent.9" Kato
concurrently offered Phillips a license.910 Phillips refused, stating
that the patent was invalid.9"
In 1989, Kato applied for reissue of its patent912 Despite Phillips'
submission of additional prior art as a participant in this patent office
proceeding, the Kato patent reissued.913 In June 1992, Kato sent
Phillips a copy of the reissued patent and again invited Phillips to
license the patented technology.914 Although Kato subsequently
requested from Phillips sales and pricing information on which to
base a licensing proposal, no further written correspondence
specifically regarding the patent occurred between the parties prior
to suit.915
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the totality
of the circumstances did not support the existence of an objectively
reasonable apprehension of suit.91 6 In particular, the appellate
903. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967, 1974 (1993) (noting
placement of burden (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937))).
904. See BP Chems., Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1124, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
905. 57 F.3d 1051, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
906. Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1054, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affig No. 92-C-0940-C, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20874 (W.D. Wis. July 20, 1993).
907. Id at 1052, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Reissue Patent
No. 33,809, reissued from U.S. Patent No. 4,311,421. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
908. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
909. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
910. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
911. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
912. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
913. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
914. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
915. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
916. Id. at 1053-54, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
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court noted that the parties had not exhausted license negotia-
tions.9 17 The Federal Circuit further held that the particular choice
of words and phrases used by the patent holder to characterize an
alleged infringer's conduct cannot alone create a reasonable
apprehension of suit.1 '
In Super Sack Manufacturing Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp.,9 19 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the declarato-
ry judgment counterclaim.92 Super Sack had sued Chase alleging
infringement of its patents to collapsible receptacles through which
to deliver flowable materials such as chemicals, grain, or fertilizer.92'
Chase counterclaimed for a declaratoryjudgment of noninfringement
and invalidity.922 Six years later, Super Sack filed a motion to
dismiss Chase's counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction. 92 In its
motion, Super Sack promised not to sue Chase for any past acts of
patent infringement.924  The district court granted Super Sack's
motion.92
On appeal, Chase argued as a threshold matter that Super Sack's
promise to sue was ineffectual because it was merely a statement of
counsel in court documents. 926 Noting the estoppel effect of the
representation by Super Sack's attorney, the Federal Circuit rejected
Chase's contention.927 Chase next asserted the continuing existence
of an actual controversy, because Super Sack's promise not to sue
extended only to past infringing activity.928  Given the absence of
any contention that Chase was presently engaged in infringing
conduct, however, the Federal Circuit held that no justiciable
controversy remained.929 The court thus affirmed the district court's
dismissal of Chase's declaratory judgment counterclaim. 90
917. Id. at 1053, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
918. Id. at 1054, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
919. 57 F.3d 1054, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 815
(1996).
920. Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1139, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied; 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996).
921. Id. at 1055, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent Nos.
4,143,796 and 4,194,652. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
922. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
923. Id. at 1056, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
924. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
925. Id. at 1057, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
926. Id. at 1059, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
927. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
928. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
929. Id. at 1059-60, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143-44.
930. Id. at 1060, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
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In Serco Services Co. v. Kelley Co.,91 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's summary dismissal of the declaratory judgment
action. 2 Serco had filed suit in Texas district court against Kelley
for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity.933 In
response, Kelley filed suit three days later in Wisconsin district court
alleging that Serco infringed its patent to a locking device designed
to prevent separation of freight trucks from dock platforms during
loading and unloading.9" Despite the conclusion that Serco
satisfied the jurisdictional requirements for a declaratory judgment
action, the Texas district court dismissed the suit so that Kelley's
infringement suit in the Wisconsin district court could proceed."3
The Texas district court exercised its discretion to dismiss based on
the availability of witnesses and documents in Wisconsin.9 6  In
addition, the Texas district court considered Serco's motive to
preempt Kelley's lawsuit as one factor in its decision to dismiss.
93 7
The Federal Circuit concluded that the Texas district court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the declaratory judgment action.
938
The court recognized that despite the rule favoring the first-filed
forum in the parties' "race to the courthouse," interests of judicial
efficiency may warrant dismissal in favor of the second-filed fo-
rum.9 9  The Federal Circuit agreed with the Texas district court
that the concentration of Kelley's documents and witnesses in
Wisconsin supported dismissal.94°
b. Personal jufisdiction
The existence of personal jurisdiction is a question of law that the
Federal Circuit reviews de novo.941 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit
applies its own precedent, rather than the law of the relevant regional
circuit.94 2
931. 51 F.3d 1037, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995), afig 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1795 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
932. Serco Servs. Co. v. Kelley Co., 51 F.3d 1037, 1040, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1217, 1219
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
933. Id at 1038, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
934. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No. 4,448,325.
Ld. at 1037, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
935. Id. at 1038, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
936. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
937. lId at 1040, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
938. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
939. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
940. M, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
941. See North Am. Philips Corp. v. American Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1578, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
942. See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 18 (1994).
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In Akro Corp. v. Luker," the Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal
of Akro's declaratory judgment action for want of personal jurisdic-
tion and remanded to the district court.9" Akro, an Ohio corpora-
tion, had filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against Luker, a
California resident.9  Akro asserted declaratory judgment jurisdic-
tion based on Luker's allegations that Akro infringed its patent to
vehicle floor mats.9" Luker did not answer Akro's complaint, but
instead filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
9 47
Akro appealed the district court's grant of Luker's motion.
948
The Federal Circuit considered whether an assertion ofjurisdiction
would be consistent with the Ohio long-arm statute and due process
principles.949 The appellate court decided that the Ohio long-arm
statute authorized the exercise ofjurisdiction to the extent that such
an exercise comported with due process.95 The Federal Circuit
focused on instances of Luker's activities purposefully directed at
Ohio.95' In particular, the court noted Luker's warning letter to
Akro and Luker's entry into an exclusive license agreement with
Pretty Products, an Ohio corporate manufacturer of floor mat
carpets.95 Moreover, the court determined that Akro's declaratory
judgment action related directly to Luker's conduct.955 In addition,
Luker did not contend that the Ohio district court's exercise of
jurisdiction would be somehow unconstitutionally unreasonable.9 4
The Federal Circuit thus concluded that the district court erred in
dismissing Akro's suit for lack of personal jurisdiction over Luker. 5
c. Standing
In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics Institute, Inc.,956 the Federal
Circuit affinned the district court's summary dismissal of the case for
943. 45 F.3d 1541,33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1505 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denie 115 S. Ct. 2277 (1995).
944. Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1549, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1505, 1512 (Fed. Cir.),
cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 2277 (1995).
945. Id. at 1543, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,871,602. Id. at 1542, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506.
946. Id at 1543, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506.
947. 1&, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506.
948. M, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506.
949. I& at 1544, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
950. M, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
951. Id. at 1546, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
952. 1&, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
953. Id. at 1549, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
954. M, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
955. M, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
956. 52 F.3d 1026,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 274 (1995).
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lack of standing.95 7  Ortho had sued Genetics Institute ("GI")
alleging infringement of its patent to a deoxyribonucleic acid
("DNA") sequence encoding erythropoietin, which stimulates the
synthesis of red blood cells.95 Ortho is a worldwide licensee of the
patent-in-suit.9 59 After filing suit, Ortho sought participation by the
licensor, Amgen, as an involuntary plaintiff." In response to GI's
motion to dismiss, Ortho premised its standing as a coplaintiff on its
rights under the license.961 This agreement provided Ortho with an
exclusive license to practice the patent in the United States and
abroad, and with the right to sue infringers on its own if Amgen
declined to participate. 2
In ruling against Ortho, the district court concluded that Ortho's
license was nonexclusive despite the express language of the license
agreement because the licensor, Amgen, retained rights to use the
patented invention in the United States.9" In addition, the district
court rejected Ortho's argument that in any event its exclusive license
abroad was an adequate basis for standing.9" The district court,
however, did not decide whether Ortho's right to sue under the
license granted Ortho standing.96
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's rulings.
96
The court emphasized that the substantive rights, not the titles used
by the parties, control the status of a licensee.967 Here, the license
agreement granted Ortho no actual proprietary interest in the
patent.9" The court held that despite any economic injury it may
incur, a nonexclusive licensee lacks standing because it suffers no
legal injury absent such a property interest.9 69  Moreover, the right
957. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1035, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1444, 1450 (Fed. Cir.), affgAmgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 808 F. Supp. 894,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578 (D. Iass. 1992), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 274 (1995).
958. Id. at 1029, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,703,008. Id. at 1028, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.
959. Id. at 1028-29, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.
960. Id. at 1029, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.
961. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.
962. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445-46.
963. Id at 1030, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
964. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
965. Id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
966. Id. at 1035, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450.
967. Id. at 1032, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448. The court stated that "it is the licensee's
beneficial ownership of a right to prevent others from making, using or selling the patented
technology that provides the foundation for co-plaintiff standing, not simply that the word
exclusive' may or may not appear in the license." Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448.
968. Id. at 1033, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449.
969. Id at 1031, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
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to sue provisions of the license could not vest Ortho with a right it
otherwise would not have.970
In Abbott Laboratories v. Diamedix Corp.,971 the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's denial of intervention in the patent
infringement action.9 72  Abbott was the exclusive licensee of
Diamedix's patents to immunoassays for the detection of hepatitis
virus in blood.9 73 Abbott had sued Ortho alleging infringement of
these patents.974 The district court denied Diamedix's motion to
intervene, holding that Abbott would adequately represent Diamedix's
interests.97 5
The Federal Circuit, however, held that the district court should
have allowed Diamedix to intervene because Abbott lacked standing
to pursue alone its patent infringement action.97 6  The court
emphasized that an infringement suit required participation by the
patent holder.97 7 Rejecting Abbott's arguments to the contrary, the
Federal Circuit noted that although Diamedix had conveyed broad
rights to Abbott, Diamedix nonetheless retained substantial interests
in the patents.9 " Embracing Supreme Court precedent, the Federal
Circuit reiterated that any transfer of less than the entirety of rights
under a patent constitutes a license rather than an assignment.97 9
Accordingly, a patent licensee bringing an infringement suit mustjoin
the patent holder licensor as a necessary party.98 0 The Federal
Circuit stated, however, that entitlement to intervention dictated
nothing regarding the nature of participation by the intervenor.98 '
970. Id. at 1034, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450.
971. 47 F.3d 1128, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1771 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
972. Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1134, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1771, 1776
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
973. Id. at 1129, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent Nos.
4,474,878 and 4,642,285. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
974. Id at 1130, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73.
975. iL, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
976. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
977. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
978. IM at 1132, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
979. Id at 1131, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773-74.
980. Id. at 1132, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
981. Id at 1133, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
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2. Dispositions
a. Summary judgment
A district court must enter summary judgment in the absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact between the parties. 2 The propri-
ety of summary judgment is a question of law that the Federal Circuit
reviews de novo.9s In addition, the Federal Circuit applies the
relevant law of the appropriate regional circuit based on the
underlying claim.
9s4
In Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. Northlake Marketing & Supply, Inc.,
85
the Federal Circuit reversed portions of the district court's summary
judgment of noninfringement and remanded." 6  Glaverbel had
sued Northlake alleging infringement of its patents to the use of
particular formulations of oxidizable substances, such as aluminum,
silicon, magnesium, or zirconium, in ceramic welding processes for
repairing industrial furnaces.
987
Northlake filed a motion for partial summary judgment of
noninfringement accompanied by documents containing results of
tests Glaverbel conducted regarding specific Northlake formula-
dons.9" Northlake's motion contained five paragraphs, three
seeking judgments of noninfringement generally (paragraphs one,
three, and four) and two requesting judgments of noninfringement
as to specific Northlake formulations (paragraphs two and five) 98
Glaverbel conceded that the Northlake formulations described in
three of the four accompanying exhibits did not infringe the
Glaverbel patents.99 The district court refused to consider any of
982. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (mandating summaryjudgment "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law"); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (interpreting
Rule 56(c) as not requiring party moving for summary judgment to always make affirmative
evidentiary showing).
983. See Conroy v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1575, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1373, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
984. See Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., 15 F.3d 1573, 1583, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1886, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
985. 45 F.3d 1550, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1496 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
986. Glaverbel Societe Aonyme v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550, 1562, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1496, 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1995), re'g in part 139 F.R.D. 368 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 19,
1991).
987. Id at 1553-54, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497-98. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent
Nos. 3,684,560 and 4,489,022. Id. at 1553, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497.
988. Id. at 1559-60, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502-03.
989. Id. at 1560, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502-03.
990. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
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the exhibits, finding them all inadmissible for lack of authentica-
don.991 Accordingly, the district court held that Northlake's motion
for summaryjudgment failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56 (c)
and (e). 9 The district court also concluded that Glaverbel failed
to prove the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.993 The
district court, however, did not distinguish between the respective
paragraphs of the motion and entered summary judgment in the
entirety for Northlake.994
The Federal Circuit noted that paragraphs one, three, and four did
not concern any specific formulation or product in controversy.99
Northlake provided no evidence to support its general requests in
these paragraphs.996 Given Northlake's failure to meet its initial
burden as the moving party on summary judgment, the court held
that Glaverbel did not have to produce any responsive evidence to
defeat Northlake's motion." The Federal Circuit therefore con-
cluded that the district court improperly entered summary judgment
as to the subject matter of paragraphs one, three, and four.
998
As for paragraphs two and five, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
entry of summary judgment."a The Federal Circuit held that the
district court properly entered summary judgment for Northlake as to
the specific formulations of which Glaverbel conceded
noninfringement.1°°° The court, however, stated that the district
court should have considered the one accompanying exhibit (Exhibit
D) discussing specific Northlake formulations that Glaverbel still
regarded as infringing' °°  This exhibit had been received into
evidence without objection as part of earlier deposition testimo-
ny."' 2 Applying Seventh Circuit precedent, the Federal Circuit
ruled that a district court may consider exhibits that are a part of a
deposition record.1003  In response to Northlake's motion with
respect to Exhibit D, Glaverbel provided nothing beyond attorney
argument asserting infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
991. Id. at 1561, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503-04.
992. Id. at 1559, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
993. I&, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
994. Id. at 1562, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
995. Id. at 1561, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
996. Id. at 1561-62, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
997. Id. at 1562, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
998. I, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
999. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
1000. Ia at 1561, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
1001. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
1002. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
1003. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
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lents."' 4  Finding this insufficient to meet Glaverbel's burden as
the nonmoving party to establish the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, the Federal Circuit affirmed the summary judgment




A district court has inherent authority to control its docket. 1°°6
The court may exercise this discretion by dismissing a lawsuit.Y°07
The Federal Circuit reviews for an abuse of discretion the propriety
of the district court's dismissal.""08 In addition, the Federal Circuit
applies the relevant law of the appropriate regional circuit.19
In L.E.A. Dynatech, Inc. v. Allina,0 10 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal without prejudice of the patent infringe-
ment suit.1011 In that case, Dynatech had filed a declaratory judg-
ment action against Allina seeking a declaration of noninfringement
and unenforceability of five of Allina's patents. 10 12 Allina counter-
claimed for infringement of one of these patents."" In addition,
Allina sought reissue of this patent.10 1 4  The patent examiner
rejected all the claims in Allina's reissue application." 5 Based on
this action, Dynatech filed a motion to dismiss Allina's counterclaim,
and requested attorney fees and costs. 10 16 The district court grant-
ed Dynatech's motion and awarded $537,541.60 in fees and
costs. 1 17 The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had
not abused its discretion in dismissing Allina's counterclaim. 018 In
particular, the Federal Circuit noted that dismissal without prejudice
1004. Id. at 1562, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
1005. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
1006. See Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
1007. See infra notes 1011-19 and accompanying text (discussing Dynatech).
1008. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962).
1009. SeeBiodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 856, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (applying law of regional circuit on procedural questions), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 980 (1992).
1010. 49 F.3d 1527, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1011. L.E.A. Dynatech, Inc. v. Allina, 49 F.3d 1527, 1532, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839, 1843
(Fed. Cir. 1995), ajF'gNo. 91-219-CIV-T-17B, 1994 WL 794114 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 1994).
1012. Id. at 1529, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1013. 1&, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No. 4,931,895.
Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1014. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1015. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
1016. 1&, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
1017. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
1018. Id at 1530, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
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amounted to a stay of the proceedings pending appeal of the patent
examiner's rejection of the reissue claims.
0 19
c. Contempt
A patent holder may bring contempt proceedings against a party
enjoined by court order from further infringement.10 20 The patent
holder must prove contempt by clear and convincing evidence.
10 21
The Federal Circuit reviews for an abuse of discretion the district
court's finding of contempt.0 22  Given the summary nature of
contempt proceedings, the Federal Circuit generally admonishes
against them.
0 23
In Arbek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Moazzam,1 24 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for contempt.'
0 25
Arbek had sued Moazzam alleging infringement of its design patent
to ornamental cabinets. 1 21 Moazzam admitted infringement. 10 27
Accordingly, the district court entered an order enjoining Moazzam
from any future acts of infringement.'0 28  Three years later, Arbek
discovered that Moazzam was selling slightly modified cabinets in
apparent violation of the court order.'0 29 Based on the existence
of substantial open issues of infringement, the district court dismissed
Arbek's motion for contempt and went on to hold that Moazzam's
modified cabinet did not infringe the Arbek patent.1030 The Feder-
al Circuit affirmed the dismissal but vacated the noninfringement
finding as premature. 03'
In Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equipment Innovations, Inc.,
10 32
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment finding the
infringer in contempt for violating the existing permanent injunc-
1019. ML, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42.
1020. See KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A.Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1530, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
676, 682 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1021. See id., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 682.
1022. See id. at 1532, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 684.
1023. See id. at 1530-31, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 682-83.
1024. 55 F.3d 1567, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1025. Arbek Mfg., Inc. v. Moazzam, 55 F.3d 1567, 1570-71, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670, 1672
(Fed. Cir. 1995), afg No. 90-1814 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 1994).
1026. Id at 1569, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Design Patent No.
313,323. Id at 1568, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
1027. 1L at 1569, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
1028. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
1029. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
1030. 1L at 1570, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671-72.
1031. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
1032. 72 F.3d 872, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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don.' 38 Metaullics had sued Molten alleging inducement to in-
fringe, and contributory infringement of, its patent to a metal
purification system.1114 Following the entry of judgment on the jury
verdict finding Molten liable, the district court permanently enjoined
Molten from selling repair parts to customers who previously
purchased its pumps to replace the original Metaullics pump in the
patented system.' 35 The district court modified its injunction to
allow Molten a two-week grace period so that its customers could
convert to noninfringing systems.0 36 During the grace period,
Molten did not convert a single pump to a noninfringing design and
simply continued to sell repair parts to its customers.13 7  The
district court found these parts sales excessive and held Molten in
contempt, assessing $23,000 in additional damages plus attorney fees
and costs associated with the contempt proceeding.
03 8
On appeal, Molten based its challenge to the district court's
contempt finding solely on the asserted impropriety of the permanent
injunction.10 39 The Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of the
permanent injunction, however.' 4 The court thus concluded that
the district court had not abused its discretion in holding Molten in
contempt."°41 Moreover, the Federal Circuit emphasized that a
party dissatisfied with the injunction may not simply ignore it, as
Molten did.1°' 2
d. Settlement
The judicial system favors dispute resolution through voluntary
settlements.1 43 Accordingly, a party seeking to invalidate a settle-
ment agreement bears a heavy burden of persuasion.'
0 44
In Core-Vent Corp. v. Implant Innovations, Inc.," 5 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of a consentjudgment based
1033. Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 883, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169,1177 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affgNo. 1:92-CV-2106 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 6,1994).
1034. Id. at 876, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,169,584. Id. at 875, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
1035. Id. at 876, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
1036. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
1037. Id. at 877, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
1038. I&, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
1039. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
1040. Id. at 881, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174-75.
1041. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174-75.
1042. Id. at 883, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
1043. See S&T Mfg. Co. v. County of Hillsborough, 815 F.2d 676, 678, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1280, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
1044. See id., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280-81.
1045. 53 F.3d 1252, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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upon the parties' voluntary settlement.a°46 Core-Vent had sued
Implant alleging infringement of its patent to a dental implant
anchor."' 7 Following jury selection at trial, the parties stipulated
in open court to infringement based on an oral settlement agreement
that further set forth the amount of damages and the framework of
a license. 4' The trial judge ordered the parties to reduce the
settlement to writing.''49 Afterwards, however, the parties were
unable to agree to the exact terms of the license.' 0 The district
court nevertheless entered final judgment on a proposed consent
judgment that Core-Vent drafted.105' In response, Implant moved
for reconsideration of the judgment and requested a hearing on the
disputed issues concerning the license.0 52  The district court
denied the motion, holding that the statements of counsel in open
court set forth adequate terms of a license agreement to which the
proposed consent judgment essentially conformed.0 53
On appeal, Implant contended that it would not have agreed to the
settlement had it known that the consent judgment embodied a final
license agreement. 0 54 Implant asserted that it believed at trial that
the consent judgment merely required the parties to negotiate and
execute a license. 55 In particular, Implant argued that it would
not have agreed to a license absent a provision allowing Implant to
cease royalty payments if any subsequent court or agency action
invalidated the Core-Vent patent.0 5 6 The Federal Circuit, however,
agreed wholly with the district court's reasoning that the settlement
agreement included an enforceable license.' 57 Furthermore, the
appellate court rejected Implant's contentions that the terms of the
consent judgment varied from those recited in open court.0 5 '
1046. Core-Vent Corp. v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 53 F.3d 1252, 1260,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1581, 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1047. Id. at 1254, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,960,381. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
1048. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
1049. Id. at 1255, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
1050. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
1051. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
1052. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
1053. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
1054. Id. at 1256, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
1055. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
1056. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
1057. Id at 1259, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587.
1058. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587.
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e. Leave to amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that leave to amend a
party's pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires."1 59
In FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics,1° ° the Federal Circuit held that
absent "sham" litigation, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine precluded any
claim of antitrust violation.0 6 The court thus affirmed the district
court's denial of the defendant's motion to amend its answer to add
a counterclaim for antitrust violations.'..2
FilmTec had sued Hydranautics alleging infringement of its patent
to a reverse osmosis membrane for water desalinization.'
0 63
Hydranautics defended that FilmTec did not have actual title to the
patent.'06 The district court bifurcated the trial into a liability and
a damages phase.106 After the liability phase of trial, the district
court found infringement and enjoined Hydranautics from further
manufacture of its accused membranes.0 6 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit held that title in the patent vested in the United States, not
FilmTec, and thus FilmTec lacked standing."6
On remand to the district court, Hydranautics sought to amend its
answer to add a counterclaim for antitrust violations.'0 8 As
grounds for denial of Hydranautics' motion, FilmTec asserted the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and undue delay. 06 9  In denying
Hydranautics' motion, the district court focused on the undue delay,
noting the filing of the motion well after full adjudication and appeal
of the underlying patent infringement action.
0 70
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasoning,
stating that Hydranautics could not have asserted sham litigation until
after the appellate decision reversing the district court's judgment in
favor of FilmTec. l 1 Before then, FilmTec's successful patent
1059. FED. R. Cw. P. 15.
1060. 67 F.3d 931, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1061. FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931,937,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1414 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
1062. Id. at 940, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
1063. Id. at 933, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,277,344. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1411.
1064. Id. at 934, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
1065. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
1066. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
1067. M, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412.
1068. Id. at 934-35, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412.
1069. Id. at 935, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412.
1070. Id at 936, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
1071. Id. at 937, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
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infringement action obviously could not be a sham. 17 2  In any
event, the Federal Circuit concluded that FilmTec's suit was not
objectively unreasonable. ' The court thus held that the excep-




In L.E.A. Dynatech, Inc. v. Allina,' 75 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's award of attorney fees and costs upon dismissal
without prejudice of the patent infringement suit.0 76 The Federal
Circuit concluded that Allina had manipulated the progress of the
district court proceedings based on the perceived strength of its
case. 10 77  In addition, the court declined to consider Allina's new
argument on appeal that the award of fees and costs would bankrupt
Allina.
078
In Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc.,0 79 the Federal Circuit
held that the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Van
Klassens for failure to withdraw its counterclaim. s10 Imagineering
had sued Van Klassens alleging infringement of its design patent to
a rocking chair.0 8' Van Kiassens counterclaimed for a declaratory
judgment of invalidity and noninfringement.0° 2 Imagineering with-
drew its patent infringement claim, but Van Klassens did not withdraw
its declaratory judgment counterclaim."' 3  The district court dis-
missed Van Klassens' counterclaim and sanctioned Van Klassens for
refusing to withdraw its counterclaim voluntarily.' 4 Imagineering
admitted invalidity of its design patent' 01 Van Klassens filed a
1072. Id. at 936, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
1073. Id. at 938, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415.
1074. Id. at 939, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415.
1075. 49 F.3d 1527, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1076. L.EA Dynatech, Inc. v. Allina, 49 F.3d 1527, 1532, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839, 1843
(Fed. Cir. 1995), affg No. 91-219-CIV-T-17B, 1994 WL 794114 (M.D. Na. Feb. 4, 1994).
1077. Id. at 1531, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
1078. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
1079. 53 F.3d 1260, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denieA, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995).
1080. Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Kiassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1266-67, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1526, 1531 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995).
1081. Id. at 1262, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Design Patent No.
313,320. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
1082. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
1083. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
1084. Id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
1085. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
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motion to recover its attorney fees, which the district court de-
nied.
08 6
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's imposition of
sanctions against Van Klassens for failure to withdraw voluntarily its
counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of design patent invalidity
and noninfringement.10 8  The court held that Van Klassens risked
a waiver of any objections to the district court's rulings on Van
Klassens' counterclaim and motion for attorney fees.'
b. Special master
A district court has the inherent discretion to appoint, without the
consent of the parties, a special master to assist the court in a
case.' 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 further defines the
court's authority to assign issues to a special master.' 9
In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 91 the
Federal Circuit held that jury consideration of a special master's
written infringement findings did not deprive the defendant of its
right to a jury trial. 1°92 The court considered the totality of the
circumstances, particularly noting the complexity of the case, and
concluded that any procedural error was harmless.' 9 3 The Federal
Circuit thus affirmed the district court's entry ofjudgment on the jury
verdict of infringement °94
Festo had sued Shoketsu alleging infringement of its patents
("Carroll" and "Stoll") to a material transport piston/cylinder system
in which movement of a sleeve member outside the cylinder is
magnetically coupled to the movement of the piston inside the
cylinder."° 5 The trial judge appointed a special master to make
recommendations regarding validity and infringement.096 The
1086. Id. at 1262-63, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527-28.
1087. Id. at 1267, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532, revu 155 F.RD. 68, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
1088. Id. at 1266, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531.
1089. SeeExpartePeterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (appointing auditor as special master to
parse out issues for trial); see also Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560,
1566-67, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057, 1060-61 (Fed. Cir.) (considering special master's findings
regarding patent validity and infringement), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 892 (1988).
1090. See FED. R. COv. P. 53.
1091. 72 F.3d 857, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1092. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857,866, 37 U.SP.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1093. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1094. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1095. Id. at 860, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent Nos.
3,779,401 (Carroll) and 4,354,125 (Stoll). Id. at 860-62, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162-63.
1096. I. at 865, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
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master's report favored Festo on the validity issues and Shoketsu on
the infringement issues.
1 7
Before trial, the district court granted partial summaryjudgment of
infringement of the Carroll patent under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.' The parties tried the remaining issues to the jury 1 99
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 (e) (3) provides for an
oral presentation only of the master's report to the jury, the district
court determined that the complexity of the technical and legal issues
warranted allowing the jury to examine the sixty-eight-page written
report before deliberations.""0 The jury found both patents valid,
and the Stoll patent infringed." 0' In addition, the jury assessed
damages against Shoketsu. l°2 The district court denied Shoketsu's
post-trial motion for a new trial, holding that any procedural error did
not substantially affect the parties' rights."0 3
On appeal, Shoketsu contended that the possession of the master's
report by the jury tainted the deliberations and effectively denied
Shoketsu's right to an independent jury trial."0 4  The Federal
Circuit agreed, however, with the district court that any error was
harmless. 10 5 The court emphasized that Shoketsu itself asked the
jury in closing to give serious weight to the master's determina-
tions.11° In any event, the jury found infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents despite the special master's statement that
prosecution history estoppel barred Festo's asserted range of
equivalents.' 0 7 The Federal Circuit thus concluded that the totality
of the circumstances did not justify a new trial.
0 8
1097. I&, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
1098. Id. at 860, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
1099. Id. at 862, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1100. Id. at 865-66, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67. Although all the jurors were supposed
to return their copies of the report to the court before deliberations, apparently not all the
copies were so returned. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1101. Id. at 866, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1102. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. The accessory sale doctrine allows for the recovery
of lost profits on auxiliary components which derive their market value from the patented item;
the auxiliary components have no independent purpose on their own. See Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1103. Festo, 72 F.3d at 866, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1104. Id. at 864, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
1105. Id. at 865, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1106. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1107. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1108. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (stating jury's conclusion on infringement was
contrary to master's conclusion).
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B. Federal Circuit Practice
1. Jurisdiction
In In re Graves," 9 the Federal Circuit held that it had jurisdiction
to consider the merits of an appeal filed prior to the Board's
reconsideration decision.111 0 The court concluded that despite the
ineffective notice of appeal when filed, the appeal became ripe upon
the Board's disposition of the pending reconsideration request."l
On the merits, the Federal Circuit held that the Board's construction
of the claims of Graves' application was proper and that the rejections
of the claims as anticipated were not clearly erroneous.11 2 The
appellate court thus affirmed the Board's decision. 3
The claims covered a device and method for testing and recording
the continuity of circuits in electronic systems.1114 The minority of
the Board construed certain claims of the application to require test
signal monitoring of input and output points simultaneously.1 5
The majority concluded, however, that the claims did not require
monitoring of one input point and multiple output points simulta-
neously.1  Following this claim construction, the majority deter-
mined that a prior art patent ("Rockwell") anticipated the claimed
invention." 7 The dissenting Board member instead construed the
claims to require parallel (simultaneous) monitoring of an input
point and multiple output points and thus disagreed with the
majority's resulting finding of anticipation."
The Board rendered its decision upholding the examiner's
rejections. 11 9  Graves requested that the Board reconsider its
decision." While this request was pending, however, Graves filed
a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit.112' About a week later,
the Board denied Graves' request to modify its original decision.
11 12
1109. 69 F.3d 1147, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1110. InreGraves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1151,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697,1699-1700 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1111. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699-1700.
1112. Id. at 1153, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701-02.
1113. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701-02.
1114. Id. at 1149,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698. The application at issue was U.S. Application
Serial No. 07/870,452. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
1115. i at 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
1116. 1, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
1117. M, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
1118. IMt, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
1119. l1. at 1149, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
1120. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
1121. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
1122. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
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As an initial matter on appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that
the Board had jurisdiction to reconsider its original decision despite
Graves' intervening notice of appeal. 123  Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit had jurisdiction to hear Graves' appeal from the reconsidera-
tion decision of the Board.1124 The court recognized that Graves'
notice of appeal would have been untimely had it been based on the
Board's original, as opposed to reconsideration, decision. 125  The
Federal Circuit thus reasoned that when Graves filed the notice of
appeal, the original Board decision was "unappealable."1 26  The
notice therefore did not divest the Board of jurisdiction to hear
Graves' request for reconsideration. 1127 In view of these particular
circumstances, the Federal Circuit considered Graves' appeal simply
suspended until the Board rendered its reconsideration deci-
sion.1
28
On the merits, the Federal Circuit concluded that the majority's
claim construction, although a broad reading of the claims, was
consistent with the specification.1129  Furthermore, the court held
that the Rockwell patent would anticipate the claimed invention even
under the claim construction asserted by the dissenting Board
member."30 To reach this conclusion, the Federal Circuit stated
that one skilled in the art would have known of simultaneous output
point monitoring, and have applied that knowledge to the series




Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a) provides that a district court
"shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon" in a case tried without a jury, or with an advisory jury.1
3 2
This facilitates a meaningful review of a bench decision by the
appellate court.
1123. Id. at 1150, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
1124. Id. at 1151, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.
1125. Id. at 1150, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
1126. d., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
1127. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
1128. Id. at 1151, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.
1129. See id. at 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701 (citing cases stating that broad reading of
claim is not inconsistent with applicant's disclosures).
1130. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
1131. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
1132. FED. R, Cw. P. 52(a).
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In Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Industries, Inc.,"' the Federal Circuit
vacated the district court's damages award."' The court held that
the district court failed to provide sufficiently comprehensive factual
findings pursuant to Rule 52(a). 3  Transmatic had sued Gulton
alleging infringement of its patent to a public transit bus interior
lighting fixture used to illuminate advertising placards." 6
Despite Transmatic's timely jury demand, the district court
conducted a bench trial with an advisory jury."s3 Prior to trial, the
district court granted Transmatic's motion for partial summary
judgment that Transmatic's patent was not invalid."' The district
court also granted Gulton's motion for partial summary judgment of
noninfringement literally." 9 After trial, the district court found
Gulton liable for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and
held that Transmatic had not engaged in inequitable conduct." 4°
The district court further found that Gulton's infringement was not
willful and awarded $3,023,773 in damages."'
The district court had apparently adopted the entire advisory jury
verdict on damages."42 Both the jury and the trial judge rejected
Gulton's asserted downward adjustments to Transmatic's lost profits
claim."' However, in view of the absence of detailed findings and
reasoning by the district court, the Federal Circuit was unable to
engage in any meaningful review of the award." 44 The Federal
Circuit thus vacated and remanded this portion of the district court's
judgment." 4'
1133. 53 F.3d 1270, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1134. Tranismatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 1270, 1279,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1035,
1042 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (vacating, inter alia, damages award). The orders appealed are found at
Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 526,31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (E.D. Mich.
1994); Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1026, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1541
(E.D. Mich. 1993); and Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1052, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1561 (E.D. Mich. 1993). The Federal Circuit vacated the damage award and remanded
for further proceedings; reversed the finding of no literal infringement; vacated as moot the
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents; and affirmed on all other issues
raised. Transmatir, 53 F.3d at 1272, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
1135. Id. at 1276, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
1136. Id. at 1272-74,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037-38. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Reexamined
Patent No. 4,387,415. Id. at 1272, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
1137. Id. at 1274, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
1138. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
1139. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
1140. I&, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
1141. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
1142. Id. at 1276, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
1143. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
1144. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
1145. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
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3. Sanctions
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 authorizes the Federal
Circuit to award attorney fees and costs for a frivolous appeal."4
In Nasatka v. Delta Scientific Corp.," 7 the Federal Circuit dismissed
the appeal as moot in light of an intervening decision of the district
court, and imposed sanctions on Nasatka for pursuing a frivolous
appeal."48 Nasatka had sued Delta alleging infringement of its
patent to a vehicle security barricade."49 The sole accused device
was a barricade that Delta claimed to have sold only to the United
States government for use at the Pentagon near Washington,
D.C."5 Because the United States Court of Federal Claims is the
exclusive forum for suits against government supply contractors
involving patented articles, Delta filed a motion to dismiss Nasatka's
infringement action for lack of jurisdiction."5  In response,
Nasatka brought a new allegation that barricades, which Delta sold to
the World Trade Center in New York City, also infringed Nasatka's
patent."52  Accordingly, Nasatka contended that district court
jurisdiction remained proper."
53
The district court dismissed Nasatka's claims as to the Pentagon
barricades for lack of jurisdiction. 54  In addition, however, the
district court granted Delta's request to dismiss without prejudice
Nasatka's claims as to the World Trade Center barriers for failure to
conduct an adequate investigation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 prior to filing suit. 55  The district court further
granted Delta's motion for attorney fees and costs under Rule
11156
Nasatka appealed the district court's dismissal of its claims as to the
World Trade Center barricades."5 7 One month after Nasatka filed
1146. FED. R. APP. P. 38 (allowing single or double costs to be awarded).
1147. 58 F.3d 1578, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 912
(1996).
1148. Nasatka v. Delta Scientific Corp., 58 F.3d 1578, 1579, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1374
(Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 912 (1996).
1149. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No. 4,630,395.
Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
1150. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
1151. M. 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. See28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1994) (providing that claims
against manufacturers of products for federal government file suit exclusively in Court of Federal
Claims).
1152. Id at 1579-80, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374-75.
1153. Id. at 1580, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
1154. M, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
1155. 1&, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
1156. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
1157. Id, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
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its appeal with the Federal Circuit, however, the district court vacated
its Rule 11 sanctions order."58 On Nasatka's motion for reconsid-
eration, the district court concluded that the prefiling investigation
regarding the World Trade Center barricades was adequate after
all.1159
The Federal Circuit advised Nasatka to dismiss its appeal voluntarily
and refile its complaint alleging infringement by Delta's World Trade
Center barricades."' Nasatka, however, ignored this suggestion
because it believed that a favorable appellate ruling on the adequacy
of the prefiling investigation would eliminate the basis for Delta's
motion before the district court for attorney fees and costs pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 285 as a prevailing party.1 6' Despite further notice
by the Federal Circuit of the possibility of sanctions against Nasatka
under Rule 38, Nasatka continued to prosecute its appeal."
62
Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot
and imposed sanctions against Nasatka." 63 The court concluded
that Nasatka's concerns regarding the award of attorney fees and costs
under § 285 did not justify continued appeal here, because Nasatka
would have recourse in a subsequent appeal from any adverse district
court order."' In addition, because the district court's reconsider-
ation of its sanctions order did not moot that part of the district
court's original judgment regarding Nasatka's claims as to the
Pentagon barricades, the Federal Circuit let the original judgment
stand.
1 65
In Munoz v. Strahm Farms, Inc.,"66 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment of invalidity, and imposed sanctions on
Munoz for filing a frivolous appeal."67 Munoz had sued Strahm
alleging infringement of its patent to a crop harvesting machine."'
Strahm counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of, inter alia,
invalidity based on anticipation.' 69  Munoz requested a jury trial
1158. Id. at 1581, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
1159. 1d, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
1160. I& at 1582, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
1161. Id. at 1581, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
1162. Id. at 1582, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
1163. Id. at 1583, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
1164. Id. at 1581, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
1165. Id. at 1581 n.2, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376 n.2.
1166. 69 F.3d 501, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1499 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1167. Munoz v. Strahm Farms, Inc., 69 F.3d 501, 505, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1499, 1503 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
1168. Id. at 502, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No.
4,616,468. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
1169. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. Strahm also counterclaimed for patent unen-
forceability. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
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held in multiple parts, beginning with a consideration of the
anticipation issue.
170
During this first phase of trial, Strahm introduced evidence of a
public use of another crop harvesting machine ("Elmore/Sahara")
before the critical date for anticipation of the Munoz patent.
117
Munoz did not dispute that the Elmore/Sahara machine would
anticipate the claimed invention if Strahm could prove its public use
before the critical date." 72  The jury heard testimony from four
Strahm witnesses that the Elnore/Sahara crop harvester was in public
use before the critical date, and contrary testimony from seven Munoz
witnesses."73 In addition, over Munoz's objection, the trial judge
admitted into evidence unauthenticated, dated slide pictures of the
anticipatory machine and the testimony of a farm advisor
("Mayberry") who purportedly took them before the critical
date." 74 At the end of the first phase of trial, the jury rendered a
verdict of invalidity of the Munoz patent based on the anticipatory
prior use of the Elmore/Sahara crop harvester.17 5 Munoz declined
to file a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
117
On appeal, Munoz challenged only the district court's evidentiary
rulings."7 7 In particular, Munoz asserted that the trial court erred
in failing to exclude the Mayberry testimony and slides." 78 Munoz
contended that the date information on the slides was inadmissible
hearsay falling outside the business records exception. 79  The
Federal Circuit disagreed."8" Moreover, the court held that the
Mayberry evidence was merely cumulative, and thus any error in its
introduction at trial would be harmless."'
The Federal Circuit also ruled on Strahm's motion for attorney fees
and costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 based
on a frivolous appeal."8 2 The court held that Munoz's appeal was
frivolous as filed and as argued."83 The Federal Circuit cited the
absence of any legal or factual ground for reversal of the jury's verdict
1170. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
1171. 1i&, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
1172. d., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500-01.
1173. I. at 502-03, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
1174. Id. at 502, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
1175. Id. at 503, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
1176. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
1177. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
1178. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
1179. Id, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
1180. Id. at 504, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
1181. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
1182. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
1183. Id. at 504-05, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502-03.
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given the cumulative evidence presented on anticipatory public
use.1184  In addition, the Federal Circuit rested its decision to
impose sanctions on: (1) the difficult burden on appeal faced by an
appellant challenging a jury's factual findings; (2) the lack of a
motion for judgment as a matter of law before the district court; and
(3) Munoz's failure to address adequately in his briefs the substantial
record evidence contrary to his position.
118 5
III. OBTAINING PATENT RIGHTS
This section provides an overview of cases involving issues of
patentability.11 86 In addition, Part III comments on several proce-
dural aspects of practice before the USPTO.
A. Patent Application Prosecution
1. Subject matter
Patent protection extends to only certain types of inventions as set
forth by statute. 118 7 Such inventions include processes, machines,
manufactures, and compositions of matter.188  In recent years, the
patentability of computer-related technology has been the focus of the
Federal Circuit's inquiries into patentable subject matter.
1 89
In In re Beauregard,19 the Federal Circuit considered the
Commissioner's motion to dismiss Beauregard's appeal of the
rejection of his computer program product claims.'19' The Com-
missioner conceded that computer programs in a tangible medium
such as a floppy diskette constitute patentable subject matter.1 92
In view of the parties' agreement that the printed matter doctrine was
inapplicable, the Federal Circuit vacated the Board's decision.
1 3
1184. IM., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502-03.
1185. Id at 505, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
1186. For a statistical study of the Federal Circuit's dispositions in appeals from the USPTO
regarding §§ 102, 103, and 112 rejections, see Dunner, supra note 207, at Charts 1C, 2C, and
3C.
1187. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining what inventions are patentable).
1188. See id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that
availability of patent protection applies to "anything under the sun that is made by man").
1189. See In reAlappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1588 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(in banc) (reversing rejection of claims to computer operating pursuant to software as
nonstatutory subject matter under § 101).
1190. 53 F.3d 1583, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1191. In reBeauregard, 53 F.Sd 1583, 1584, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1192. Md., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
1193. 1I&, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
1634
1995 PATENT LAW DECISIONS
2. Conditions for patentability
a. Novelty
To receive patent protection, an invention must be novel, that is,
not anticipated by the prior art."94 An invention is anticipated if
a single prior art reference expressly or inherently discloses each and
every limitation of the claimed invention.1 9 Anticipation is a
question of fact that the Federal Circuit reviews for clear error."
9 6
A patent applicant may overcome an anticipation rejection by
attesting to an actual reduction to practice of the claimed invention
before the effective date of the cited reference.19 7 A party seeking
to show actual reduction to practice must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the invention existed and worked for its intended
purpose."9 8 The Federal Circuit reviews de novo the ultimate
conclusion of a reduction to practice and reviews for clear error the
underlying fact findings." 9
In In re Asahi/America Inc., 2°0 the Federal Circuit reversed the
Board's decision, which upheld the patent examiner's rejection of the
claims as anticipated. 2° Asahi had filed a request for reexamina-
tion of its patent in view of a patent issued to Sweeney.2 02 The
subject matter of the Asahi reexamination application was a double
pipe system in which the surrounding outer pipe would contain any
leaks from the inner pipe. 2103  If the Sweeney patent constituted
prior art, it would anticipate, and thus invalidate, the Asahi pat-
ent.2 04 Asahi therefore attempted to remove the Sweeney patent
as a prior art reference by showing actual reduction to practice before
1194. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (describing conditions of patentability, novelty, and loss of
right to patent).
1195. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1196. See id., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010 (stating that anticipation is question of fact); see
also Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 619, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
634, 637 (Fed. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 976 (1985).
1197. See37 C.F.R. § 1.31 (1995).
1198. SeeLacotte v. Thomas, 758 F.2d 611, 613, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 633, 634 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(stating reduction to practice must be proven by preponderance of evidence).
1199. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 81, 87 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating reduction to practice is reviewed "free of the clearly
erroneous standard"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
1200. 68 F.3d 442, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1201. In re Asahi/Am. Inc., 68 F.3d 442, 447, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921, 1924 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
1202. Id. at 443, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
1203. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921-22. The reexamination proceeding involved U.S.
Patent No. 4,930,544. Id. at 442, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
1204. Id. at 443, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921-22.
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the April 1987 filing date of the Sweeney patent application.2 5
Asahi relied solely on trade articles published before April 1987 that
contained photographs of the double containment pipe system
claimed in the Asahi patent. 12°  The Board agreed, however, with
the patent examiner that Asahi's evidence was insufficient to prove an
actual reduction to practice, and that the Sweeney patent thus stood
as anticipatory prior art to the Asahi patent.
20 7
The Federal Circuit held that the double containment pipe systems
depicted in the photographs conformed to the claims of the Asahi
patent.1208  In addition, the court ruled that in view of the simple
nature of the claimed invention, mere construction was sufficient to
satisfy the criteria for actual reduction to practice. 1209 The Federal
Circuit thus reversed the invalidity holding and remanded.
2 10
b. Nonobviousness
To receive patent protection, an invention must be nonobvious at
the time of the invention to one of ordinary skill in the relevant
art.12 1' Nonobviousness is a question of law that the Federal Circuit
reviews de novo. 2  The conclusion of nonobviousness, however,
is subject to underlying factual findings, which the Federal Circuit
reviews for clear error'
21 3
During patent prosecution, the patent examiner bears the burden
of establishing a prima facie case of obviousness. 21 4  Once the
examiner meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the applicant
to provide rebuttal evidence to overcome the examiner's rejec-
tion.
12 15
1205. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
1206. Id, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
1207. Id. at 444, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
1208. Id. at 446-47, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
1209. Id. at 447, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
1210. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
1211. See35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (defining conditions for patentability, including nonobvious
subject matter).
1212. SeeIn reDonaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1192,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845, 1848 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (in banc).
1213. See In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1577, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934, 1935 (Fed. Cir.
1990); see also In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1311, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1040, 1041 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (discussing what prior art teaches as question of fact reviewable under clearly erroneous
standard).
1214. See In reRijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1955, 1956 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1215. See id.; see also In reDilon, 919 F.2d 688, 692-93, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1901 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (in banc) ("Such rebuttal or argument can consist of... any other argument or
presentation of evidence that is pertinent."), cert. denkAe, 500 U.S. 904 (1991).
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In In re Deue, 21 6 the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's deci-
sion, which upheld the patent examiner's final rejection of the claims
as obvious. 1217 The subject matter of the application involved DNA
encoding heparin-binding growth factor ("HBGF") of bovine and
human origins. 218 As such, this appeal presented the Federal
Circuit with the challenge of merging the technical realities of
biotechnology inventions with traditional patent law principles. 1 9
The arrival of such appeals has been recent, only since In re
O'Farrel41220 and uncommon, with only about fourteen substantive
cases since 1988.1221 The frequency of these appeals, however, will
likely increase as continually greater numbers of biotechnology patent
applications are filed with USPTO.
Deuel achieved the claimed invention by first isolating bovine
uterine HBGF protein and determining the amino acid sequence of
a small beginning portion of the protein. 22 Next, Deuel chemical-
ly synthesized a single strand of DNA ("oligonucleotide") correspond-
ing to this short amino acid sequence.1223  Using this oligonucleo-
tide, Deuel isolated the naturally occurring bovine HBGF gene from
1216. 51 F.3d 1552, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1217. In reDeuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1554,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1995), revo
33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1993).
1218. 1d., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211. The application at issue was U.S. Application Serial
No. 07/542,232. Id. at 1553, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
1219. For a comprehensive treatise on biotechnology patent law, see HAROLD C. WEGNER,
PATENT LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY CHEMICALS & PHARMACEUTICALS (2d ed. 1994).
1220. 853 F.2d 894, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1221. See, eg., Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding manufacturer's process for making human growth
hormone was in literal scope of patent); Novo Nordisk of N. Am., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 77
F.3d 1364,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1773 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (declaring that human growth hormone
prodfction process did not literally infringe patent for producing human growth hormone
product); Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1743 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(affirming summary judgment concerning interference in fusion protein production); In re
Denel, 51 F.3d 1552, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding patent claims for
DNA molecules encoding proteins that stimulate cell division is not invalid as obvious); In re
Nunberg, 40 F.3d 1250,33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming decision to reject
application of patent for protein production); In reVaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reviewing rejection of certain claims for invention using genetic
engineering techniques for production of insecticidal proteins); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding
plaintiff's claim on patent for DNA sequences encoding Erythropoietin were not obvious, and
had priority over defendant's claim on method for purification of Erythropoietin); In reEli Lilly
& Co., 902 F.2d 943, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1741 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming Patent and
Trademark Office ruling which rejected, as obvious, claim on method of using lasalocid to
enhance feed conversion efficiency in animals); In re Gangadharam, 889 F.2d 1101, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding Board of Patent Appeals erred when it
rejected as obvious applicants' patent claim on in vivo drug treatment); Merck & Co., Inc. v.
Biocraft Lab., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (ruling patent for
diuretic formulations invalid for obviousness).
1222. Deue 51 F.3d at 1555, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1223. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
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a collection of DNAs ("cDNA library") encoding bovine uterine
proteins in general. 1224 Deuel then determined the entire nucleo-
tide sequence of the bovine uterine HBGF gene and predicted the
amino acid sequence of the remaining unknown portion of the
bovine uterine I-IBGF protein.12  These bovine sequences consti-
tuted part of the claimed invention.
12 26
In addition, Deuel used the oligonucleotide to isolate the naturally
occurring human HBGF gene from the human placental cDNA
library. 227 Similarly, Deuel then determined the entire nucleotide
sequence of the human placental HBGF gene and predicted the
amino acid sequence of the complete human placental HBGF pro-
tein.2 8  These human sequences also constituted part of the
claimed invention.
1229
The patent examiner asserted that the claimed invention would
have been prima facie obvious in view of the prior art. 121 The
prior art upon which the examiner relied included a reference
("Maniatis") describing gene cloning methods and a reference
("Bohlen") disclosing the partial amino acid sequences of proteins
composing a subclass of human and bovine HBGF.1' The examin-
er maintained that Bohlen would have motivated one skilled in the
art to clone the respective human and bovine HBGF genes according
to Maniatis to produce human and bovine HBGF protein.
1212
In rebuttal, Deuel contended that the prior art taught away from
the claimed invention, that is, Bohlen suggested that one skilled in
the art would not have been motivated to use the same oligonucleo-
tide to isolate the genes for human and bovine HBGF, as Deuel
ultimately did." 3 The examiner rejected Deuel's "teaching away'
argument, however, apparently relying on the unfounded notion that
HBGF genes were homologous across species. 21' The Board
upheld the examiner's rejection, focusing instead on the allegedly
routine nature of cloning."'
1224. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1225. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1226. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1227. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1228. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1229. IM, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1230. I1& at 1555-56, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212-13.
1231. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212-13.
1232. Id at 1556, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1233. Id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1234. Id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1235. Id at 1556-67, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
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In reversing the rejection of Deuel's claims, the Federal Circuit
relied on precedent stating that, absent prior art suggesting the
specific claimed DNA, a particular DNA sequence is not obvious
simply because the prior art discloses general methods for isolating
DNA. 236 The court further applied precedent regarding chemical
inventions that the prior art disclosure of a broad genus does not
necessarily render obvious a specific compound within the ge-
nus. 11' Because many different DNA sequences can encode the
identical protein, the court concluded that the simple disclosure of
the protein does not render any particular one of those DNA
sequences obvious, absent prior art specifically pointing one out.
12 3
The Federal Circuit also discounted the Board's contentions regard-
ing the routine nature of Deuel's work as mere speculation and
impermissible hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention.
1239
In In re Ochiai,124° the Federal Circuit held that a claimed process
is not prima facie obvious based solely on its conventional nature
where the process involves a novel, nonobvious compound. 4'
Recently enacted legislation amended 35 U.S.C. § 103 to provide
statutory authority for this rule. 242 This provision, however, was
limited to certain biotechnology process inventions.243 Through
its holding in Ochiai,'2" the Federal Circuit has essentially facilitat-
ed the general application of this new legislation. 24
The subject matter of the application was a process for preparing
a cephem compound having antibiotic properties.'246 Specifically,
the claimed process required the reaction of the acyl side chain of a
particular organic acid having a 2-aminothiazolyl group with certain
amines.147 The novelty and nonobviousness of the organic acid
starting material and the cephem product was not in dispute.
248
1236. Id at 1559, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215 (reaffirming In reBell, 991 F.2d 781,785, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
1237. Id-, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215 (citing with approval In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 29
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
1238. 1L at 1558-59, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
1239. !ML at 1558, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
1240. 71 F.3d 1565, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1241. In reOchiai, 71 F.d 1565, 1569-70, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1242. Pub. L. No. 104-41, 109 Stat. 351 (1995) (amending § 103).
1243. Id.
1244. Id.
1245. For an insightful discussion of Ochiai and the legislative amendments to § 103, see
Harold C. Wegner, Process Patents and Ochiai: Return To Kongo Rot (1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file ith The American University Law Review).
1246. Ochiai, 71 F.3d at 1566-67, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128-29. The application at issue
was U.S. Application Serial No. 07/462,292. Id. at 1566, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
1247. Id. at 1566-67, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128-29.
1248. I4, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128-29.
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The patent examiner nevertheless rejected the process claims as
obvious over six prior art references.124 Although the prior art
described a standard acylation process for producing cephem
compounds with the claimed amines, the prior art contained no
suggestion or motivation to make the claimed cephem compounds
using the claimed organic acids.12 °
The Board upheld the patent examiner's obviousness rejec-
tion.121 The patentability of the starting materials or final prod-
ucts, the Board ruled, was irrelevant to the obviousness of the claimed
process. 12 2  Relying on the Federal Circuit's holding in In re
Durden,1"' the Board concluded that the claimed process was
obvious based on the routine nature of the acylation reaction, which
the prior art amply demonstrated. 124
On appeal, the parties asserted that an irreconcilable conflict
existed in the relevant Federal Circuit precedent. 12 5 The Federal
Circuit disagreed, stating that despite the existence of "minor
tensions" in these opinions, the actual holdings presented no actual
conflict.' 56 The court emphasized that the precedent was in clear
agreement concerning the inappropriateness of per se rules in the
fact-specific obviousness inquiry.1" In this case, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the those of ordinary skill in the art could hardly have
chosen the novel, nonobvious, claimed organic acid starting material
to acylate the known amine to produce the claimed cephem com-
pounds.12 8  The court discounted the Board's reliance on an
asserted similarity between the claimed organic acids and those
described in the prior art.129 The absence in the prior art of any
teaching or suggestion to obtain the particular claimed cephem
1249. Id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128-29.
1250. Id. at 1567-68, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
1251. Id. at 1568, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
1252. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
1253. 763 F.2d 1406, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1254. Ochiai, 71 F.3d at 1568-69, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
1255. See id. at 1571-72, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132. CompareIn reDurden, 763 F.2d 1406,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding rejections for obviousness of chemical
processes), In reAlbertson, 332 F.2d 379, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 730 (C.C.P. 1964) (same), and
In re Larsen, 292 F.2d 531, 130 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 209 (C.C.PA 1961) (same) with In re
Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d 823, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reversing rejections
for obviousness of chemical processes), In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303
(C.C.PA 1974) (same), andIn reKuehl, 475 F.2d 658, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 250 (G.C.PA. 1973)
(same).
1256. Ochiai, 71 F.3d at 1571, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
1257. Id. at 1571-72, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
1258. IL at 1569-70, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
1259. Id at 1570-71, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131-32.
1640
1995 PATENT LAW DECISIONS
products by the claimed process mandated the conclusion of
nonobviousness. 1260 The Federal Circuit thus reversed the Board's
decision.
1 261
In In re Chu,262 the Federal Circuit held that the USPTO may
not disregard evidence and arguments that an applicant proffers to
traverse an obviousness rejection simply because the specification does
not contain this information.123 The court reiterated that a proper
obviousness inquiry entails a consideration of the totality of the
record.121 On the merits, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
features which distinguished the claimed invention over the prior art
were not mere design choices and would not have been obvious to
one skilled in the art.1265  The court thus reversed the Board's
decision.
1 216
The subject matter of the claims involved a device to control fossil
fuel emissions following combustion in boilers. 267  The patent
examiner rejected the claims as obvious in view of two prior art
patents ("Doyle" and "Szymanski") .12' According to the examiner,
the Doyle patent disclosed a device having all the claimed elements
except a housing for fabric filter bags, which contained bag retainers
with a selective catalytic reduction catalyst inside.1269 In addition,
the Szymanski patent taught a filter containing a catalyst in the filter
fabric rather than in the bag retainer.1
270
Chu responded that Doyle was not prior art, because Chu's appli-
cation was a continuation-in-part of the application from which the
Doyle patent issued. Furthermore, Chu argued that in any event
neither patent even suggested placing the catalyst in the bag retainers
as claimed. 72 Chu asserted that this placement provided the
1260. Id. at 1570, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
1261. Id. at 1572, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133, rev' 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1265 (Rd. Pat.
App. & Interferences 1992).
1262. 66 F.d 292, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1263. In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 298, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1264. See id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094 (quoting In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1265. Id. at 299, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095.
1266. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095.
1267. Id at 294-95, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090-92. The application at issue was U.S.
Application Serial No. 07/593,546. Id. at 294, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
1268. Id. at 295, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1269. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1270. Id. at 296, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1271. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1272. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
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unexpected advantage of stability during pulsejet cleaning.1273 Chu
also submitted technical evidence to support this assertion.'
274
The Board rejected Chu's first contention, reasoning that the Doyle
patent was prior art under the circumstances because of the lack of
complete identity of inventors between the applications.'271 In
addition, the Board concluded that the claimed catalyst placement
was an obvious variation as a mere design choice.1276 In so ruling,
the Board found Chu's evidence unpersuasive because the specifica-
tion made no mention of such an unexpected property.
12 77
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board's conclusion regarding
the prior art effect of the Doyle patent but for a different rea-
son.1278  The court held that Chu was not entitled to rely on the
filing date of the Doyle patent application because it did not disclose
the subject matter that Chu now claimed. 1279 The Doyle patent was
thus prior art to Chu's application. 28° The appellate court, howev-
er, concluded that the Board erred in discounting the impact of
Chu's rebuttal evidence concerning catalyst placement. 281 The
Federal Circuit noted the absence of any legal authority holding that
the failure to specify an unexpected property of the invention in the
specification constitutes a waiver of any such subsequent argument to
overcome an obviousness rejection.282 Moreover, on the totality of
the record, Chu's claimed invention would not have been obvious in
view of the prior art patents. 283
In In re Soni, 284 the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's decision,
which upheld the patent examiner's final rejection of the claims as
obvious.' 82  The subject matter of the application involved conduc-
tive polymer compositions.' 2 6 In rebuttal to the patent examiner's
rejection of the claims as prima facie obvious, Soni argued that the
claimed compositions exhibited unexpectedly improved physical and
1273. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1274. Id. at 299, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095.
1275. Id. at 296, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1276. It at 298, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1277. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1278. Id. at 297, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
1279. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
1280. X. 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
1281. It at 298, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094.
1282. Id. at 299, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095.
1283. I., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095.
1284. 54 F.3d 746, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1684 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1285. In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 74849, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1684, 1685-86 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1286. it at 747-48, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685. The application at issue was U.S.
Application Serial No. 07/462,893. Id. at 747, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
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electrical properties compared to lower-weight prior art composi-
tions.128 7 Soni's contention failed to persuade the examiner or the
Board. 1'2  The Board noted especially that Soni's position was
unsupported by any data.128 9 The Federal Circuit disagreed, relying
on specific data in Soni's specification showing improved proper-
ties. 290 The court held that absent evidence to the contrary, an
applicant's assertion of surprise supported with a showing of substan-
tially improved results suffices to establish unexpected results. 29'
Given Soni's duty of candor, and the absence of a sound basis to
question Soni's assertion, the Federal Circuit held that the Board
clearly erred in finding that Soni did not establish unexpected
results.292
In In re GPAC Inc.,'2 9 . the Federal Circuit held that a proper
obviousness inquiry requires consideration of prior art not only in the
field of the invention, but also in analogous arts.1 294  The court
concluded that certain references cited by the patent examiner
constituted analogous prior art because they were "'reasonably
pertinent to the particular problem confronting the inventor. '"1295
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision, which upheld the
patent examiner's final rejection of the claims as obvious in light of
analogous prior art.
L1 296
The context of the case was a second reexamination proceeding
questioning the validity of GPAC's patent. 297  The USPTO had
issued a reexamination certificate after a first proceeding in which
GPAC overcame the patent examiner's rejections for anticipation and
obviousness. 298 The subject matter of the application involved the
control of airborne asbestos contamination during asbestos removal
from an existing building.' 299 To provide a stronger factual basis
for obviousness in the second reexamination, the patent examiner
1287. Id. at 748, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
1288. Id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
1289. Id at 749, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
1290. I& at 750, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
1291. Id. at 751, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
1292. IM., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
1293. 57 F.3d 1573, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1294. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1577-78, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir.
1995), affig 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1993).
1295. Id. at 1578,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120 (quoting In reWood, 599 F.2d 1032,1036,202
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 171, 174 (C.C.PA 1979)).
1296. Id. at 1576, 1581-84, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118, 1122-25.
1297. Id. at 1576, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118-19.
1298. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1299. Id. at 1575,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. The reexamination proceeding involved U.S.
Patent No. 4,604,111. Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
19961 1643
THE AMERICAN UNVERSITy LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1529
cited twelve references not before the USPTO in the first proceed-
ing.1300  The patent examiner used these twelve references in
combination with a principal reference to support an obviousness
rejection. 1" The Board upheld the rejection.11
2
The Federal Circuit recognized that the field of invention was
asbestos removal with containment control.130 3  In contrast, the
twelve references described dampers designed to stop the back flow
of air caused by negative pressure in a ventilation system.""0 4 The
court, however, concluded that although these references involved
different fields of endeavor, an inventor concerned primarily with
asbestos containment nonetheless logically would have considered
them.' 5 The Federal Circuit thus discerned no clear error in the
decision to consider these twelve secondary references as analogous
art.
1306
In In re Napier,3 °' the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's
decision, which upheld the patent examiner's final rejection of the
claims as obvious.' The subject matter of the application in-
volved noise-reduced auxiliary power units ("APUs") thatjet aircraft
use when on the ground.' 9 The patent examiner stated that the
claimed invention was obvious in view of a prior art patent issued to
Johnson, which taught a nozzle designed to reduce noise from jet
aircraft engines during takeoff.1310 Napier argued that one of
ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to apply the
teachings of Johnson regarding jet engines to accomplish noise
reduction in APUs. 3 11 The Board disagreed, holding that the
desire for significant aircraft noise reduction supplied the requisite
motivation. 1312 Discerning no clear error in the Board's findings,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision.'
313
1300. Id at 1576, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1301. M, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1302. 14-, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1303. Id. at 1578, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
1304. 1&, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
1305. Id. at 1578-79, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120-21.
1306. Id. at 1579, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
1307. 55 F.3d 610, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1308. In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 611, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1309. Id. at 612, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783. The application at issue involved U.S.
Application Serial No. 07/467,179. Id. at 611, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
1310. Id at 612-13, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
1311. Id. at 613, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
1312. Id. at 614, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785-86.
1313. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785-86.
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3. Disclosure requirements
To obtain patent protection, an inventor must set forth an adequate
written description of the invention."14 In addition, an inventor
must provide a disclosure sufficient to enable any person skilled in the
art to practice the invention.3 The adequacy of a written descrip-
tion is a question of fact that the Federal Circuit reviews for clear
error.
1316
In In re Brana, 317 the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's deci-
sion, which upheld the patent examiner's rejection of the claims of
the application for failure to satisfy the requirements of the first para-
graph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.13"8 As in Deuel, the court here considered
the technical realities of a biotechnology invention with traditional
patent law principles.131 9 The subject matter of the application
involved pharmaceutical compositions having antitumor activity in
humans.1
320
In the final office action, the patent examiner rejected the claims
of the application, because the specification failed to (1) "disclose a
specific disease against which the claimed compounds are useful" and
(2) "establish a reasonable expectation that the claimed compounds
had a practical utility."32 ' The Board upheld the examiner's
rejection under § 112, first paragraph, but stated that a rejection
under § 101 would likewise have been proper.
322
Regarding the examiner's first ground for rejection, the Federal
Circuit noted that the applicants had tested the claimed compounds
on tumor cell lines derived from animals suffering from lymphocytic
leukemias1 323 The court thus concluded that the disclosed amelio-
rative activity of the claimed compounds on tumor cells constituted
a proper allegation of sufficiently specific use. 3 24 As for the second
ground for rejection, the Federal Circuit held that the patent
examiner failed to satisfy the initial burden of challenging a presump-
1314. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
1315. See id.
1316. See Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc. 772 F.2d 1570, 1575, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
177, 179 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1317. 51 F.3d 1560, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1318. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1569, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1319. See supra notes 1216-39 and accompanying text (discussing Deueo.
1320. Brana, 51 F.3d at 1562, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38. The application at issue was
U.S. Application Serial No. 533,944. Id at 1562, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
1321. Id. at 1563-64, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439-40.
1322. Id. at 1564, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
1323. Id at 1565, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
1324. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
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tively correct assertion of utility in the disclosure.1 32' The court
noted that the prior art references upon which the Board relied did
not question the usefulness of any related compound as an antitumor
agent.1 326 Moreover, one of the references disclosed compounds,
structurally similar to those of the claimed invention, that possessed
proven in vivo effectiveness as chemotherapeutics againstvarious types
of tumors.' 27 The Federal Circuit held that even had the USPTO
satisfied its initial burden, the applicants provided evidence of
statistically significant animal tests sufficient to convince one skilled
in the art of the inventions' asserted utility.13 28 To require in vivo
human testing akin to Phase II clinical studies conducted by the Food
and Drug Administration would place a higher standard for § 112,
first paragraph, compliance on applicants seeking patent protection
for pharmaceuticals for humans.'
3 29
In Eiselstein v. Frank,330 the Federal Circuit affirmed part of the
Board's decision, upholding the interference examiner's determina-
tion that certain claims were invalid for anticipation.""3 ' Eiselstein
and Frank, respectively, owned an issued patent and a patent
application to the same invention of certain sturdy, tensile, and
corrosion-resistant, nickel-based alloys used to make deep-drilling
equipment in the mining and oil industries.3 3 2 In an interference
proceeding, Eiselstein claimed priority over Frank as the first inventor
of this subject matter.13  In particular, the parties both alleged
first invention of such a nickel-based alloy having a nickel content
"with nickel being at least about 50% of the alloy."lSs4 Although
the Eiselstein patent issued from an application filed in October 1986,
Eiselstein sought the benefit of the earlier effective filing date of April
1981, based on its "grandparent" application. 13 - This would ante-
date the May 1986 filing date of Frank's patent application.3 3 6 In
considering this issue, the examiner determined that certain claims
1325. Id at 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1326. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1327. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1328. I& at 1567, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42.
1329. Id at 1567-68, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
1330. 52 F.3d 1035, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1331. Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035,1036-37,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1467,1468-69 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
1332. Id. at 1036, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468. The interference involved U.S. Patent No.
4,788,036 (Eiselstein) and U.S. Application Serial No. 869,138 (Frank). Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1468.
1333. Id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
1334. Id. at 1037, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
1335. Id. at 1036-38, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468-69.
1336. Id at 1036, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
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of the Eiselstein patent were not entitled to the benefit of the filing
date of the grandparent application, because the grandparent
application did not adequately describe the invention claimed in the
Eiselstein patent.1117 Furthermore, the examiner decided that these
claims of the Eiselstein patent were invalid as anticipated by
Eiselstein's European patent application, which published in Decem-
ber 1982.1"s The issues of priority of invention and invalidity of
the claims of the Eiselstein patent therefore both depended on
whether the grandparent application contained an adequate written
description of the claimed invention. 39 Eiselstein appealed the
anticipation issue." °
The examiner's written description ruling relied on the fact that
the grandparent application recited a nickel content of "45% to 55%,"
whereas one set of claims of the Eiselstein patent specified a nickel
content of "about 50% to about 60%" ("claim set one"), while a
second set of claims stated a nickel content of "about 45% to 55%"
("claim set two"). " ' The Board upheld the examiner's finding of
inadequate written description as to claim set one and further held
claim set two unpatentable for the same reason." 2 The Federal
Circuit affirmed the Board's decision as to claim set one but reversed
as to claim set two.
l 34
As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit recited precedent that an
earlier application from which a party seeks a filing date benefit for
its later application need not contain a written description employing
the exact same words as those found in the later application." 4
The court noted that the grandparent application here used vague,
imprecise language to express amounts of metal contained in its
alloys.' 45 One skilled in the art, having read the grandparent
application, would interpret "45% to 55%" to mean "about 45% to
about 55%." 341 Because one skilled in the art would readily know
that Eiselstein possessed the subject matter claimed in claim set two
at the time of filing the grandparent application, claim set two of the
Eiselstein patent was entitled to the benefit of the earlier filing date
1337. Id. at 1037, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
1338. Id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
1339. Id. at 1038, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469-70.
1340. I&, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469-70.
1341. Id. at 1039, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.
1342. Id. at 1037, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
1343. Id. at 1039-40, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470-71.
1344. Id. at 1038-39, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.
1345. Id. at 1039, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
1346. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
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of the grandparent application."lM 7 The Federal Circuit thus held
that the Board clearly erred in finding claim set two invalid as
anticipated.1
348
As for claim set one, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's
decision."O The court found that however imprecise the grandpar-
ent application was regarding nickel content, that is, even if construed
as "about 45% to about 55%," the grandparent application simply did
not describe nickel-based alloys having "about 50% to about 60%" as
set forth in claim set one of the patent."' The disparity was just
too great.'3 5'
B. Patent Office Matters
During 1995, the Federal Circuit issued two precedential opinions
regarding aspects of practice before the USPTO.
1. Maintenance fees
After a patent issues, the patent holder must make periodic
payments of maintenance fees throughout the patent term."52 The
penalty for failure to pay the required fees in a timely manner is
expiration of the patent. 353  The Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks has discretion to accept late payments upon a showing of
unavoidable delay." 4 The applicable standard is the level of due
care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise.3 55
In Ray v. Lehman,l "5 6 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. 357 The
patent agent responsible for Ray's application retired from practice
after the patent issued in August 1984.1... Ray discovered in March
1990 that his patent had expired for failure to pay the maintenance
1347. Id. at 1039-40, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
1348. Id at 1040, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
1349. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
1350. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
1351. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
1352. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (1994) (mandating patent fees).
1353. Id.
1354. See id. § 41(c) (1) (discussing payment of maintenance fees).
1355. See Douglas v. Manbeck, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697, 1698, 1700 (E.D. Pa. 1991), affd
me., 975 F.2d 869 (Fed. Cir. 1992). A recent amendment to § 41 has lowered the standard for
patent expiration due to unintentional failure to pay the maintenance fees. Pub. L. No.
102-444, § 1, 106 Stat. 2245, 2245 (1992).
1356. 55 F.3d 606, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 304 (1995).
1357. Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 607, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1786 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 304 (1995).
1358. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786. The patent-in-suit was U.S. Patent No. 4,466,797.
Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
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fee due in 1988.1359 Ray's patent agent had been unable to contact
Ray."' Ray asserted lack of knowledge of the payment require-
ment, and filed a petition to reinstate his patent for failure to pay the
required maintenance fees.13" The Commissioner denied Ray's
initial and reconsideration petitions, finding that lack of knowledge
did not constitute unavoidable delay.'.. 2 The district court affirmed
the Commissioner's decision.'363
The Federal Circuit rejected Ray's contentions that the
Commissioner's standard for unavoidable delay here was inconsistent
with the analogous standard as used in other statutory provi-
sions.136 In addition, the Federal Circuit declined to decide
whether the USPTO has a duty to provide actual notice to patent
holders of the maintenance fee deadlines.3 6 5  The court noted




2. Admission to practice
Only registered patent agents and attorneys may practice before the
USPTO.l'3 7 In general, applicants for registration must possess
certain technical qualifications and pass the examination for
admission.'3
In Premysler v. Lehman, 69 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner.1370  The
Commissioner had denied an application to sit for the USPTO
registration examination. 3 7' The Commissioner concluded that
Premysler was unable to show the requisite technical expertise.'
3 72
The Federal Circuit held that the Commissioner did not abuse his
discretion by rejecting Premysler's application.'373
1359. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
1360. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
1361. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
1362. Id. at 608, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
1363. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
1364. Id. at 609, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
1365. Id. at 610, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
1366. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
1367. See35U.S.C.§ 31(1994) (providingthatCommissionermayissue regulations governing
attorneys and agents); 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.5-.18 (1995) (regulating which individuals may practice
before USPTO).
1368. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.7 (presenting requirements for registration).
1369. 71 F.Sd 387, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1370. Premysler v. Lehman, 71 F.3d 387, 388, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1995), af/'g 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1859 (D.D.C. 1994).
1371. Id. at 389, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
1372. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
1373. Id. at 390, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
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Premysler did not have a bachelor's degree in a scientific subject as
required by regulation. 1 7 4 He first sought to take the registration
examination in 1990, but the Office of Enrollment and Discipline
rejected his application." In 1990, an applicant could demon-
strate the requisite technical competence through scientific course
credit and practical experience."3 7" Already working with a regis-
tered patent attorney, Premysler enrolled in physics courses to satisfy
the requirements.1 377  In 1991, however, the requirements
changed. 378 By 1993, when Premysler again applied to sit for the
examination, the requirements no longer allowed the combination of
course credit and apprenticeship experience as proof of technical
competence.
1379
In any event, the Commissioner considered evidence of Premysler's
apprenticeship experience.' ° The Commissioner, however, found
the length and nature of Premysler's apprenticeship insufficient.'
The Commissioner thus denied Premysler's application." 2 The
Federal Circuit ascertained no reversible error in either the promulga-
tion of the interpretive rules or the Commissioner's actions.'-"'
IV. THEMES
This last section of the Article briefly considers jurisprudential
themes developed through the opinions of the court issued during
1995. Beyond the significance of the substantive patent law holdings
of this past year's cases, the decisions, particularly the in banc
decisions, appear to reflect an attempt by the Federal Circuit to
merge general legal principles with the arguably esoteric nature of the
patent law. Two themes are most apparent: (1) the Seventh Amend-
ment implications of parsing roles for the judge and the jury in the
resolution of particular individual patent law issues; and (2) the
inconsistency between the Federal Circuit's present standard of review
of USPTO decisions and the standard of review of agency decisions
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Repeated statements by the
court in both holdings and dicta this past year suggest a level of
1374. 1& at 388-89, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
1375. Id at 389, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
1376. Id at 388, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
1377. Id. at 389, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
1378. hIL, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
1379. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
1380. Ld at 390, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
1381. Id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
1382. I&, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
1383. It, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
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concern about these issues that will likely continue in the year to
come.
A. Roles ofJudge and Jury
On several occasions during 1995, the Federal Circuit visited the
issue of the respective roles of the judge and the jury in patent
cases.1 384 These instances have invoked a broad spectrum of reac-
tions by members of the court. Indeed, the various opinions in
Markman and Hilton Davis offered some dramatic statements regarding
this matter.'s 5 For example, in Markman, Judge Mayer concurred
in the judgment but vigorously criticized the majority's reasoning that
eliminated any role of the jury in proper claim construction.t 6
Judge Mayer wrote:
Today the court jettisons more than two hundred years of
jurisprudence and eviscerates the role of the jury preserved by the
Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; it
marks a sea change in the course of patent law that is nothing short
of bizarre. Sadly, this decision represents a secession from the
mainstream of the law. It portends turbulence and cynicism in
patent litigation. For this is not just about claim language, it is
about ejecting juries from infringement cases. All these pages and
all these words cannot camouflage what the court well knows: to
decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case.
But today's action is of a piece with a broader bid afoot to
essentially banish juries from patent cases altogether.... Declaim-
ing that the jury is a "black box" incapable of a "reasoned decision,"
several judges of the court have already advised that they are
aboard this campaign. The quest to free patent litigation from the
"unpredictability" of jury verdicts, and generalist judges, results
from insular dogmatism inspired by unwarrantable elitism; it is
unconstitutional. 3 8 7
1384. A likely cause of this is the steady increase in recent years of the relative number of
patent cases tried to ajury. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTs, ANNUAL REPORTS
OF THE DIREcrOR, 1975-1994, at Table C-4 (1995) (providing percentage statistics of patentjury
trials). In 1994, 70% of district court patent cases were jury trials, as compared with 11.9% in
1975.
1385. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1537, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) (Plager, Archer, Rich, & Lourie, JJ., dissenting)
("By today's opinion, the majority essentially blesses the continued unfettered use of the
doctrine of equivalents, at the discretion of ajury, noting that in some cases at least the ritual
chant will be quite sufficient justification for a rewriting of the claimed limitations."), cert.
granted; 116 S. Ct 1014 (1996).
1386. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,989-98,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1337-45 (Fed. Cir.) (in banc) (MayerJ, concurring), affid, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
1387. 1& at 989,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337-38 (MayerJ., concurring) (citations omitted).
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With Markman and Hilton Davis, the Federal Circuit clearly
committed claim construction to the judge, and the determination of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents to the jury. The
Federal Circuit's attention this past year to the roles of the judge and
the jury in patent cases is remarkable. Certainly, concerns over the
Seventh Amendment implications of delineations injury responsibility
in patent trials did not originate with Markman and Hilton Davis.'
In addition, the actual holdings in these cases represent only a
questionable shift in patentjurisprudence. Nonetheless, during 1995,
the Federal Circuit strongly developed a litigant's right to a jury
determination of specific patent issues as a theme in its opin-
ions.'m9
In In re Lockwood,'... the Federal Circuit issued an order granting
the petition by American Airlines, Inc., for a rehearing by the panel,
but denying its petition for a rehearing in banc.' 9' Lockwood had
sued American Airlines alleging infringement of its patents to
automated ticketing systems." 2 Lockwood's complaint included a
jury trial demand.1 9 American Airlines counterclaimed for a
declaratory judgment of noninfringement and, alternatively, patent
invalidity and unenforceability.1 94 On American Airline's motion,
the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringe-
ment.
1395
The district court decided not to certify the summary judgment for
interlocutory appeal but instead proceeded with trial on the remain-
ing issue of invalidity.396 Furthermore, the district court concluded
that the remaining claims were equitable in nature. 97 The district
court thus held that Lockwood was no longer entitled to a jury
1388. See, e.g., Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815,12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1508, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that patent jury trials are
subject to same rules as all jury trials); Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506,
1515, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 929, 937-38 (Fed. Cir.) (noting recent advent ofjury trials in patent
cases), cert. denieA, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547,
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (asserting that right to jury trial should not be
rationed).
1389. See infra notes 1390-1406 (discussing Federal Circuit's emphasis on role ofjury in In re
Lockwood).
1390. 50 F.3d 966, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1406 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. American
Airlines v. Lockwood, 115 S. Ct. 2274, and vacated, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995).
1391. In reLockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1406, 1407 (Fed. Cir.), vacated,
116 S. Ct. 29 (1995).
1392. Id. at 968, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407.
1393. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407.
1394. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407.
1395. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407.
1396. Id. at 968-69, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
1397. Id. at 969, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
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trial.1893 Lockwood petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of
mandamus to direct the district court to reinstate the jury de-
mand.3 99
In a nonprecedential order, the Federal Circuit granted Lockwood's
petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to
reinstate its jury demand.' On American Airline's petition for
rehearing and rehearing in banc, the Federal Circuit characterized
American Airline's declaratory judgment suit as an inversion of an
infringement action involving an affirmative defense of patent
invalidity.' The court therefore held that the equitable nature
of the declaratory judgment action did not divest Lockwood of its
Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury on the issue of patent
validity.1402
Judge Nies, joined by Chief Judge Archer and Judge Plager,
dissented from the denial of a rehearing in banc."'J As an initial
matter, the dissenting opinion commented that the Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial in patent infringement cases does not
delineate the respective roles of judge and jury in resolving the
individual issues involved. 11°4 In addition, the dissent noted the
absence of Supreme Court precedent as to whether a litigant has a
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on the factual questions
underlying an issue of law."4 5 The Supreme Court resolved this
issue in April 1996, affirming the Federal Circuit's decision in
Markman.
14°6
B. Judicial Deference to the USPTO
The Administrative Procedure Act sets forth a standard for judicial
review of federal agency determinations."07 The Federal Circuit
1398. Id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
1399. M, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
1400. Id. at 968, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407.
1401. Id. at 974-75, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412-13.
1402. Id. at 980, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417.
1403. M, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (Nies,J., dissenting).
1404. Id at 981, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (Nies,J., dissenting).
1405. d. at 989, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1916 (Nies, J., dissenting).
1406. 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (holding that relegation of claim construction exclusively to
judge did not violate Seventh Amendment, but rather fostered consistency in patent
infringement case resolution).
1407. Administrative Procedure Act, 324, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243-44 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)). The statute provides that the reviewing court shall:
"(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."
5 U.S.C. § 706.
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presently applies the same standard of review in appeals from the
United States district courts and the USPTO.14 " The court reviews
questions of law de novo' 409 and questions of fact for clear er-
ror.4"° With regard to the Federal Circuit's review of the USPTO's
factual findings, the presently applied clearly erroneous standard is
more stringent than the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard.'4
Particularly since the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,1412 the USPTO has asserted
entitlement to the judicial deference accorded other federal agen-
cies. 1413  However, the presumed agency expertise rationale, which
typically militates forjudicial deference to agency actions, may be less
significant with the USPTO.1414 The specialized subject matter
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and the exclusivity of its appellate
relationship with the USPTO, arguably undercut the basis forjudicial
deference under the APA.
1415
In any event, the USPTO has adopted the practice of raising the
standard of review issue in its briefs to the Federal Circuit. For
1408. Compare Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that
Federal Circuit applies clearly erroneous rule to district court's findings of fact and upholds their
legal conclusions unless they are incorrect) wth In reKulling, 897 F.2d 1147,1149, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1056, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting Federal Circuit is bound by USPTO's findings of fact
unless clearly erroneous) and In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 3 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (observing that standard for reviewing legal conclusions of USPTO "is correctness or
error as a matter of law").
1409. See, e.g., In reDonaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189,1192,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845,1848 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (in banc) (noting questions of law receive de novo review); In re Kathawala, 9 F.3d
942, 945, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785, 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (same); In re Caveney, 761 F.2d at
674, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 3 (same).
1410. See, eg., In reBaxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1283
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that questions of fact are not reversed unless clearly erroneous); In re
Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1577, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934, 1935 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (same); In
re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 703, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 191, 195 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same).
1411. See, e.g., In reNapier, 55 F.3d 610,614,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(acknowledging that current standard of review is "more stringent than" APA's standard); In re
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1569, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding Board's error
reversible under both clear error and arbitrary and capricious standards and declining to address
change from dearly erroneous standard).
1412. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For an excellent discussion of the applicability of Chevron
deference to the USPTO, see RL Carl MoyJudidalDeferene to the PTO's Interpretations of the Patent
Law, 74J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 406, 426-39 (1992).
1413. See Napier, 55 F.3d at 614,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785 (rejecting Commissioner's plea
to apply APA standard of review to USPTO decisions); Brana, 51 F.3d at 1568-69, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1443 (noting Commissioner's contention that USPTO decisions should be accorded
deferential standard of review).
1414. See Moy, supra note 1412, at 434-35 (considering assumptions upon which Supreme
Court's holding in Chevron rests).
1415. See Moy, supra note 1412, at 435 (noting Federal Circuit was given doctrinal
responsibility for patent law in order to increase expertise of court).
1995 PATENT LAW DECISIONS
example, in In re Wodkiewicz, 1'4 16 the principal brief of the USPTO
Solicitor contained the following footnote:
The Commissioner believes that the standard of review for factual
determinations made by the agency should be the arbitrary and
capricious standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 706. However, in this case the findings are not clearly
erroneous and thus should survive review under either standard.
See In re Napier, No. 93-1363, slip op. at 9 (Fed. Cir. May 22,
1995) .1417
In two precedential opinions during 1995, the Federal Circuit
recognized the USPTO's position on this matter but declined to
decide the issue. In In re Brana,418 the Federal Circuit held that
the disposition of the case did not turn on the standard of re-
view.1 419  Similarly, in In re Napier,1421 the Federal Circuit held it
unnecessary to decide the question. 4 '1 The respective opinions of
the court in Brana and Napier make clear that the Federal Circuit will
not consider the appropriate standard of review of USPTO determina-
tions until faced squarely with an appeal in which the standard of
review will dictate the outcome. Perhaps the Federal Circuit will
decide such an appeal in 1996.
CONCLUSION
The majority of the precedential opinions issued by the Federal
Circuit during 1995 concerned matters of enforcing patent rights
rather than obtaining patent rights. During this past year, the court
repeatedly addressed issues involving the more procedural aspects of
patent litigation. The impact of trial procedure on the disposition of
substantive patent issues will likely continue to receive attention by the
Federal Circuit even after the Supreme Court's review in 1996 of the
respective roles of judge and jury in patent cases.
1416. 66 F.3d 347 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (mem.).
1417. Brief for Appellee at 12 n.1, In re Wodkiewicz, 66 F.3d 347 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-
1280).
1418. 51 F.3d 1560, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1419. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1569, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1420. 55 F.3d 610, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1421. In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 614, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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